"Gallantry and Discipline"

Part 4

by Mark Clayton, U. K.

An analysis of the outlook and morale of British soldiers in the Peninsular War and Waterloo Campaign, (1807 - 15).

The morale and discipline of British Infantry was such that, throughout the Peninsular War, hardly any unit seems to have been routed. They were forced to retreat many times, in the face of superior number, or stiff resistance, but I have found only one instance when they lost all discipline, ignored their officers and fled, - such as Spanish troops did at Talavera, and much of the French Army did at Vitoria and Waterloo. Of course this was to a large extent due to the success of British strategy and tactics, but it was also due to the steadiness of their discipline and morale.

Colbourn's brigade at Albuera suffered the disaster most infantry feared, - being charged by cavalry when unprepared and 1,250 out of 1,650 were killed wounded or taken prisoner. Yet rather than flee, many troops banded together in groups of six or eight, and did the best they could to stand and fight. The same was done by the 69th and 42nd at Quatre Bras when unexpectedly attacked by French Lancers and Cuirassiers.

However, not all British soldiers were models of discipline. The cavalry, in general, were too impetuous and lacked the discipline to stop and reform when ordered to do so. They usually galloped when charging, and just concentrating on staying seated and keeping an approximation of the ranks left little attention for sudden commands. They sometimes lost the order of their ranks so becoming a mob of individuals, rather than a body to be commanded, and either charged too far as did the 13th Dragoons- at Los Santos (April 1811: Long) and the Scots Greys at Waterloo; or just dispersed, and disappeared to the rear, as did many of the inexperienced Household Brigade at Waterloo who "did not know where to assemble after the charge". (Tomkinson). This was largely due to their inadequate training, for British cavalry were not taught to disperse and then form again "which of all things before an enemy is the most essential." (Tomkinson).

But it was also probably due to the character and backgrounds of the officers and men that formed the British cavalry, which was the most aristocratic of the three arms. Lt. Gronow quoted the French Marshal "Excelmann" (Kellerman?) after Waterloo as commenting, "The British cavalry officer seems to be impressed with the conviction that he can dash and ride over everything; as if the art of war were precisely the same as that of fox- hunting", - an opinion which Gronow respected.

Yet battle also brought out other elements in British soldiers' mentality. As observed above, war was a great hardener of men's feelings, and this was particularly so in battle with numerous sights of horrific carnage. Several writers record horrible sights that they would never forget, - and which show that amidst the killing and destruction, they still preserved feelings for their fellow men.

Many of the survivors in Mercer's battery did not get a wink of sleep in the night after the battle of Waterloo for the sight of Driver Crammond who had only a bloody visage of his head remaining, and whose eyes transfixed the other men. Tomkinson, Harris, and Costello also noted fearful wounds they saw, - from direct hits of cannon balls, and sabre cuts. They indicate the `stupefaction' of the soldiers' natural humanity, and the stimulation of their instincts for self-preservation, - by their discipline, their sense of duty and honour, their familiarity with the horrors of war, and perhaps also by intoxicating drink, - that was necessary for them to kill and be killed.

If a soldier was wounded in battle, it was, as seen above, generally expected that everything possible should be done for him, - but this was according to the medical standards of the day which were not high. There were hospitals and these were the obvious places to transport the wounded to, as the only places where they could rest and receive attention. But medical knowledge was not very developed and little was expected of it.

The main role of surgeons was knowing when and how to amputate limbs, and even this was by some distrusted, e.g. Tomkinson, who thought British surgeons were too hasty in cutting off limbs. There were few complaints among the troops about the large number of men who died in the hospitals, (mainly from disease), but it seems to have been an accepted fact of life. Apart from amputation and bleeding, there was little that could be done except to make the wounded comfortable, and attend to their immediate needs, e.g. changing dressings so that the wounds should not become maggot-ridden.

There were perhaps more complaints about the lack of religious provision for the troops. "The people of England little think how her soldiers are neglected respecting spiritual aid, or I believe it would not be so." (Wheeler). All regiments were officially meant to have a chaplain but few did so, or only had a surrogate to read the service on Sundays. Those chaplains that there were seem to have spent their time hunting or otherwise enjoying themselves away from the troops in the field, and in the hospitals.

Despite this, some British soldiers at least, were not irreligious, particularly in battle. Wheatley and Mercer thanked God for preserving them, and Costello, wounded at Badajoz, prayed for the first time in years. Morris frequently attended church in Antwerp, - and Wheeler was prejudiced against the Catholic clergy in Spain. Hennell wrote in July, 1813, "Old soldiers knew well what a ball can do, & many feel more than they express, though I believe we shall not be charged with being unfaithful." Some took a fatalistic approach, and tried not to worry too much about death; - according to Wheatley, "All soldiers are predesinarians, and if `tis preordained I should fall, I'll die with credit I hope."

Such spirit I think was fairly typical of British soldiers. Their training, comradeship, concepts of duty, honour and chivalry, their mixed attitudes towards the French, Portuguese and Spanish, and their confidence in themselves and their leaders, confirmed by experience, - was an outlook that produced a high standard of discipline and morale on the battlefield. However, it should not be imagined that this was unique to the British, - France, Prussia, Austria, Poland, Russia all had well disciplined armies. The French defeat in the Peninsular War cannot be explained by the British being better troops, but a complex variety of factors; - of British advantages, e.g. in strategy and tactics; - and of French disadvantages, e.g. the guerrilla problem and the over stretching of French resources between Russia, the German States, and Spain 1812 - 13.

