"Gallantry and Discipline"

Part 3

by Mark Clayton, U. K.

An analysis of the outlook and morale of British soldiers in the Peninsular War and Waterloo Campaign, (1807 - 15).

Without doubt, most British soldiers were patriotic. Stories and anecdotes like those above, related in letters and memoirs, were an expression of this patriotism of their pride at being militarily "amongst the most splendid soldiers in the world", who could also be men of humanity and chivalry. There were concepts of the honour of their country and their duty towards it, but it is difficult to see whether these were widely held, particularly amongst the illiterate majority of troops.

Certainly there were some who feared disgrace for their country, e.g. in retreating - such as Thomas of the 71st, but it was probably more the sense of wasted effort and needless sufferings that afflicted most troops. Harris wrote that when they realised they were retreating towards Corunna, the soldiers started to murmur at not being allowed to turn and fight, rather than endure their present toil. However, according to Morris, the 73rd, in battle on the plains of Gardo in Swedish Pomerania, were exhorted by their colonel not to disgrace themselves as the only regiment of English on the field, and "a hearty cheer from the men was the assurance that they would do their duty." Surtees recorded that in the last months of the war in 1814 there was a disposition in both armies to mitigate the miseries of the war "as much as was consistent with each doing their duty to their country."

Yet the concept of honour was mainly a military and personal one, that of British troops as soldiers; - rather than a patriotic one. I have found no notion of defending the British way of life and values, and only the odd mention of the British liberating Spain and Europe from Napoleon, - seen as the British doing the others a favour in fighting their war, rather than having interests in its outcome themselves. Most soldiers seem to have had little idea of why they were fighting, perhaps they did not give it much consideration,

"Their's not to reason why, Their's but to do or die,"

Honour was based on courage and endurance, overcoming fear and not hanging back from the enemy. The honour of British troops as a body was the extension of each individual's personal honour, i.e. one's self-esteem and reputation among one's companions. This concept was strongest in the ideal of the officer being a gentleman, e.g. the officers of the 10th Hussars, were so disgusted with their colonel for repeatedly refusing to let them charge at the battle of Orthes, they signed a `round robin' not to speak to him. However, the importance of one's reputation seems to have been felt as much among the rank and file as among the officers, at least in the elite regiments.

Harris (of the 95th) wrote, "It is, indeed, singular, how a man loses or gains caste with his comrades from his behaviour, and how closely he is observed-in the field. The officers too are commented upon and closely observed." Those who dropped out from the march when they had only a minor illness or wound, or who disappeared without excuse, were called `skulkers' and censured by the men. The night before Waterloo, only one man was absent from Tomkinson's squadron. When he returned from plundering, on the morning of the battle, he was booted by his comrades. In battle, Harris remembered "only one British soldier endeavouring to hold back when his comrades were going forward" and he was later removed to a veteran battalion, because he was a bad influence on the men.

This sense of personal honour was also seen in British soldiers' strong feelings for the honour and reputation of their regiments, deliberately instilled in them from their first joining. These feelings were particularly identified with the regiment's standards, - the King's and Regimental Colours. Lieutenant Edward Macready at Waterloo, was most relieved when the colours of the 30th Foot were taken to the rear; and Morris tells of how after the loss of their colour at Quatre Bras, the officers of the 69th set tailors to work to make a new one, to dispute the loss. But, according to Morris, the deceit was unnecessary for if a colour was taken while contending "a vastly superior force it cannot reflect any disgrace on the men." Some soldiers also felt an association with other regiments with whom they had fought, e.g. the 95th, 52nd, and 43rd in the Peninsula, and the 42nd Highlanders and the Scots Greys after Waterloo.

