The plan for the XIV Corps' drive against Munda was completed shortly after Griswold took over. (Unless otherwise indicated this chapter is based on the same sources as Chapter VIII.) Col. Eugene W. Ridings, Griswold's assistant chief of staff, G-3, flew to Koli Point to confer with General Harmon and Admiral Wilkinson on naval gunfire and air support. Ridings also asked for, and obtained, a better radio (SCR 193) for Liversedge, to improve communications between him and Griswold. Harmon stressed the importance of submitting a precise plan for air support to Admiral Mitscher. Dive bombers would naturally be the best for close work, while mediums and heavies should be used for area bombing, he asserted. Harmon agreed to send in more tanks at Griswold's request. I(It was at this conference that he approved the transfer of the 161st Regimental Combat Team to New Georgia.) Plans The American Plan Naval support plans called for a sevendestroyer bombardment of Lambeti Plantation shortly before the infantry's advance. Comdr. Arleigh A. Burke, the destroyer division commander, came to Rendova on 23 July to view Roviaria Lagoon and select visual check points. Air support for the offensive would include besides the normal fighter cover, pattern bombing by multiengine planes in front of the 43d Division about halfway between Ilangana and Lambeti Plantation. Single-engine planes would strike at positions north and northeast of Munda field. Artillery spotting planes and liaison planes would be on station continuously. Artillery support would be provided by Barker's artillery from its island positions. Plans called for fairly standard employment of the field artillery, providing for direct and general support of the attack, massing of fires in each infantry's zone of advance, counterbattery fire, and the defense of Rendova against seaborne and air attack. One 105-mmhowitzer battalion was assigned to direct support of each regiment, one 155-mmhowitzer battalion to general support of each division. Except for specific direct and general support missions, all artillery would operate as the corps artillery under Barker. The XIV Corps had neither organic artillery nor an artillery commander. (See Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp. 218-19.) Griswold's field order, issued on 22 July, directed his corps to attack vigorously to seize Munda airfield and Bibilo Hill from its present positions which ran from Ilangana northwest for about three thousand yards. (Map 10) Map 10: Capture of Munda Point Jumbo Map: Capture of Munda Point (very slow: 238K) The 37th Division was to make the corps' main effort. Beightler's division was to attack to its front, envelop the enemy's left (north) flank, seize Bibilo Hill, and drive the enemy into the sea. At the same time it would protect the corps' right flank and rear. The 43d Division was ordered to make its main effort on the right. Its objectives were Lambett Plantation and the airfield. Liversedge's force, depleted by the abortive attack on Bairoko, was to continue patrolling and give timely information regarding any Japanese move to send overland reinforcements to Munda. The 9th Defense Battalion's Tank Platoon would assemble at Laiana under corps control. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 169th Infantry, at Rendova, constituted the corps reserve. (Griswold issued his attack order as NGOF FO 1, 22 July 43, although Hester had issued NGOF FO 1 in June.) The 37th Division was less the 129th Regimental Combat Team and the 3d Battalions, 145th and 148th Infantry Regiments, and was reinforced by the 161st Regimental Combat Team (less its artillery) and a detachment of South Pacific Scouts. The 43d Division was less nearly all its headquarters, whose officers were filling most of the posts in Occupation Force headquarters, and less two battalions of the 169th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 103d Infantry.) All units were ordered to exert unceasing pressure on the enemy. Isolated points of resistance were not to be allowed to halt the advance, but were to be bypassed, contained, and reduced later. Griswold ordered maximum use of infantry heavy weapons to supplement artillery. Roads would be pushed forward with all possible speed. D Day was set for 25 July. The thirtyminute naval bombardment was to start at 0610, the air bombing at 0635. The line of departure, running northwest from Ilangana, was practically identical with the American front lines except in the zone of the 161st Infantry where the existence of the Japanese strongpoint east of the line had been determined on 24 July. The XIV Corps was thus attempting a frontal assault on a two-division front, with the hope of effecting an evelopment on the north. In the initial attack it would employ two three- battalion regiments (the 161st and the 172d) and three two-battalion regiments (the 103d, the 145th, and the 148th). Enemy Positions and Plans On 22 July the Japanese front line ran inland in a northwesterly direction for some 3,200 yards. This line was manned by the entire 229th Infantry, and at the month's end the 2d Battalion, 23oth Infantry, was also assigned to it. In support were various mountain artillery, antitank, antiaircraft, and automatic weapons units. (These included the Antitank Battalion, 38th Division; 2d Independent Antitank Battalion; a detachment of the 2d Battalion, 90th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment; thirteen 7.7-mm. machine guns, and two 75-mm. antiaircraft units.) The positions were the same complex of camouflaged and mutually supporting pillboxes, trenches, and foxholes that had halted Hester in midmonth. The pillboxes started near the beach at Ilangana and ran over the hills in front of the 103d, 172d, 145th, and 161st Regiments. A particularly strong series lay on a tangled set of jungled hills: Shimizu Hill in front of the 172d Infantry, and Horseshoe Hill (so named from its configuration) in front of the 145th and 161st Regiments. Horseshoe Hill lay northwest of Kelley Hill and invest of Reincke Ridge. East of Horseshoe Hill lay the Japanese pocket discovered by the 161st. The pocket lay on a north-south ridge that was joined to Horseshoe Hill by a rough saddle. The pillbox line terminated at about the northern boundary of the 161st Infantry. When the 2d Battalion, 230th Infantry, was committed it did not occupy carefully prepared positions. From the end of the pillboxes the line ran west to the beach, and this north flank does not seem to have been strongly held. XIV Corps headquarters still estimated that four enemy battalions faced it; three at Munda and one at Bairoko. This was a fairly accurate estimate of strength on the enemy line, but Sasaki had an ace up his sleeve--the 13th Infantry. This regiment, which was not in full strength, was stationed on the American right flank about 4,900 yards west by north from Ilangana. Sasaki's plans to use his ace were similar to his earlier plans. On the same day that Griswold issued his field order, Sasaki directed Colonel Tomonari to attack the American right flank in the vicinity of Horseshoe Hill on 23 July, then drive east along the Munda Trail. But the Americans struck before Tomonari made his move. More XIV Corps Offensive Plans Ilangana and Shimizu Hill Attack Against the Ridges Advance and Withdrawal Jungle Techniques and Problems Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com