Some of Brown's troops garrisoned Sackett's Harbor, the Navy's most important base on the Great lakes, but the greater portion of Brown's division was on the Niagara Frontier. In April, Brown gave Scott command of four regiments of infantry to begin training at Buffalo. Ripley assisted Scott. Scott's brigade of fewer than two thousand soldiers was to become the nucleus, the hard core, of the Left Division. No sooner had Scott's men set up camp when Brown was compelled to return to Sackett's Harbor to ensure the security of that post. He would remain there until June, trying to forge a campaign plan out of a confusion of guidance from Armstrong. Before he left, Brown directed Scott to make preparations for the invasion and to drill the troops. [8]
Scott's task was daunting. He had to clothe his soldiers, so many of whom were in rags. They must be trained to meet a competent and brave enemy. While he put them through an exceptionally rigorous training agenda, he had to maintain the men's motivation and their good conduct. In Brown's absence, Scott was responsible for setting up a logistical base to support the invasion and to gather information on friend and foe alike: responsibilities which would normally have fallen to the division commander. Prior to 1814, Scott had not experienced what now amounted to an independent command. However, the opportunity gave full range to his abilities, at least until Brown's return. Scott began work with a passion that spread to his officers.
Getting uniforms was Scott's top priority. Due to the sheer pettiness of the previous commander of the military district, all uniforms were sent to the troops on Lake Champlain. As late as 17 May Scott complained that two of his regiments were "now almost in a state of perfect nakedness." Scott's brigade received new, gray uniforms only days before they loaded into boats to invade Canada. Even this required the intercession of the Secretary of the Army himself. [9]
Army legend holds that Scott single-handedly trained the Left Division which fought so well and so gallantly at Chippawa and Lundy's Lane. This tradition was perpetuated by Scott himself and has been challenged only recently. [10] Yet in some ways the truth is very much as remarkable as the lore. His first decision was to standardize the drill manual since at least three systems of drill were prevalent in the Army. He directed that "the French regulations" were to be used.[11]
This referred to the Regulations of 1791, which had provided the armies of Revolutionary France with both speed and flexibility, and ultimately greater firepower than her continental enemies. In his memoirs, Scott made the astounding claim that he possessed the only copy in French and that throughout his command only a single other copy existed and this was a "bad translation" into English. [12] The War Department had given official sanction to two drill manuals during the war and both of these were abridged but clearly recognizable translations of the French Regulations of 1791. Hundreds of copies had been printed and it is unthinkable that only one other officer of the scores at Buffalo had one of these texts with him. [13]
The importance of drill, given the weapons of the day, cannot be overstated. The smoothbore musket was slow to load and, if fired at an individual target, quite inaccurate. But when fired by the hundreds, one volley every twenty-five seconds or so, it was a proven killing machine. Drill was the means by which a unit could inflict physical damage upon the enemy. All things being equal, the unit that could inflict the greater number of casualties had the better chance of causing the other side to break. The purpose of formations was to put the greatest number of weapons in range of the enemy in the smallest amount of time. But no amount of drill was sufficient to prepare the men for battle because drill could not replicate the sights, sounds, and feelings that would confuse the men and create fear in their ranks. In some ways it obscured the realities of battle.
To understand this contradiction, one must return to the musket. To save cartridges and flints for battle, the men learned to load and fire by "dryfiring." A soldier probably dryfired hundreds of times to gain expertise for each round fired in anger. Since a flint was only good for twenty shots or so, soldiers substituted wooden flints called "snappers." They pretended to bite paper cartridges and load them. Dryfiring went a long way to develop skill to fire two, sometimes three, rounds in a minute for sustained periods. But dryfiring eliminated much of the reality of live firing. [14]
The recruit, perhaps firing live rounds for the first time in battle, experienced much that was dangerous and frightening. The discharge of hundreds of weapons created a deafening roar and clouds of impenetrable smoke. After two volleys the musketeer probably could not see his target and perhaps feared that the enemy was even then attacking with the bayonet. Before long, his eyes burned and be began to gag on the smoke. Splinters from flints breaking against frizzens and bits of burning powder hit unprotected faces. The kick of the musket was similar to that of the twelve gauge shotgun of today. The barrel grew hot to the touch. Biting into cartridges with their heavy content of saltpeter caused soldiers great thirst and swollen, cracked lips. Seeing comrades die caused fear and fear led to mistakes in loading which were more dangerous to the firer than to the enemy. However, long and exacting drill prepared the men as much as possible - and that is what Scott gave them.
Scott ordered company drill in the morning. Presumably, this included individual drill in loading and firing as well as company formations and movement. At three o'clock, the regimental commanders drilled their battalions for two to three hours. [15] Scott himself, from time to time, drilled each battalion. After this, Scott gathered two or more battalions together to drill them as a brigade. Scott's methodology is remarkable in several respects. By drilling each battalion himself, he ensured uniformity and corrected errors. Scott chose not to conduct sequential training, that is individuals and units demonstrating skill at each lower level before attempting the next higher level. Instead, starting on the first day, he warned his troops that they could expect him to maneuver the entire brigade. By emphasizing drill at all levels each day - individual through brigade - he let his troops see the big picture: each piece fit into a succession of larger pieces and ultimately into a brigade acting as a coherent whole. Scott did not know how much time he had before the invasion, but he probably suspected action in as few as five weeks. By training at all levels each day, he ensured that the brigade would have some level of expertise regardless of how long - or short - the training program lasted.
Scott ordered staff officers to drill so that they would be able to replace fallen commanders. He cancelled drill only for snowfall or heavy rain. He conducted inspections of the men and their equipment each Sunday so that the missing equipment could be requisitioned. The men were ordered to bathe in Lake Erie frequently and to cut their hair. He directed his officers to sample all food before the men ate it. Scott was fanatic about camp cleanliness. As a result, illness among the troops plummeted. He controlled alcoholic beverages and civilians entering his camp. At the end of drilling each day, the troops performed guard duty and night patrols to protect their camp, the village of Buffalo, and their supply depots. Scott emphasized military courtesy, calling such rules "the indispensable outworks of subordination."
Scott ordered that each regiment form a section of pioneers who were soldiers armed with axe, shovel, or saw to march at the front of the formation to clear the route. As companies of new soldiers entered the camp, he divided his command into two brigades with Ripley commanding the second. The regulars at Buffalo were slowly transforming into proficient soldiers under competent officers serving in efficient regiments. [16]
To Prepare an Army Buffalo 1814
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© Copyright 2002 by Rich Barbuto.
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