British soldiers naturally appreciated credit and glory for their regiments and for the army as a whole. Lt. Gen. Robert Long was most annoyed with Marshal Beresford for not giving credit to the 13th Dragoons (one of the regiments in Long's brigade) for the action at Campo Major (12th April, 1811). For Kincaid, there was "nothing in this life so enviable as the feelings of a soldier after a victory", and for a soldier of the 5th Dragoon Guards, the entry of the British into Madrid in 1812, to the greetings and applause of the inhabitants, was "one of the brightest moments of my existence, all hardships and sufferings were forgotten in the spirit of the stirring scene around us."

The honour and glory of British arms was part and parcel of the great self confidence British soldiers felt. This is evident in the journals, letter collections and memoirs from the beginning of the Peninsular War, and is by no means just hindsight on victory, or patriotic license. It was a confidence in themselves and their leaders which was felt even in the most disastrous of retreats; - of the road to Corunna, Thomas of the 71st wrote, "From the first moment of the attack, and as long as the French were before us, discipline was restored .... We felt not our sufferings, so anxious were we to end them by a victory, which we were certain of obtaining."

Doubtless though, much of their confidence was built on experience of the leadership of Wellington who never lost a battle. Two drunks in September 1811 named him as the "long-nosed beggar that licks the French." Costello recorded the almost unbounded confidence of the Light Division at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Kincaid remembered the British troops at Salamanca being filled with "the most devoted confidence in their leader, and an invincible confidence in themselves."

Much of this confidence was due to the personality of Wellington himself who in his handsome and distinctive features, smart but unostentatious dress, cool and severe personal style but good humoured nature, together with his deep understanding and care for the troops, - inspired in them loyalty and devotion, order and discipline. His coming had an electric effect on the men, particularly at Waterloo, - `"The Duke .... was coolness personified .... No leader ever possessed so fully the confidence of his soldiers .... Wherever he appeared, a murmur of `Silence - stand to your front - here's the Duke.' was heard through the columns, and then all was steady as on a parade.'" (Macready).

Wellington had all the qualities of a great leader, - many of which were also embodied in his subordinates. Although M. Glover is going too far in writing that they "almost without exception" understood the art of leadership, undoubtedly many officers did inspire their men. As seen above, most officers were by definition regarded as gentlemen, especially those from aristocratic or gentry families, the leaders of British society.

Harris had a clear impression of who was a gentleman and their advantages, "in our army the men like best to be officered by gentlemen, men whose education has rendered them more kind in manners than your coarse officer, sprung from obscure origin, whose style is brutal and overbearing, .... it requires one who has authority in his face, as well as at his back, to make them (the English) respect and obey him". Sergeant majors showed that command "does not suit ignorant and coarse-minded men", and some soldiers were driven to insubordination by being worried by "little-minded men" for trifles about which gentlemen would never torment them.

The soldiers most respected those officers who showed care and concern for their physical welfare, those who "filled their bellies". This concern was particularly shown when necessity demanded food or firewood from the local population, not formally requisitioned by the Commissary. In June 1813, Wheeler's battalion was allowed to fill their haversacks with wheat and rye from the roadside, as they had had no bread issued for nine days. Wellington issued constant and stringent orders against the taking of timber from houses for fire-wood, but officers would not enforce them because this was often the only fuel they could find to cook the rations.

The ranks also naturally appreciated officers who showed tactical ability on the battlefield, e.g. in leading them out of a scrape without loss, and those officers who led by example and with courage. Captain Mercer of `G' Troop, Royal Horse Artillery at Waterloo, having reproved his men for lying down when shells burst, felt he could not do so when one landed at his feet, "I stood, endeavouring to look quite composed until the cursed thing burst," - and as it did not injure him, "the effect on my men was good." General Crauford was one of the very first killed at the head of the forlorn hope at Badajoz, and Costello's epitaph shows him to have been a successful leader, - he was "a gallant veteran; who though most strict in discipline was averse to punishment and beloved by the men for his justice and care for them, as well as for his bravery."

Crauford also had that touch of eccentricity which was particularly appreciated and remarked upon by the soldier - authors, a quality that was in Wellington, and some of his junior officers, e.g. Wheeler's Colonel Mainwaring, and Harris' Major Travers "a regular good `un" who at Vimiero offered a guinea to any man who could find his wig!

