by Richard V. Barbuto
This paper was presented to the 10th annual meeting of the Ohio Valley History Conference in October 1994. Less than two months after Congress declared war on Great Britain, Thomas Jefferson predicted that:
As if in response to President Jefferson's prophecy, the seed of genius had indeed germinated within the American Army. Two soldiers in particular, Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott, were to leave an indelible mark upon the traditions of the U.S. Army. [2]
The Left Division, commanded by Brown and trained by Scott, departed American shores in July 1814 on America's last invasion of Canada. That this expedition ultimately failed in no way detracts from the imposing battle record of the officers and soldiers of the Left division. Its martial accomplishments were the result of an intense if uneven preparation of its disparate elements: regulars, militia, native warriors, and renegade Canadians. This is the story of the preparation of the Left Division.
After two years of fighting, the United States was not one step closer to accomplishment of its war aims. Invasion armies had been repeatedly thrown back from Canada. Much of the Creek Nation was in open warfare. The Royal Navy was enforcing an ever-tightening blockade of the American coast. With Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig, the specter of tens of thousands of veteran British troops invading America, perhaps to reverse the outcome of the Revolutionary War, haunted the Madison Administration. There was one last chance to seize key parts of Canada before the British struck. The invading army was to form in western New York in the spring of 1814 under newly promoted Major General Jacob Brown.
Brown, who as a militia brigadier came into national prominence by his tactical skill and bold leadership in battle, now faced the most difficult challenge of a general officer -- the building of an army and the planning and execution of a campaign. Assisting him were a trio of brigadiers. Winfield Scott, tall, vain, and aggressive to the point of foolhardiness, was assigned to train the Left Division. Eleazar Ripley, unlike Scott, was not a professional soldier but a lawyer and politician before the war. Brown eventually gave Ripley command of a brigade of regulars. Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York assigned the aggressive and brave militia general Peter B. Porter to command the militia element of the invasion force. Porter, a War Hawk, had been at the forefront of the march to war in Congress. two years of defeats had not diminished his enthusiasm for fighting although his respect for regular officers had waned considerably. These generals contributed in varying degrees to molding units of largely untrained and inexperienced men into the most competent army the United States fielded during the war. [3]
Brown's regulars consisted of two thousand men who followed him out of winter quarters at French Mills and marched over 350 miles west to Buffalo. The Secretary of the Army, John Armstrong, ordered the remainder of the army at French Mills, six thousand regulars, to Lake Champlain where they became the Right Division. French mills reminded the Army of Valley forge. The weather was bitterly cold and food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies were all insufficient. Suffering and death were widespread. Each of the eight regiments Brown brought out of winter quarters was considerably understrength. As enlistments expired, many of the most experienced soldiers left and were slowly replaced by raw recruits. Except for the 1st Rifles and the 23rd Infantry, most of Brown's foot soldiers had seen little combat and what they had experienced was mostly defeat. But by 1814 those who remained were inured to the rigors of campaign and the weak officers had left the regiments. [4]
Governor Tompkins had promised Armstrong five thousand militia for the campaign if the War department would provide twenty-five hundred regulars. New York was already rotating militia units onto the Niagara Frontier every ninety days and the western counties tired of the incessant call ups. Two years of uneven performance by the militia persuaded Tompkins, in March, to authorize the recruiting of twenty-seven hundred volunteers for six months service with the same pay as regulars. Porter spent his time procuring weapons, uniforms, and camp equipment while his officers recruited volunteers. [5]
Porter also opened negotiations with the Iroquois to join the war. The New York Iroquois professed neutrality so that they would not have to fight their kin, the Grand River Iroquois, who supported the British from the start. but when the Grand River Indians burned Black Rock in July 1813 and destroyed the Tuscarora Village in December 1813, killing Iroquois in the process, the influential Seneca sachem Sa go ye wat ha threw in with the Americans. A real possibility of British victory and subsequent boundary changes existed in the spring of 1814. The sachem, known to whites as Red Jacket, was a fervent nationalist and he believed that Iroquois interests were best served if Indian lands remained within American boundaries. [6]
Another group of soldiers who would fight as part of the left Division were the Canadian Volunteers. In 1813, several hundred ex-patriate citizens of Upper Canada joined together under their leader Joseph Willcocks and offered their services to the Americans. The Canadian Volunteers were active in scouting, and raiding their former neighbors. In May 1814, Willcocks returned to the Niagara Frontier from Washington where he had successfully lobbied for federal recognition of his battalion. He found his band shrunken to fewer than one hundred, many of his soldiers now absent without leave. [7]
To Prepare an Army Buffalo 1814
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