The 43d Division In the 43d Division's zone, the offensive began as scheduled on the morning of 25 July. For once the weather was favorable. D Day dawned fair and clear, with visibility as good as could be expected in the jungle. Naval gunfire, air, and artillery preparations went off as scheduled. Commander Burke's seven destroyers had sailed up from Tulagi. At 0609 the two screening destroyers fired the first of four thousand 5-inch shells at Lambeti Plantation; these were followed by the main group at 0614. Visibility to seaward was good, but the morning haze still hung over Lambeti Plantation. Fifteen minutes later visibility had improved but now the target area was partly obscured by smoke and dust raised by the bombardment. (When the infantrymen later reached Lambeti Plantation they found that although the bombardment had done extensive damage many positions, which could have been destroyed only by direct hits, remained intact. The theoretical density of this shelling was 70 rounds per 100 square yards. Admiral Wilkinson, who thought the target area was too far west of the front lines, later observed that 200 rounds per 100 square yards would be required to achieve complete destruction. Because of the difficulty in distinguishing targets in morning haze, Commander Burke recommended that shore bombardments should not start earlier than twenty minutes before sunrise. See CTF 31 (Com III AMPHFOR) Action Rpt for Morning 25 Jul 43, The Bombardment of Munda, 3 Sep 43, in Off of Naval Rcds and Library; and ONI USN, Operations in the New Georgia Area, PP. 53-54.) Firing ceased at 0644. From 0630 to 0700, 254 aircraft unloaded 500,800 pounds of fragmentation and high explosive bombs on their target area, a 1,500-by-250-yard strip beginning about 500 yards west of the 103d Infantry's front lines. No corps artillery concentrations were fired on 25 July, but the 43d Division's supporting artillery began before 0700 the first of more than 100 preparations that were fired that day. The 103d and 152d Field Artillery Battalions fired more than 2,150 105-mm. howitzer shells; the 155-mm, howitzers of the 136th Field Artillery Battalion threw 1,182 rounds at the enemy. With the din subsiding as the artillery shifted its fire to positions farther west, the infantrymen of the 43d Division moved to the attack at 0700. In the 172d Infantry's zone the 2d and 3d Battalions on the left and right attacked westward a(yainst Shimizu Hill. But by 1000 they had run into the enemy pillbox line and halted. Colonel Ross then requested tanks, got some from the corps reserve, and attacked again. By 1430 three tanks were disabled, and the attack stalled. A little ground had been gained on the regimental left. The 103d Infantry, now commanded by Colonel Brown, attacked alongside the 172d with little more success. (Colonel Brown, formerly commander of the 2d Battalion, took over regimental command when Colonel Hundley replaced the 43d Division chief of staff on 22 July) The 3d Battalion, on the left, pushed forward against machine gun and mortar fire, but immediately hit the Japanese line and stopped. The battalion attempted to move around the pillboxes but found that this maneuver took its men into other machine gun fire lanes. The 2d Battalion, 103d, in the center of the 43d's zone, did better. It moved forward two or three hundred yards against light opposition. By 104o E Company's leading elements had advanced five hundred yards. The company kept moving until noon, when it had reached the beach near Terere. Here it set up a hasty defense position. But the companies on either flank had not been able to keep up, and the Japanese moved in behind E Company to cut the telephone line to battalion headquarters. To exploit E Company's breakthrough, General Hester took the 3d Battalion, 169th Infantry, out of division reserve and ordered it to push through the same hole E Company had found. But the Japanese had obviously become aware of the gap, and as the 3d Battalion marched to the line of departure it was enfiladed by fire from the south part of Shimizu Hill and from the pillboxes to the south. It halted. Five Marine tanks were then ordered to push over Shimizu Hill but could not get up the steep slopes. When three of them developed vapor lock all were pulled back to Laiana. In late afternoon the E Company commander decided to abandon his exposed, solitary position, and E Company came safely back through the Japanese line to the 2d Battalion. North of the 43d Division the 37th Division had made scant progress. (See below, pp. 149-52.) Thus the first day of General Griswold's offensive found the XIV Corps held for little gain except in the center of the 43d Division's line. The 43d Division was weakened by almost a month's combat, and its reduced strength was spread over a long, irregular, slanting front. It was obvious that combat efficiency would be increased by narrowing the front, and this could be done by advancing the left and straightening the line. Consequently Hester's plan for 26 July called for the 172d to stay in place while the 103d Infantry attempted to advance the eight hundred yards from Ilangana to Terere. Strong combat patrols went out in the morning of 26 July to fix the location of the Japanese pillboxes as accurately as possible. After their