Officers of course are the key figures in all the actions of a military unit, and were particularly important in Napoleonic warfare when virtually all movement, especially for the infantry, was based on specific, laid-down manoeuvres of massed bodies of men. Whether it was a company in a line twenty to thirty men wide, or a battalion of ten companies in line, the manoeuvres required were complex, precise and difficult to execute, and had to be instilled into officers and men by repeated drill and practice. Their primary purpose was to bring as much firepower to bear on the enemy as possible, - numbers being crucial with the inaccurate, short-ranged, smooth-bore musket, the standard infantry weapon.

But the firing lines also had to contract into denser formations, e.g. an oblong square to face the threat of cavalry. Being trained to fight in large line formations, and to maintain the order of the ranks at all times greatly added to a soldier's confidence. It induced feelings of safety in numbers, comradeship and solidarity, which were an important part of the Napoleonic soldier's battlefield morale. "While order subsists, the soldier feels his advantage, exerts himself, and acts with energy and spirit. When disorder prevails he perceives his inferiority, desponds, loses all confidence in himself or commander, personal safety soon occurs, and the moment of flight is not far distant".

Only `light' troops were trained to fight in open order and to rely on their own initiative, e.g. - to make the best use of the terrain, and not to rely entirely on the word of command. They were skirmishing troops who scouted, formed advance pickets and harassed the enemy in larger battles. Light infantry were trained to shoot accurately at a target rather than just pointing the weapon in the direction of the enemy and relying on numbers to make effect.

They were aware of their superior training, and regiments like the 52nd, 43rd and especially the 95th (which had a disproportionate number of writing members) had an extra confidence and regimental pride, - `esprit de corps'. They were the Light Division generally referred to as THE Division, the cream of Wellington's army. Yet for these the order of the ranks was by no means irrelevant, for the 43rd and 52nd were armed with muskets and therefore often fought in close order, and the 95th Rifles marched in column like any other regiment and occasionally had to form square against the threat of cavalry.

It was the drill and training of the troops, the authority commanded by their officers and the threat of punishment, their patriotism, and sense of duty, honour and pride in their regiment, their confidence in themselves and their leaders, as well as the restraints of their humanity and concept of the rules of war, - that made up the overall `discipline' and morale of a unit. Richard Glover has written, "it is a vulgar error to confound discipline with uniformity of conduct inspired by fear of punishment.

Essentially, discipline means loyal co-operation towards a common end. It reaches its peak in the team spirit that leads a good rugby side or boat race crew to obey its coach without the suggestion of penalties ever being made; .... some might indeed call a team spirit in a military unit `good morale', but good morale and good discipline are Siamese twins. There is no separating them. Discipline declines whenever morale deteriorates and so does morale when discipline becomes lax, for the enthusiasm, which forms so large a part of morale, cannot co-exist with the slackness that leaves unpunished the bad or lazy soldier who lets his unit down. So discipline, morale and punishment all hang together." It was British soldiers' discipline, and the enthusiasm of their morale that enabled them to undergo the `hard pounding' that were battles like Albuera and Waterloo; and to repeatedly endeavour, in-the face of horrendous casualties, to get over the breaches of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.

The men of the `forlorn hope', the first storming party that had to establish entry into a town or fortress for the rest of the troops, were particularly at risk, and were made up of volunteers from each regiment. The walls at Badajoz were thirty feet high with a sixteen foot ditch; there was no cover but darkness, and even this was destroyed by the enemy's fireballs, and the flash of muskets and cannon. Its storming cost 3,713 casualties. Yet there was never any shortage of volunteers, indeed there could be quite fierce competition. Bugler West bribed the sergeant with two dollars to take William Green's place, among the 95th, though the lots had been drawn, but Green wouldn't have it and reported the situation to the adjutant. Kincaid was obliged to leave his baggage in the charge of a wounded man because his servant insisted on going.