It would be interesting to examine the attitudes and outlook of other Napoleonic armies and see how they affected their morale and performance on the battlefield. On campaign, British soldiers showed a strange mixture of disciplined perseverance, humanity and chivalry, - and criminal debauchery and rapacity. But on the battlefield, they have a splendid record of discipline and courage. They may have been "the scum of the earth", but their commander was proud of them, - "His majesty and the public have a right to expect from us that we should place a reasonable confidence in the gallantry and discipline of the troops under our command; and I have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having tried them frequently, they have never failed me." (Wellington).

APPENDIX

The highest regimental rank achieved by the principal original authors examined.

RankNameBibliography
Number
Lieutenant-GeneralRobert B. Long21
Lieutenant-Colonel William Tomkinson27
Captain William Bragge5
Captain John Kincaid7
Captain Cavalie Mercer10
Quartermaster William Surtees25
Lieutenant William Dent28
Lieutenant Augustus Dobree2
Lieutenant John, William and Edward Freer24
Lieutenant August Schaumann20
Lieutenant Edmund Wheatley17
Sergeant-Major Edward Cotton6
Sergeant James Anton10
Sergeant Edward Costello3
Sergeant Thomas Morris22
Corporal William Wheeler19
Corporal Thomas of the 71st16
Private Anonymous Dragoon1
Private John Green14
Private William Green26
Private Harris8

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Materials

1) Anonymous, Memoirs of a Dragoon, N.A.M., MSS. 6807 - 213.
2) Dobree, Augustus Frederick, A Journal of the campaign in Spain during the years 1808 - 09. N.A.M. Archives Dept. 6807 - 148.

Published Works

3) Brett-James, Antony (ed.), Edward Costello, The Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns, (Longmans 1967).
4) Brett-James, Antony, Life in Wellington's Army, (London 1972).
5) Cassels, S. A. C. (ed.), Peninsular Portrait 1811 - 14 The Letters of Captain William Bragge, Third (King's Own) Dragoons, (London 1963)
6) Cotton, Edward, A Voice from Waterloo, (Wakefield 1974).
7) Curling, Henry (ed.), Captain J. Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, (1830), new edition with introduction by the Hon. Sir John Fortescue (London 1968).
8) Curling, Henry (ed.), Recollections of Rifleman Harris, (1829), new edition with introduction by Sir John Fortescue (London 1966).
9) Dundas, David, Principles of Military Movements chiefly applied to the Infantry, (London 1788).
10) Fitchett, W. H., Wellington's Men, some soldier autobiographies, (1900) Book Club Edition (1976)
11) Glover, Michael (ed.), A Gentleman Volunteer, The Letters of George Hennell from the Peninsular War 1812 - 13, (London 1979)
12). Glover, Michael, Wellington's Army in the Peninsular 1808 - 14, (Vancouver 1977).
13) Glover, Richard, Peninsular Preparation. The Reform of the British Army 1795 - 1809, (Cambridge 1963).
14) Green, John, A Soldier's Life, (EP. Publishing Ltd. 1973). Originally - The Vicissitudes of a Soldier's Life or a series of occurrences from 1806 to 1815 (Louth 1827).
15) Gronow, Recollections and Anecdotes of the Camp, the Court, and the Club at the close of the Last War with France, new edition (London 1864).
16) Hibbert, Christopher (ed.), A Soldier of the Seventy-First, The Journal of the Highland Light Infantry 1806-15, (London 1975).
17) Hibbert, Christopher (ed.), The Wheatley Diary A Journal and Sketchbook kept during the Peninsular War and Waterloo Campaign, (London 1964).
18) Keegan, John, The Face of Battle, Book Club Associates (London 1978).
19) Liddell-Hart, B. H., (ed.), The Letters of Private Wheeler 1809 - 28, (London 1951).
20) Ludovici, Antony M. (ed.), On the Road with Wellington, The Diary of a War Commissary in the Peninsular Campaigns by August L. F. Schaumann, (London 1924).
21) McGuffie, T. H., (ed.), Peninsular Cavalry General, The Correspondence of Lieutenant-General Robert Long (1811 - 13), (London 1951).
22) Morris, Thomas, Recollections of Military Service in 1813, 1814 and 1815, through Germany, Holland and France, (London).
23) Rottenburg, Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry and Instructions for their conduct in the Field, trans. by W. Fawcett, (London 1808).
24) Scarfe, Norman (ed.), Letters from the Peninsula The Freer Family Correspondence 1807 - 14, (University College, Leicester 1953).
25) Surtees, William, Twenty-Five Years in the Rifle Brigade, (1833) new edition (London 1973).
26) Teague, John and Dorothea (eds.), Where Duty Calls me- The Experiences of William Green in the Napoleonic Wars, (Synjon Books, West Wickham, Kent 1975).
27) Tomkinson, James (ed.), The Diary of a Cavalry Officer - 1809 - 15, (Lt.-Col. William Tomkinson), (1894), New edition (London 1971).
28) Woodford, Leonard, (ed.), A young Surgeon in Wellington's Army, (Unwin bros. 1976).

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