"Gallantry and Discipline"

Part 1

by Mark Clayton, U. K.

An analysis of the outlook and morale of British soldiers in the Peninsular War and Waterloo Campaign, (1807 - 15).

Military history has been primarily studied from the political and strategic point of view, the exposition of wars and campaigns in terms of states, armies, corps and divisions. The minds and methods of great war leaders of the past have attracted the most interest from historians, and before the nineteenth century are the main source of military history from their papers and manuscripts, and from what past historians have written about them. The vast majority of `ordinary soldiers', the rank and file, are for the most part, silent in their illiteracy. However from the Napoleonic Wars, we have for the first time a large number of writings from men of lower rank, including some non-commissioned officers and private soldiers.

In Britain this was due to a variety of circumstances;- the increase in literacy along with industrial growth, and the spread of devotional Protestantism, (Methodism in England, and particularly Presbyterianism in Scotland), meant that sons of professional men, merchants, lawyers and clergy could, because of their education, become officers in the army. They broadened the social basis of the officer corps, it was no longer the traditional monopoly of the aristocracy and gentry. The recruiting of soldiers from the militia, from 1805 onwards, also facilitated the entry of educated men into the army. Being a conscript force, the militia drew a wider sample of society than that provided by the voluntary recruitment of the army, (for most of whom it was the last resort), and therefore provided some educated volunteers who wrote letters, journals and memoirs, (of whom Wheeler [51st Regt.] and Costello [95th Regt.] are two prime examples). The social and political impact of the Napoleonic Wars stimulated the writing and publishing of journals and memoirs and created an audience for those who had taken part in the long struggle.

Experiences

Through these sources, we have for the first time an opportunity to examine the experiences of the soldiers in the field, their attitudes to their commanders, the enemy, and the war in general. Read with care, these sources can prove most useful, especially when the authors are attempting to describe, by diaristic factual details and anecdotes, - experiences which they know to many of their readers (including the historian) will be completely alien. Captain J. Kincaid wrote in his preface, "In tracing the following scenes, I have chiefly drawn on the reminiscences of my military life, and endeavoured to faithfully convey to the mind of the reader the impression which they made on my own at the time of their occurrence".

To understand an alien experience, is I would suggest the principal interest in examining the attitudes of British soldiers in the Napoleonic Wars. For no modern historian, especially those who have not fought in a war, can fully comprehend what it was like to have lived with Wellington's army, or to have taken part in battles like Albuera, Vitoria or Waterloo. More specifically, an examination of the troops' mental outlook will help us to understand the morale of British soldiers, - their discipline and confidence, or `team spirit'.

It hardly needs to be stated that morale is the key factor which determines the fate of battles, (and therefore often of wars), - and an appreciation of it, and how it was influenced, is essential to an understanding of Napoleonic warfare. Likewise, some knowledge of an army's attitude and morale will shed light on its leaders, - their successes and failures; and are an important element to be taken into account in a discussion of strategical questions of the outcome of campaigns and wars.

Let us begin then, by looking at the rank and file, the men most representative of the army. In doing so, surely the first question to be asked is why should men have joined the army at all? For the living conditions of the soldier in peacetime, let alone on campaign, were unattractive to say the least. It was a strictly disciplined life regulated by severe corporal punishments. In 1812 the daily pay for a private in the Line infantry was 1 shilling; in the Foot Guards 1s.1d.; in the Line cavalry 1s. 3d.; in the Life Guards 1s. 113/4d., - compared to the average wages of a farm labourer of 14s. 6d. per week. Sixpence per day of the soldier's pay was deducted for his rations, which consisted of 1lb of meat, 11/2 lbs of bread and a quart of beer per day, " - not sufficient for his subsistence for any great length of time" (Wellington). Although soldiers were provided with accommodation, this was usually in unsanitary barrack blocks in which the allotted space to each man was only 400 cubic feet, which was less than half the allocation of a convict. Marriage was positively discouraged among the rank and file, and there was always the prospect of being sent to a foreign garrison where there was a much higher risk of death through disease.