Such courage was not just motivated by fear of the lash, or just a strong pride in the regiment, though this was undoubtedly a factor. There were inevitably many different motivations for volunteering for a forlorn hope. Green wanted to go "where my duty calls me"; for Kincaid, "it had ever been the summit of my ambition to obtain a post at the head of a storming party". According to Surtees, Lt. Harvest of the 43rd, having been recommended for the captaincy of a company, insisted on being its senior member in the forlorn hope at Badajoz, for not to claim this post might have been construed as detrimental to his honour. A lieutenant who led a forlorn hope contingent and survived was virtually guaranteed promotion to the crucial rank of captain, without having to purchase.

Thus courage, ambition, glory, duty and honour, were all concerns and aspects of British troops, - as were their drill discipline, comradeship, confidence and patriotism, rapacity and debauchery, humanity and concepts of the rules of war. All these came to the fore in British soldiers at different times, depending on the situation they were in. Taken as a whole, they add up to the mentality of British campaign life in the Peninsular War, which was a product of the men's backgrounds and experiences. Yet it was also itself an influence on the experiences of the men, - on the march, during a siege, and particularly, on their reactions in battle.

In Battle

A large pitched Napoleonic battle like Albuera, Vitoria and Waterloo could be a surreal experience. The voluminous smoke which muskets and cannons (using black gunpowder), belched forth, their heat, and that of personal physical exertion, the terrific noise from the guns, and the cries of men and horses, are described by various writers, particularly Mercer, as having a dream, or nightmare-like quality, - "We breathed a new atmosphere - the air was suffocatingly hot, resembling that issuing from an oven. We were enveloped in thick smoke, and, in spite of the incessant roar of cannon and musketry, could distinctly hear around us a mysterious humming noise, like that which one hears of a summer s evening proceeding from myriads of black beetles". Mercer's memories of Waterloo, set down in his journal a few days afterwards, were somewhat confused, especially about the later part of the day when he was "fatigued and almost deaf."

Not surprisingly then, a battle produced in its participants a variety of feelings and attitudes which were largely unique to it, and which contributed to the morale, and so the actions of British soldiers. Naturally fear was probably the dominant emotion for most men, - perhaps at its worst in the immediate period before an expected battle started. However for some, like Surtees, it may have been less strong from "a consciousness of superiority and good prospect of success." It also apparently decreased considerably once one was in action; - Wheeler became quite `indifferent' to his personal safety; and Hennell wrote that "After viewing the enemy you feel at the word `Fall in' (more) than you do when the first ball passes and less as they increase."

Concentrating on physical activity, e.g. following the drill of loading a musket (twenty movements), or a cannon, - in giving little time to think and look about one's position, - to some extent also averted troops' feelings of fear, and awareness of what was going on around them. Mercer's guns, faced by French cavalry at Waterloo, were served with "astonishing activity", for "the safety of all, everything, depended upon not slackening our fire." Inactivity during a battle, particularly when one was being shot at was "the most unpleasant thing that can happen to soldiers in an engagement." (Leeke)

But it was mainly the discipline or morale of British troops that overcame their innate fear and natural inclination to flee from danger, and the continual threats of pain and death that faced them in battle. They were remarkably `steady' troops able to undergo very heavy fire, or to face and await the advance of imposing and daunting enemies, and still maintain their order and discipline, and respond to their officers' commands. Taking examples from Waterloo, the most written-about battle;- many units suffered heavy casualties, including Mercer's battery, and especially the 27th Foot, the Inniskillings, who stood for four hours at the La Haye Saint crossroads during which they lost 450 out of the 750 officers and men. By comparison, the Brunswickers, (who were generally regarded like the Spanish and Dutch-Belgians as a poorer class of soldier) - drawn up in square behind Mercer's battery, appeared so unsteady under the artillery fire they were receiving, that Mercer resolved to disobey Wellington's orders for gunners to retire to the infantry squares when threatened, lest it signal the Brunswickers also to take flight.

