Book Review
The Glory Years 1805-1807
Napoleon and Austerlitz
Reviewed by John Cook
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by Scott Bowden
According to the dust jacket, Scott Bowden "Skilfully and painstakingly" drew "upon a vast array of historical sources, including French, Austrian and Russian army archives". I think it is not unreasonable to infer, therefore, that he exploited all available official, and other, records held in the national repositories of the principal participants in this campaign. Although it is possible to accept that the he appears to have done so in the context of the French, insofar as he quotes individual documents from the French archives, this cannot be said of the Austrians and Russians. If he has exploited the "combination of archival documents in France, Austria and Russia" that he claims to have done in his preface, the reader is entitled to ask why he depends so heavily on secondary and tertiary material when he comes to discuss the allies. Why, one wonders, has the author not been equally precise with his identification of Austrian and Russian material, which, after all, is no less a part of the provenance of the book. He alludes to the Austrian Kriegsarchiv, unidentified "smaller archival collections throughout Germany", and "an extensive collection of regimental histories in the Russian army archives", which we are told are "in Saint Petersberg", and so on. On close examination, however, it is impossible to identify a single archival source, in the context of the allies, that compares in specificity with those Bowden deploys for the French. Why has this author not displayed the detail of the Austrian and Russian material he claims to have used? In my opinion, the inference of this nebulous documentation is that Bowden has not used the archival material he claims to have done. The absolute rubbish that he writes about the allied armies tends, in my view, to confirm such a supposition. The preface tells us that the principal primary sources were 193 cartons of material from the French archives, from which Bowden identifies the individual documents alluded to earlier. So, one can say, straight away, that this is going to have a heavy French bias and, sure enough, this is evident from the outset. What, then, do we get for the £ 35 which is the asking price in UK. Part I comprises a single chapter, 80 pages long, which describes the nature of the Grand Army. This is a useful summary which goes a long way to explaining how Napoleon was able to inflict such overwhelming defeats on his enemies. He had spent two years preparing it! This is a useful description of how the tool Napoleon wielded in 1805 and 1806 was trained. If only the rest of the book was of the same standard. We now come to the first of many bad parts. Part II consists of two chapters and deals with the Russian and Austrian armies. Bearing in mind that this book is hyped on the basis of archival research, the need for the extensive use of Stein's two volume recently re-published 1885 history of the Russian army, and Wrede's multi-volume official history of the Austrian army, written at the turn of the century and also recently re-published, is not understood. Furthermore, if the author has had access to Russian and Austrian archives, why was it necessary to use Christopher Duffy's Russia's Military Way to the West, which doesn't go beyond 1800, the same author's 1977 study of Austerlitz, and The Army of Maria Theresa which has no relevance to that of 1805 as its cut-off date is 1780, and Rothenberg's The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814? Where are the results of his archival research? What we have here is the uncritical recycling of published secondary and tertiary material. This is not acceptable in a book that is sold in large part on the basis of original research. There are numerous statements and references that deserve critical attention but there is only room here to examine a few of them. Chapter II to Part II describes the Russian army in 1805 and on p96 we are told that there were four standing armies. The footnote refers to Duffy's Russia's Military Way to the West (RMWW) p126, where we find that this describes a 1777 proposal by Count Pert Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev, which was, apparently, never adopted. On pp98-99 Bowden gives the strength of a Russian infantry battalion as "738 combatants". Turning to the reference in the footnote, von Stein's Geschichte des Russischen Heeres Vol1 p245, there are some tables to be found, but where this figure comes from is unclear as it does not appear in the context of unit strengths. Indeed, where Bowden obtained all of his figure from in this context is unclear - they certainly did not appear to come from the quoted reference. This part of Stein is concerned with the maintenance costs of various