Thus, life in the army was tough, and as a volunteer force, tended to mainly attract "the very worst members of society". They were men of the lower working classes for whom the hardship of a soldier's life was nothing new, and often who had no alternative means of personal support. There was a large criminal element among recruits, from the wholesale enlistments from gaols and prison-ships, and from men escaping from awkward situations in their local communities. John Stevenson wrote;- "of those who voluntarily enlist, some few are driven by poverty ..... some have disgraced themselves in their situation of employment, many have committed misdemeanours which expose them to the penalties of the law of the land, and most are confirmed drunkards". As shall be seen, drunkenness was rife throughout the army, and during the Peninsular War there was considerable robbery, and some murder, committed by British soldiers against the indigenous populations which Wellington attributed "to our having so many men who have left their families to starve for the inducement of a few guineas to get drunk".

Those few guineas, the bounty, which in 1808 was established at twelve guineas for seven years enlistment, or seventeen for life, appear to have been a great incentive. For many recruits it was the largest sum they had or would ever hold, and as there was little else for a soldier to spend his money on, but drink (and women), men like Costello, Harris, and Morris promptly did so.

Other Motivations

However, by no means all of the British rank and file were pressed by economic hardship, were criminals or addicted drunkards, - there seem to have been other motivations for enlisting. These are particularly seen in those who joined from the militia, several of whom confessed to patriotic and glamorous motivations; e.g. Morris and Costello were both attracted to the soldier's life by hearing and reading accounts of campaigns, and by the smart ostentatious uniforms of the period. It is likely that many soldiers little knew what they were letting themselves in for when they joined up, and that many were victims of skillful recruiting sergeants.

These "would give a glowing description of their several regiments, describing the victories they had gained and the honours they had acquired," - often plying their listeners with strong drink, so that they should first accept the King's shilling, and then not go back on their agreement. Amongst the militia, according to Morris, other coercive measures were sometimes adopted by the recruiting officers, such as long drills and field exercises, "which were so repressive, that to escape them, the men would embrace the alternative and join the regulars." Thus it was often a problem to keep new recruits once they were sober again, and "bounty-jumping" was fairly common.

It was mainly for officers that the army provided an attractive career, i.e. for those who were educated, and often who had some private income. The pay of junior officers (4s. per day, after 6d. ration deduction for ensigns) was just adequate to live on, but providing one's own equipment required a large extra outlay. A private income was also a great advantage to an ambitious officer who could use it to buy commissions in the more prestigious regiments, or to ascend the ranks, as opportunities became available. Around 18% of promotions in the infantry 1810 - 13 were by purchase, and 45% in the cavalry, and Morris reveals that there was a certain amount of resentment in the army against the ability of wealthy and particularly aristocratic officers, to monopolise the `crack' regiments.

Officer Origins

However, by the nineteenth century, British officers were by no means exclusively drawn from the aristocracy and landed gentry who had traditionally commanded the army. Army and navy officers were the largest group who fathered military sons, but the other professions also provided a number, clerics, lawyers, doctors, scientists etc. The largest number of new officers entered from the militia, or were given a free commission on the recommendation of someone above the rank of major. Less than 20% purchased their first commissions, 3.9% came from the Royal Military College, 5.42% rose from the ranks, and 4.5% gained commissions as volunteers. The latter were young gentlemen who, with the permission of a colonel, went on active service with a battalion. All officers were `officially' gentle men, though as shall be seen, the soldiers had clear ideas of `gentlemanly' behaviour. Thus being an "officer and a gentleman" was a socially applauded, honourable career, which provided a comfortable life particularly in peacetime, but also in war.

On Campaign

Life on the march had a great variety of conditions and experiences for the troops. Without doubt there were great hardships undergone, each ranker carrying up to 70 lbs of kit, on daily marches of ten to twelve miles, with occasional forced marches of up to thirty miles. The weather of course had the greatest influence on conditions, varying to extremes of heat and cold, depending on the time of year and the region of Europe. The only protection against rain was one's greatcoat on the march, natural cover in camp (before 1813), or an overcrowded billet in a village or town.

Tents were not issued to the rank and file until 1813 and were an attempt to reduce the large numbers of men incapacitated by illness, the "natural consequence" of the fatigues of the camp. Another major source of discomfort was the frequent daily famines or short rations caused by an inefficient supply system. Although based on mules, the best form of transport for the eninsular terrain, supplies were slow moving, and directed by a commissary that was faced with an enormous task with little previous experience to deal with it. The forward units of light infantry and cavalry often outreached their supplies and went without rations sometimes for several days.

Experience of such hardships enforced their acceptance as there was little to be done about them. As stated above, many soldiers came from working class backgrounds for whom hard, physical work and poor living conditions were not unusual. Most soldiers took a fatalistic attitude towards campaign life, for of course there were also good times on the march, fine weather, plentiful supplies, a comfortable billet or bivouac. Thus, "if we do suffer privations at times, we have some sunshiney days, and dame fortune often leads us out of difficulty and puts us into possession of all the luxuries of life." (Wheeler). Veteran soldiers could be quite indifferent, "I had been in so many changes of plenty and want, ease and danger, that they had ceased to be anticipated either with joy or fear." (`Thomas' of the 71st.)

Complaints

Though, inevitably, there were grumbles about the commissary, most complaints and discontent seem to have been mainly directed towards the enemy, the reason the troops were there, and therefore the cause of their sufferings. According to Tomkinson, the common talk among the infantry in 1813 was of paying the enemy back for making them walk so far. Wheeler wrote of the wet and muddy retreat to Portugal in 1812, "But amidst all these difficulties no-one murmured, or if there was any discontent; it was because we were not allowed to give them battle." This was also the main complaint on the retreat to Corunna which saw the worst conditions experienced by British soldiers in the Peninsular War.

On this march, the constant rain, bad provisioning and poor state of health of many men made life "rather a burden" and without the hope of a general engagement, probably many more would have "abandoned themselves to disease and despair." Those who did so showed that there came a point when one just gave up, and when the mutually supporting camaraderie of the soldiers broke down in a `sauve qui peut'.

The hardships and sufferings of a campaign increased the number of incidents of indiscipline amongst the troops, e.g. insubordination, or being drunk on sentry duty, which were punished by flogging. Most sentences were between three hundred, (for minor offences), and eight hundred lashes, (for more serious offences like sacrilege and attempted desertion.), yet there were fifty sentences of 1000 lashes during the Peninsular War. The majority of soldiers seem to have considered flogging to be "absolutely necessary" (Anton) to prevent hundreds falling victim to the rapacity "to be expected from such an heterogeneous mixture of depravity and ignorance as is to be met with in an army." (Wheatley). Harris thought it essential, to preserve the army's efficiency and discipline. He recorded that on the retreat to Corunna, when some of the 95th were becoming "careless and ruffianly in their demeanour," General Crauford flogged two for insubordination and so "saved hundreds from death by his management."

However, there were some like Morris who agreed with the reformers (e.g. Sir Francis Burdett), that flogging "invariably makes a tolerably good man bad, and a bad man infinitely worse." (Morris). But whatever their views on flogging, the soldiers respected those who dispensed it with fairness and humanity, at least by the standards of the day. Most officers seem to have done this, Wellington once declared to a parliamentary committee that "it was the desire of every commanding officer I have ever seen, and who knew his duty, to diminish corporal punishment as much as possible." Costello's commanding officer in 1808 rarely resorted to the whip, but punished by extra drill, or by chaining a 6 lb shot to a man's leg for a period of time.

Probably in the hope of obtaining better conditions or possibly from defeatism, many British soldiers deserted to the French and vice versa. Those British who were caught were shot or flogged, but the practice still continued, until 1813 when British victories.and advance through Spain, not surprisingly, made it tail off. Desertion was particularly prevalent in the regiments of the King's German Legion, perhaps the roughest soldiers in the British army, and men without the sense of patriotic duty and regimental pride that motivated other British troops. The mixture of different nationalities in the Legion enabled some men to learn foreign languages to further their chances as deserters. Desertion was almost entirely a phenomenon amongst the rank and file, for officers generally remained sufficiently comfortable to have little incentive to desert.

More Gallantry

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