Several writers tell of the fear and trepidation they felt at the imposing advance of the massed French cavalry (ordered forward by Marshal Ney in mid-afternoon), and the infantry of the French Imperial Guard (around 7pm), both of which were "certainly enough to inspire a feeling of dread." Yet the British and allied squares repulsed the repeated charges of the French cavalry, and the Imperial Guard were routed in the usual way, which had often been employed throughout the Peninsula, - of holding fire until the enemy were about thirty yards away, and delivering a devastating volley, followed by a charge.

"No movement in the field is made with greater confidence of success than that of the charge; it affords little time for thinking, while it creates a fearless excitement, and tends to give a fresh impulse to the blood of the advancing soldier, rouses his courage, strengthens every nerve, and drowns every fear of danger or death; thus emboldened, amidst the deafening shouts that anticipate victory, he rushes on and mingles with the flying foe."

There is perhaps a little exaggeration in this, - and Anton was in the 42nd Highlanders which was one of the `crack' regiments in the British army; but it does express the excitement and fearlessness, even exhilaration, which was engendered by a charge. This was particularly so in a cavalry charge when the speed and sound of the galloping horses added to the thrill.

But the charge also needed considerable discipline and high morale, for to be successful, the participants had to be determined. A cavalry charge against other cavalry involved trotting or galloping straight towards, and through the enemy's ranks, which must have required strong nerves, - and against an infantry square, could largely only be successful if the imposing look of the cavalry could frighten the infantry into breaking their ranks or surrendering. Experience taught that when cavalry charged infantry, not in square, or when cavalry charged cavalry, or infantry charged infantry, the most determined side would almost always `break' the enemy by the shock of contact.

This often physically disordered their ranks, but mainly, and more importantly it broke them mentally, i.e. their discipline and morale disintegrated into panic and mob rule, in which the unit turned and fled. Tomkinson wrote of a cavalry action at Fuentes de Onoro on the 3rd May, 1809, "This is the only instance I have ever met with of two bodies of cavalry coming into opposition, and both sides standing, as invariably, as I have observed it, one or the other runs away." Captain Childers of the 11th Light Dragoons always charged with the greatest determination, and even against three times his numbers always succeeded. (Tomkinson)

The infantry generally used their bayonets against an enemy already in flight, and it seems that the only instance of a melee with bayonets, was at Roncesvalles on the 25th July, 1813. Just the look and sound of a charge by enthusiastic, shouting troops was enough to turn less disciplined troops, and could be successful against any enemy, (even the French Imperial Guard) when preceded by the `shock' of a large musket volley at close range.

To some extent the `enthusiasm' of British troops in a charge was artificial. It was whipped up by their officers and themselves, e.g. by cheering; - every British attack was preceded and accompanied by wild "Hurrahs!", or slogans such as "Scotland for ever." The French did the same when they attacked, "huzzaing and shouting like madmen." Morale was also `boosted' by music from drums, bugles, or pipes. While wounded, Wheeler longed to hear the "soul-stirring bugles again." Dundas recommended the use of drums in a charge for "inspiring and directing the attack."

The morale and discipline of British infantry was such that, throughout the Peninsular War, hardly any unit seems to have been routed. They were forced to retreat many times, in the face of superior numbers, or stir resistance, but I have found only one instance when they lost all discipline, ignored their officers, and fled, - such as Spanish troops did at Talavera, and much of the French army did at Vitoria and Waterloo.

Of course this was to a large extent due to the successes of British strategy and tactics, but it was also due to the steadiness of their discipline and morale. Colborn's brigade at Albuera suffered the disaster, infantry most feared, - being charged by cavalry when unprepared and 1,250 out of 1,650 were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Yet rather than flee, many troops banded together in groups of six or eight, and did the best they could to stand and fight. The same was done by the 69th and 42nd at Quatre Bras when unexpectedly attacked by French Lancers and Cuirassiers.

More Gallantry

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