units in 1802, and we find that 738 is the pay in roubles received by a lieutenant colonel in the dragoons and hussars. Perhaps it is coincidence that the pay of these officers and the strength of a battalion were the same figure. On p100 Bowden discusses the composition of the Russian guard infantry. Using Stein as the provenance again, Bowden alludes to an organisation extant during the reign of Paul I. One turns to the page indicated in Stein to find that there is nothing whatever to substantiate Bowden's assertion that a guard infantry regiment comprised two battalions of musketeers and one of grenadiers, or that the grenadier battalion was detached from each to form a three battalion 'Guard Grenadier' regiment in the field. This whole passage is just rubbish. The 'Guard Grenadier' regiment alluded to was, in fact, the Leib-Grenadier regiment, the senior regiment of the line. There is more of the same on p101 where, presumably to demonstrate the archaic nature of the Russian army, Bowden states quite confidently that Russian musketeers were still wearing bicornes in 1805, on the grounds that it would have been impossible to implement the change to shakos in the time available. In the first place, he does not tell us how he knows this, except by a reference to a magazine article by himself in the context of the French 1812 uniform! In the second he has got his facts wrong. Although it is quite true that all Russian infantry were authorised shakos in February 1805, they did not replace bicornes in the musketeer regiments, as Bowden thinks. Reference to Mark Conrad's exemplary translation of Viskovatov, which has been available since 1994, would have told Bowden that bicornes had already been replaced by an earlier pattern felt shako in August 1803. Furthermore, Zweguintzow, another source quoted by Bowden, says that the guard received shakos in 1804. Thus, although it is possible to accept that Russian grenadiers regiments might still have been wearing mitres in December 1805, as their shakos were not authorised until February 1805, we can be confident that the only infantry wearing bicornes was the French. The regimental tables are simply awful, so inaccurate are they. This is not excusable as the correct information is readily available in Conrad, for example. Space simply precludes listing the multitude of similarly misleading and inaccurate references, most of which would have been avoided if Bowden had researched the subject thoroughly, or simply read the secondary and tertiary sources he had in front of him. Chapter III to Part II dealing with the Austrians is more of the same old rubbish. On p124 footnote 15 refers to Gallina's Beiträge zur Geschichte des österreichischen Heerwesens, a secondary work published in 1872, specifically 'Suggestions for the drill and Evolutions of Foot'. Now, Gallina wrote in German and no part of his work was given an English title; except by Gunther Rothenberg in his The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814, at footnote 22 to p87. The wording and reference are identical. This, of course, could be coincidence, couldn't it?. The regimental tables, like the Russian ones, should be treated with extreme caution. I don't think there is much to be gained exposing similar second-rate 'research', but the footnotes to the Chapter show that it is replete with secondary and tertiary source material. Where are the results of the authors alleged archival research? There is none to be found here. The host of errors only leads to the conclusion that Bowden does not really know much about his subject. In Chapter IV to Part III Bowden gives his prejudices given full rein. His contempt for all the Continental absolute monarchs is evident throughout; even poor old mad King George III, a constitutional monarch, who wielded far less personal power than Napoleon, or any other absolute monarch for that matter, is referred to as an oligarch. He must have been, did not Napoleon himself say so on St Helena? This is the level of Bowden's archival research. The English (sic), the reader is told, apparently feared that the ideals of freedom in Napoleonic France would spread to their countrymen. Napoleonic France, let us be clear, was a thoroughly undemocratic country and although it certainly had 'democratic' institutions, the democratic process was woefully absent from their proceedings. Democracy in Napoleonic France was an unrepresentative, powerless and servile facade. Bowden goes on to say that there was a fear that Napoleonic ideals might infect the "slaves" of Britain's "far-flung Empire". Never mind that there was no British Empire as such at this period, but these are also the same Napoleonic ideals that re-introduced slavery into the French colonies after it had been abolished by the Convention? This drivel, remember, is being peddled by an American, which makes