return, the artillery began firing at 1115, one hour before the infantry was to attack. At 1145 the 103d's front was covered with smoke and tinder its cover the front-line companies withdrew a hundred yards. At noon the artillery put its fire on the Japanese positions directly in front. As the tanks were not quite ready at H Hour, 1215, the artillery kept firing for ten more minutes. It lifted fire one hundred yards at 1225, and the 103d started forward. The tanks led the advance in the center; behind them was the infantry. Flame Throwers Attached to the 103d for the attack were 2d Lt. James F. Olds, Jr., the acting corps chemical officer, and six volunteers from the 118th Engineer Battalion. Each carried a flame thrower, a weapon which the 43d Division had brought to New Georgia but had not used up to now. (On 19 July Griswold radioed Guadalcanal to state his urgent need for more M1A1 flame throwers.) Griswold, whose headquarters had conducted flame thrower schools on Guadalcanal, was aware of the weapon's possibilities. That morning the six engineers had received one hour of training in the use of the M1Al flame thrower. The flame throwers went forward with the infantry, which halted about twenty yards in front of the pillbox line and covered it with small arms fire. Under cover of this fire the flame thrower operators, their faces camouflaged with dirt, crawled forward. Operating in teams of two and three, they sprayed flame over three barely visible pillboxes in front of the center of the 103d's line. Vegetation was instantly burned off. In sixty seconds the three pillboxes were knocked out and their four occupants were dead. (Capt. James F. Olds, Jr., "Flamethrowers Front and Center," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, VOL 30, No. 3 (June-July 1944), PP. 5-9. This account, while valuable, seems to have telescoped two situations and actions into one, for Olds asserts that the 103d was at Lambeti Plantation on 26 July. From the fact that three pillboxes had only four occupants, it would seem that this part of the Japanese line was lightly manned.) Operations of the infantry, tanks, flame throwers, and supporting heavy weapons and artillery met with almost complete success. The 103d Infantry encountered seventy-four pillboxes on a 600-yard front, but by midafternoon, spurred on by pressure from General Wing, it had reduced enemy resistance at Ilangana. From there it continued its advance through underbrush and vines and gained almost 800 yards. By 1700 the left flank rested on the coastal village of Kia. The 43d Division's line, formerly 1,700 yards long, was now much straighter by 300 yards. From 28 through 31 July, the 43d Division inched slowly forward, a few yards on the right flank and about five hundred yards along the coast. This was accomplished by "aggressive action and small unit maneuver, combined with constant artillery and mortar action [which] gradually forced the enemy back from his high ground defenses." (43d Div Rpt of Opns, Munda Campaign, p. 13.) The 172d ground its way over Shimizu Hill the last real ridge between it and Munda airfield, and in doing so it helped unhinge the main Japanese defense system in its zone, just as the 103d's drive through Ilangana had broken the enemy line on the left. (Unfortunately the records are too scanty to provide details showing just how the 172d took this position. During the attack 1st Lt. Robert S. Scott almost singlehandedly halted a Japanese counterattack and for his gallantry was awarded the Medal of Honor. WD GO 81, 14 Oct 44.) Major Zimmer's 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry, was brought over from Rendova on 29 July; the 3d Battalion, now commanded by Maj. Ignatius M. Ramsey, was taken out of division reserve and the 169th (less the 2d Battalion) was assigned a zone between the 172d and the 103d. (Colonel Reincke was now regimental executive officer.) As the month ended the 169th (less its 2d Battalion in corps reserve) was in the process of extending to the northwest to pinch out the 172d. Command of the 43d Division changed hands on 29 July when Maj. Gen. John R. Hodae, the tough, blunt commander of the Americal Division, came tip from the Fijis to take over from Hester. This change was ordered by General Harmon who felt that Hester had exhausted himself. General Hodge had served as assistant commander of the 25th Division during the Guadalcanal Campaign, and thus had had more experience in jungle warfare than any other general then in New Georgia. Hodge, Harmon wrote, was the "best Div Comdr I have in area for this particular job." (See Ltr, Harmon to Griswold, quoted in SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia Campaign, L 25, OCMH. See also Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p. 161; Rad 2027, COMGENSOPAC to CofS USA, 10 Aug 43, in Marshall's IN Log.) The 43d Division, having cracked through the Shimizu Hill-Ilangana positions, was in a favorable position to drive against Munda under its new commander, while the 37th Division on its right fought its way through the enemy positions in its hilly, jungled zone. More XIV Corps Offensive Plans Ilangana and Shimizu Hill Attack Against the Ridges Advance and Withdrawal Jungle Techniques and Problems Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com