Operation Cartwheel

Action in the Admiralties

To the Shores of Seeadler Harbour

by James Miller, jr.

Seizure of Momote Airfield

Meanwhile, at Oro Bay and Cape Cretin Colonel Hoffman's support force, numbering about 1,500 ground combat troops and 428 Seabees, had loaded aboard six LST's and an equal number of 2d Engineer Special Brigade LCM's that were towed by the LST's. These vessels, escorted by Australian and American destroyers and two minesweepers under Capt. E. F. V. Dechaineux of the Australian Navy, made a quiet voyage and stood into Hyane Harbour shortly after 0900 on 2 March.

The two minesweepers and one destroyer steamed to the north of Los Negros in an attempt to force the 1,500-yard-wide entrance to Seeadler Harbour. They encountered such heavy fire from Japanese coastal guns on the guardian islands of Hauwei and Ndrilo that they retired. Captain Dechaineux then brought three more destroyers, which fired at the Japanese while the first three ships again unsuccessfully attempted to force the passage. Minesweeping would obviously have to await ships with heavier guns than those of destroyers and minesweepers.

The LST's and LCM's made their way through the entrance to Hyane Harbour and beached, whereupon Japanese mortars and machine guns north of the skidway opened up. The landing craft replied with their machine guns, and at the same time B-25's attacked the Japanese positions.

In the midst of the din the combat troops walked ashore. Then bulldozers left the LST's and began building ramps to get the other vehicles ashore. Unloading was finished by 1700, and the LST's departed; the LCM's remained in Hyane Harbour.

Before the LST's left for New Guinea Chase requested that the destroyers put fire in the northern point of land at Hyane Harbour. Four ships each fired fifty 5-inch rounds from close range, but when the LST's started out of the harbor they met machine gun fire. They replied and made the open sea in safety. One destroyer and the two minesweepers took the LST's to New Guinea while four destroyers stayed in the vicinity of the Admiralties to intercept any Japanese seaborne attacks.

Since Momote airfield was not yet in American hands, Chase assigned part of the 40th Construction Battalion to a defensive sector on the right (north) flank of the beachhead. The Seabees, meeting some rifle fire while moving into position, used their ditch-digger to scoop out a 300-yard-lon trench.

As men, weapons, ammunition, supplies, and equipment came ashore during the day the beachhead became crowded. Chase decided to attack and enlarge his perimeter to include all the airfield, dispersal area, and revetments, and the roads immediately around the airfield. When Hoffman came ashore in the morning he was met by Colonel Thompson, who took him to Chase's headquarters where the three officers completed plans for an attack by the 5th Cavalry that afternoon.

At 1415, B-25's, P-38's, and P-47's began bombing and strafing the west half of the airfield, the dispersal area, the skidway, and the northern part of Los Negros. This attack lasted until 1530.

The 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 5th Cavalry, on the left (south) and right respectively, had attacked at 1500. There was no opposition from the enemy; within the hour Hoffman's regiment was in possession of the entire airfield and had begun to dig in along the line of the western and southern dispersal bays. The day's sole casualties, two men killed and four wounded, were caused by three American bombs that fell on positions held by E Troop and antiaircraft artillerymen.

It was clear to the Americans that the Japanese garrison had not yet made its maximum effort, for papers found in the advance over the airfield indicated that Baba's battalion was still south and west of the airfield. And earlier estimates had placed two thousand troops in the west half of Los Negros and Lorengau. Major Chiaramonte therefore warned the invasion force to expect attacks from the south, from Porlaka in the west, and southward from the skidway. (BREWER Rcn TF S-2 Periodic Rpts 1-3, 1, 2, and 3 Mar 44, in Vol. II, 1st Cav Brigade Hist Rpt, 27 Feb-18 May 44.)

The invading Americans carefully prepared their defense positions. The front lines, still without barbed wire, included nearly all the dispersal area. Two antiaircraft batteries and E Company, 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, were assigned to beach defense. Seabees established an inner defense line west and northwest of Chase's command post. The three 75-mm. batteries of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion set up in revetments some five hundred yards behind the front in a semicircle with overlapping sectors of fire. Because it was next to impossible to prevent the Japanese from infiltrating the front lines, all units inside the perimeter prepared all-round local defenses. (General Chase again requested barbed wire by air but reported that he never received it.)

Ezaki Attacks Again

Colonel Ezaki now was preparing for a larger effort. He planned a co-ordinated attack, with the 2d Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment, driving south from Salami across the skidway, while one company, having moved from western Los Negros to Porlaka, struck eastward. Meanwhile, other detachments from the outlying islands and from inland regions of Manus were to concentrate at Lorengau. His forces were slow in concentrating, and Ezaki postponed the attack until the night of 3-4 March. As a result the 5th Cavalry was merely harassed in its new positions on the night of 2-3 March.

The Americans used the daylight hours to strengthen their defenses. ([Frierson] The Admiralties, PP. 43-44, asserts that when a group of Japanese officers attempted to land on the beachhead from a boat on the morning of 3 March they were all killed, and that a document carried by one of them warned the Americans to expect attack that night. No contemporary evidence to support this statement has been found.)

Bulldozers cleared fields of fire in front of the cavalry squadrons' lines. To keep infiltration to a minimum, each cavalry troop posted three rifle platoons in line with troop heavy weapons attached to each platoon. Japanese revetments were used as much as possible. Riflemen dug foxholes on the reverse slopes of the mounds, mines were laid in front, and the approaches to all positions were rigged with empty C-ration cans that contained lumps of coral and were hung close to the ground so they would rattle when struck by a shoe. The 60-mm. mortars were situated to deliver close support fire directly in front of the cavalry squadrons, while the 8 i's were massed near the center of the perimeter in front of the field artillery to deliver deeper supporting fire. Most of the antiaircraft .50-callber machine guns were returned to their normal missions, but since the main attacks were expected from the north and west the guns posted on the north end of Momote field facing the skidway remained at the front.

While the riflemen made ready, the artillery and the offshore destroyers fired at every evidence of the Japanese. They put concentrations on enemy groups north of the skidway. At 1600 field and antiaircraft artillery shot up several enemy barges that were observed behind overhanging vegetation on the north shore of Hyane Harbour.

After dusk Japanese patrols began probing the lines, and at 2100 a lone plane dropped eight bombs which cut the telephone wires between the 1st Squadron and the 5th Cavalry command post.

When the plane departed, flares and tracers heralded an attack by the remnants of the late Baba's battalion against the southwest portion of the perimeter, held by the 1st Squadron under Lt. Col. Charles E. Brady. Mortar and machine gun fire supported the attack, but it was weak. American mortars and machine guns beat off the attackers, although some infiltrated the lines, concealed themselves, and had to be flushed out and killed after daylight.

The 2d Battalion, 1st Independent Mixed Regiment, delivered the main assault from the skidway, which was coupled with a drive east from Porlaka by other detachments. F Troop, which held the north-south portion of the line in the western dispersal area, and G Troop, defending the line from F Troop's right flank to the beach, received the brunt of the attacks. E Troop suffered only harassing attacks and infiltration. By now the 2d Squadron, having landed on 29 February, had had more than enough experience in repelling night attacks, but this one differed from earlier ones in which the enemy had moved quietly and concealed himself as much as possible. On this night the Japanese advanced in the open in frontal assault with a good deal of talking, shouting, and even singing. Artillery and mortars opened fire at once.

As they approached F and G Troops, the leading enemy waves hurled grenades, but they fell short of the cavalry lines. The Japanese pushed through the mine fields, taking casualties but not stopping, and drove into the interlocking bands of fire from the machine guns, which promptly cut them down. More kept coming; the cavalry lines held, but some Japanese managed to infiltrate and cut telephone lines. G Troop's three platoons stayed down in their positions and fired or hurled grenades at all possible targets. just before dawn some Japanese soldiers penetrated G Troop's positions and Capt. Frank G. Mayfield organized a quick counterattack and drove them out. A few minutes later the Japanese assaulted again. This time, as two of Mayfield's platoons had exhausted their machine gun ammunition, the Japanese nearly succeeded in breaking through. But the Japanese were killed or driven off by a platoon of H Troop heavy machine guns under S/Sgt. Edwin C. Terry.

During these attacks Sgt. Troy A. McGill, of G Troop, was holding a revetment with his squad of eight men. When all but McGill and one other man had been killed or wounded, McGill ordered the other survivor to retire, fired his rifle until it jammed, then fought in front of his position with clubbed rifle until he was slain. McGill's gallantry won him the Medal of Honor. (WD GO 35, 9 May 45.)

The attacks had been delivered with frequency and resolution throughout the night, but there was little evidence of skill or co-ordination. For example, about an hour before daylight a column of soldiers advanced down the road from Porlaka, singing, the cavalrymen later reported, "Deep in the Heart of Texas." (The Japanese may have been singing, but it seems improbable that they sang this song, which was a favorite of the 1st Cavalry Division. The Rd Squadron had been on Los Negros for four days, and this was its third night in close combat. One may guess that nerves were strained, imaginations overactive.)

Mines, machine guns, rifles, and grenades killed nearly all of them.

Reports of the night's action also relate instances of Japanese shouting false commands in English and tapping telephone lines. One H Troop mortar section thought it heard an order to retreat and abandoned its position with the result that the 2d Squadron lost its 81 -mm. mortar support.

During the night the 99th Field Artillery Battalion fired almost continuously, as did all mortars except those that were abandoned. This fire was delivered in spite of harassing attacks from Japanese who had slipped through the front lines. Three field artillerymen were killed by infiltrators, and one antiaircraft crew abandoned its gun under pressure from the Japanese. Five Japanese, one with a grenade discharger, actually posted themselves on the roof of the dugout containing Colonel Lobit's command post, but Capt. Bruce Merritt killed them from his nearby foxhole. The Seabees, in their secondary line behind G Troop, passed ammunition to the hardpressed cavalrymen and toward dawn some moved up to help G Troop hold its line. Other Seabees met a group of Japanese attacking two antiaircraft gun positions and killed them.

By daylight of 4 March the Japanese had pulled back and the close fighting was over, but enemy mortars and field pieces hit the American positions until about 0730. The intensity of the night's action is indicated by the fact that two of the machine guns in G Troop's sector had fired a total of 8,770 rounds, and 168 enemy corpses lay directly to the troop's front. There were no prisoners. Sixtyone Americans were killed, 244 wounded, of whom 9 dead and 38 wounded were Seabees. Ezaki had made his greatest offensive effort and failed. With more Americans due soon, the shattered Japanese units would be capable of defensive action only.

The Advance

On 1 March, meanwhile, at ALAMO headquarters on Cape Cretin General Krueger had completed plans for reinforcement of Chase's men and for seizure of the entire Admiralties group. (The total forces involved included the rest of the 1st Cavalry Division; Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Group; C Battery, 237th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Searchlight); the 211th Coast Artillery Battalion (Antiaircraft); the 2d Battalion, 50th Coast Artillery Regiment; the Shore Battalion and A Company, Boat Battalion, 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment; and a large array of signal, medical, quartermaster, and engineer units.)

Krueger ordered Swift to strengthen the reconnaissance force, seize Seeadler Harbour, extend control over the entire Admiralties, and start building airdromes and a naval base. (ALAMO FO II, 1 Mar 44, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jul 7, 1-3 Mar 44.)

On the 2d, the day Hoffman's support force landed, Krueger received an urgent request from Chase, who asked for his other regiment, the 12th Cavalry. Krueger, Swift, and Barbey then arranged to speed up the movement to the Admiralties and land the 12th Cavalry and other units on 6 March, the 2d Cavalry Brigade on 9 March instead of on 9 and 16 March, as they had originally planned. (Rad, CC, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, 1 Mar 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 1 Mar 44.)

They also arranged to rush the 2d Squadron and the Weapons Troop, 7th Cavalry, and the 82d Field Artillery Battalion on three APD's, to arrive on the morning of 4 March. ([Frierson] The Admiralties, P. 43; Rad, Chase to CG ALAMO, 2 Mar 44, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl 7; Rad, ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, 2 Mar 44, and Rad, CTF 76 to Comdr Seventh Flt, 2 Mar 44, both in CHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 2 Mar 44. Barbey proposed using LST's for the 4 March reinforcements, but Krueger persuaded him to send them on APD's.)

General Krueger desired that Seeadler' Harbour be opened up. Two factors, besides the obvious one that Allied forces were eventually to use the harbor as a major naval base, motivated him. Hyane Harbour and the initial beachhead were becoming too congested to receive the 2d Brigade, but Salami Plantation on the west shore of the northwest peninsula of Los Negros offered a good landing place. Clearing the harbor would also make possible a shore-to-shore movement from Los Negros against Manus.

Therefore air and naval bombardments of enemy positions on the northwest tip of Los Negros, and on the guardian islands of Koruniat, Ndrilo, and Hauwei were arranged. (ALAMO Force Rpt, BREWER Opus, p. 11; Rad, CG ALAMO to GHQ SWPA, 4 Mar 44, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 4 Mar 44.)

Krueger, on 3 March, ordered Swift to proceed to Los Negros at once, to survey the situation, and to take command ashore.

On the morning of 4 March, shortly after Ezaki's attack subsided and after supporting Allied destroyers had shelled the skidway and the region to the north, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, and the 82d Field Artillery Battalion (75mm, pack howitzers) landed at Hyane Harbour. Chase decided to wait for more troops before attacking, and put the 2d Squadron, 7th, under Lt. Col. Robert P. Kirk, in the line to replace the weary men of the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry. Except for minor harassing attacks, infiltrations, and a one-plane bombing attack, the night of 4-5 March was quiet.

General Swift, accompanied by the 1st Cavalry Division's chief of staff, Col. Charles A. Sheldon, and the intelligence and operations officers, reached Hyane Harbour aboard the destroyer Bush on the morning of 5 March. He assumed command of the troops ashore at 1100, but since the Bush was busy executing fire support missions he stayed aboard until 1600 so as not to interrupt the firing.

Swift directed Chase's reconnaissance force to clear the major part of Los Negros from Momote to the north and west, and to be prepared to extend over the entire island. He instructed the 2d Cavalry Brigade, due to arrive on 9 March, to land at Salami Plantation, to be prepared to move to a point on Manus west of Lorengau, and to attack eastward against that airfield and secure the eastern half of Manus. (BREWER TF FO 3, 5 Mar 44, in ALAMO ANCHORAGE Jnl 8, 4-6 Mar 44.)

To carry out the instructions for seizing all of Los Negros, the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was ordered to attack north across the skidway on the afternoon of the 5th. Accordingly the 2d Squadron, 5th, began relieving Colonel Kirk's squadron in the perimeter late in the morning.

At 1120, while the relief was being effected, the Japanese began a series of harassing attacks, followed after noon by a resolute attack from Porlaka and the skidway. The enemy soldiers who broke into the front lines were all killed while field artillery and mortars broke up the attacks. Twenty-five dead Japanese bodies were counted, but twelve cavalrymen were wounded and it was 1630 before the 2d Squadron, 7th, was reorganized and ready to attack.

Once it had moved beyond the perimeter, Kirk's squadron found that the Japanese had mined the approaches to the skidway. The mines caused some casualties at first but thereafter were successfully detected and removed. The squadron advanced slowly past enemy corpses that littered the road, but by darkness had reached the skidway, where it halted for the night.

Kirk resumed his advance early on 6 March. Later in the morning the i2th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Col. John H. Stadler, Jr., came ashore. Transported to Hyane Harbour aboard four LST's, the combat team, 2,837 men strong, consisted of the 12th Cavalry; the 271st Field Artillery Battalion (105- mm. howitzers); three light tanks of the 603d Tank Company; five LVT's of A Company, 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment; and engineer, medical, and signal troops. (12th Cav, Hist of 12th Cav During the Admiralty Islands Campaign, 27 May 44, P. 3)

When it reached shore, the 12th Cavalry, accompanied by the tanks, began moving north across the skidway to join Kirk in the advance, while the 271st Field Artillery Battalion moved into position near the airstrip. The Japanese, obviously in retreat, offered only minor resistance. The advance was slowed chiefly by mud and trees they had felled across the roads and trails to Salami. Near the beach at Salami some Japanese in bunkers and buildings offered fight but were blasted out by tanks and 75mm. howitzers.

By 1630 all three cavalry squadrons were established at Salami. The surviving Japanese had escaped by boat and canoe to the west. Thus by the day's end the 1st Cavalry Brigade held the beachhead where the 2d Brigade was to land.

Meanwhile air and naval surface forces had been at work on the Japanese positions guarding the entrance to Seeadler Harbour. Two days after the minesweepers were driven off, cruisers and destroyers of Admiral Crutchley's Task Force 74 bombarded suspected enemy gun positions on orders from Admiral Kinkaid, and on 5 March they fired eighty 8-inch, three hundred 6-inch, and one hundred 5-inch rounds without meeting any return fire. (Rad, Comdr Seventh Flt to CTF 74, 4 Mar 44, and Rad, CTF 76 to CG ALAMO, 5 Mar 44, both in ALAMO ANCHORAGE JnI 8, 4-6 Mar 44.)

Next morning, the lone destroyer Nicholson approached the harbor entrance to draw enemy fire. The Japanese opened up at 850 yards range, whereupon Task Force 74 and Allied bombers struck at the enemy positions thus disclosed. They were bombed again on 7 March by seven B-24's, and on 8 March by seventeen B-24's and eleven B-25's. Thereafter LCM's, destroyers, and other craft entered the harbor freely without encountering enemy fire.

From 6 through 8 March the 5th Cavalry extended its holdings around the airstrip. The 2d Squadron took Porlaka on 6 March, then crossed Lemondrol Creek in canvas and rubber boats and amphibian tractors to seize Papitalai village on 7 March.

American control over Seeadler Harbour was furthered on 7 and 8 March by the seizure of two promontories northwest of Papitalai. The 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, using amphibian tractors, shuttled from Salami to Papitalai Mission and captured it against sharp opposition. The 2d Squadron, 7th, using LCM's, took Lombrum Plantation.

The 12th Cavalry and the tanks patrolled to the northwest tip of Los Negros to cover the 2d Brigade's landing, releasing, in the process, sixty-nine Sikh soldiers that the Japanese had been using as laborers.

On the morning of 9 March destroyers shelled Lorengau and minesweepers checked Seeadler Harbour.

LST's LOADED WITH TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT landing at Salami Plantation.

Then six LST's and one cargo ship entered the harbor to land Brig. Gen. Verne D. Mudge's 2d Cavalry Brigade and attached units at Salami Plantation. (This force consisted of: the 2d Cavalry Brigade (less the 2d Squadron and Weapons Troop, 7th Cavalry); the 61st Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzers); various divisional and nondivisional engineer, medical, quartermaster, and ordnance units; B Battery, 168th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Gun); B Battery, 2iith Coast Artillery Battalion; F Company, 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment; an Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit detachment; and a detachment of No. 62 Works Wing, RAAF.))

Los Negros was now firmly in Allied hands. The next task facing the combat troops was the seizure of Lorengau.

More Action in the Admiralties

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