it doubly asinine to refer critically to British slavery (which was abolished in 1807) at a time when the US economy depended on the products of the plantations of Virginia and Carolina, whose owners worked their properties with black slave-labour, and continued to do so until the 1860's. If one comment, above all others, shows that Bowden's understanding of British social history is as weak as his prejudices are strong, is his discussion of the Act of Union of 1801 which apparently calls into question the "self-righteousness of the English (sic)" in the context of their objection to the French annexation of Piedmont. He ignores the simple fact that, for better or worse, Ireland was a British possession at the time, whilst Piedmont was a foreign country which Napoleon seized. Furthermore, he needs lessons in 400 years of British social and political history, which space precludes giving him here, before he starts pontificating on matters about which he clearly understands nothing. What, the reader may well ask, has all this got to do with Austerlitz. A very good question. The square root of not a lot. Eventually, Bowden does get back on track, and we get 92 pages in Chapter V devoted to a description of the destruction of Mack at Ulm, albeit principally from the French viewpoint. The Austerlitz campaign is described at Part IV in the subsequent 164 pages. This is divided into four chapters and takes us to the end of the book. Although we do get glimpses of the 'other side of the hill', the description continues to be based largely on French material, including a significant proportion of published, in contrast to archival, material. The French bias remains, but the very detailed accounts at the tactical level are extremely well executed. In the accounts of the French army in action we find the infantry going through the entire repertoire of the training they received in the Channel camps, skirmishing, defending and attacking in lines, attacking in half battalion columns, double-company columns and so on. The tactical versatility of the French, particularly the infantry, is very evident. On the other hand where sources, other than French ones, such as Adolenko and Willbold, give an account that conflicts with the French, they are ignored. The Austrians and Russians, receive much less attention generally and one is left with an image of stupidity and barbarity respectively. There must, of course, be more to it than that but the limitations of the source material used by this author, and the resulting bias, exacerbated by his own predilections, prevent the formation of any clear idea of the relative capabilities of the allies. We find poaching from other sources evident again on p324 in his account of the attack on Telnitz by Kienmayer, which he footnotes as coming from Stutterheim. Bowden has the 2nd Szeklers supported by the 1st Szeklers and Border Croats. Duffy, also using Stutterheim in his 1977 Austerlitz 1805, says the same thing. Examination of Stutterheim, however, shows that the Austrian, a primary source who was on the spot, says that Kienmayer committed 1st Szeklers initially and that he then ordered General Carneville to advance with the remainder of his infantry. The remainder of his infantry, therefore, comprising 2nd Szeklers and Border Croats, supported the 1st Szeklers, and not as Bowden and Duffy have it. The only explanation for this that I can think of is that Bowden copied from Duffy, claiming to have taken it from Stutterheim, but repeated Duffy's error. It could, on the other hand, be a simple coincidence that Duffy and Bowden made the same transcription error, some 20 years apart. The accounts of the fighting are supported by numerous maps which 'zoom' into the relevant part of battlefield to give a better understanding than words alone could do and this is an idea that could be used to advantage in any book of this kind. The maps, however, could have been better. Many do not have a scale bar or a north arrow, north is not always at the top, and contour lines are not always marked. These inconsistencies occur throughout the book and should have been reconciled before publication. A final example of Bowden's obsessive anglophilia, which is irresistible, concerns Soult and can be found on p432. This particular marshal suggested 'Duke of Austerlitz' for himself, when titles were being dished out in 1808. Napoleon, apparently, refused him. Bowden deploys two sources to support his contention that Soult did not deserve it and that it was all a British plot to make Wellington appear better than he was! No, wait, there is a kind of logic to it. The first source is a Captain Vincent, a courier from Vandamme's division, who was sent by Vandamme to carry any orders that were forthcoming from Soult. There were, apparently, none. The other is Thiébault, a brigade commander, who Bowden concedes "had nothing good to say about anyone" yet on the other hand says "cannot be dismissed". According to Bowden, "despite these two eyewitnesses some English (sic) historians", support Soult's claim and "cry out in righteous indignation that by the Emperor denying the marshal a title that included the name Austerlitz, Soult became an injured party in Napoleon's never-ending quest for self-aggrandisement." He then names Paddy Griffith and David Chandler as amongst "Johnny-come-lately supporters of the calculating and egomaniacal Soult" to whom Thiébault is the "best possible response". Oh really? Thiébault the best possible response? By Bowden's own admission he is unreliable. The French historian Claude Manceron also has some very uncomplimentary things to say about Thiébault in his study Austerlitz where, in essence, he describes him as a bloodthirsty braggart, and it is evident that he and Soult detested each other. Furthermore, Col Elting agrees with Bowden's own assessment in the introduction to this turgid book, where he admonishes Bowden for using Thiébault and, in a review of another recent work, Elting further describes Thiébault as "long recognised as unreliable", whose memoirs were "the product of imaginative ghost writers." So, in order to criticise Griffith and Chandler, Bowden deploys just two sources. One a junior officer who was outside the chain of command and decision making the process, the other an unreliable and biased brigade commander, who did not like his corps commander, with who knows what axes to grind. On this basis, Griffith and Chandler are then accused, together with others unnamed English (sic) authors, of "supporting this imposture" in an attempt "to build up Soult's battlefield reputation as one of Napoleonic France's greatest leaders so his later defeat at the hands of the Duke of Wellington can be seen to be an all the more brilliant feat of arms, while also doubling as a way to denigrate Napoleon, is as clumsy as it is transparent as it is inaccurate." So, without producing any evidence, Bowden proceeds to infer something that exists only in his productive imagination. His views, nevertheless are significant, not because they represent the truth, for in any substantial sense, they do not, but rather because they are typical of the prejudices evident in Bowden's work. This rambling and ridiculous tirade virtually removes any claim Bowden has as a serious historical writer. His unnecessary rudeness towards David Chandler and Paddy Griffith is just unacceptable. The remaining pages comprise orders of battle and a bibliography. There is no index, which is most unusual in a book of this kind and makes it very difficult to refer to. The orders of battle are obligatory these days and will be useful to wargamers. Some of them should, however, be treated with great care. Russian transliterations are a mess, largely Germanic published By Greenhill books in origin and presumably taken from Stein. They are also inaccurate and incomplete and, in the case of the Austrians, where the numbers have been rounded off, of unknown provenance and suspect. The Biography contains a list of the works which, one presumes, were consulted in writing the book. If so, what on earth is Mercer's Journal of the Waterloo Campaign and Bowden's own Armies of Waterloo doing there, to mention but two works which have no place in it? The bibliography contains a number of such works and the ungenerous might conclude that they were padding, designed to give the book an air of authority. Finally, on page 525 there is an entry under "Derselbe", who apparently wrote Die Schlacht bei Austerlitz. Now, 'Derselbe' actually means 'the same' in German and the real author of this particular 1898 work was Janetschek! The only explanation I can think of is that Bowden has simply lifted it from somebody else's bibliography without knowing what it meant. This tends to raise questions about the provenance of large parts of this book and his ability to exploit German language sources. The book is cheap for its size, but it is not worth more. It comprises 528 pages, measures 8 1/2 x 11 x 1 1/2 , and weighs approximately 4 1/2 lbs. It is certainly a big book but, as we all know, size isn't everything. It is a biased and incomplete account of the 1805 campaigns, based heavily on French sources at the expense of Austrian and Russian. It should not be inferred, however, that the book is entirely without value, but of the whole, approximately one third is worth preserving. The rest would be better recycled into something. More Reader's Reviews
Die Vorgeschichte, Gründung und fröhe Entwicklung The Glory Years 1805-1807 Napoleonic Weekend (video) Wellington's War L'Epopee Napoleonienne 1815: The Waterloo Campaign The Eagle Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #40 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |