by Richard V. Barbuto
While Scott was preparing his and Ripley's brigades of regulars for the invasion, the non-regular forces of the militia and native warriors were also gathering and preparing. Governor Tompkins' hope for a brigade of volunteer militia foundered because of the prodigality of previous militia formations. While volunteers collected in their various counties and elected their officers, Porter refused to order a muster for the entire brigade until there were sufficient quantities of tents, cooking kettles, cartridge boxes, blankets, axes, and other supplies and equipment. The federal and state supply depots had been virtually emptied after two years of war. Porter asked Brown for assistance and Brown sent his requirements to the War Department. Armstrong eventually dispatched the equipment to New York but not without advising Brown of the great quantities of federal stores that had been previously issued and apparently wasted by the militia of New York. Brown, who had gained national prominence as a general of New York militia offered no opinion about Armstrong's accusation. [19]
Although Porter's New York Volunteers were undersubscribed, additional manpower appeared from an unexpected source. At Gettysburg, over nine hundred men mustered into Colonel James Fenton's Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers. They marched off to Erie where they began a relaxed training program. Fenton wrote to Scott on 3 May revealing that the Governor of Pennsylvania had ordered the regiment to report to the Left Division. Scott was surprised for he was unaware of any militia reinforcements coming from that state. Certainly he was disappointed; Fenton noted that his men were without ammunition and in danger of starving. Scott did not hide the disdain he held for the Pennsylvanians. He wrote to Brown "I now give it as my opinion that we shall be disgraced if we admit a militia force either into our camp or order of battle." [20]
As if to measure up to Scott's scorn, a large minority of Fenton's men refused the order to march to Buffalo. They were hungry, without pay, and many of them shoeless. Fenton's officers arrested a few of the ringleaders. A regular officer at Erie assisted by ordering his cannon, loaded with grapeshot, turned on the masses. The incipient mutiny collapsed and the men marched off. As they arrived at Buffalo in mid-June, Brown, who had just returned from Sackett's Harbor, issued the Pennsylvanians two months pay and integrated the regiment into Scott's training program.
Contrary to his opinion of militia, Scott called the Iroquois "powerful auxiliaries." Porter had great success in recruiting the natives and over six hundred Onondaga, Oneida, Tuscarora, and Seneca gathered at Buffalo. Indian agents gave the natives unofficial ranks and pay ranging from $8 a month for warriors to $40 for their native captains. About half were armed with their own firearms, some used bows, and all carried tomahawk and knife. Many cut their hair in the traditional Mohawk style. Warriors might wear untucked shirts or go bare-chested but nearly all were in leggings and moccasins; Iroquois believed that moccasined feet helped the dead find their way to heaven. Several women carried weapons and would fight alongside their men. [21] When the invasion began, Porter's heterogeneous brigade was composed of the mounted New York riflemen, Fenton's Pennsylvanian Infantry, and Red Jacket's Iroquois.
As for the regulars, over eleven hundred soldiers, many of them new recruits, marched or sailed into Buffalo during the two weeks prior to the invasion. Armstrong had failed miserably in sending Brown the numbers of regulars he needed to ensure victory. Brown had about four thousand regulars with him to strike the main blow for the year. However, the Right Division on Lake Champlain, whose mission it was to make a diversionary attack toward Montreal, had nearly five thousand soldiers. To be sure, hundreds of regulars and New York militia joined the Left Division after the invasion began. None of these enjoyed the first-rate training of Scott's Buffalo encampment. In fact, more than half of the soldiers of the Left Division had two weeks or less time training under Scott. [22]
Nonetheless, in the three weeks after Brown's Left Division entered into Canada, it captured Fort Erie, soundly defeated a comparably-sized force at Chippawa, and fought a larger body of veteran troops to a standstill at Lundy's Lane. Clearly this was the best showing of an American Army in offensive operations during the war and the pre-Civil War Army took justifiable pride in these accomplishments.
To Prepare an Army Buffalo 1814
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