French Development Efforts The British, though first, were not alone in their efforts to craft a tank. The French had a parallel program of design and development working the concept of a machine-gun proof armored vehicle. Lt. Col. Jean Baptiste Eugene Estienne, commander of the French 6th Division's 22nd Regiment artillery, is deemed to be the first prophet of French armor. He remarked during the early September 1914 retreat that the first side to make land iron clads that can cross ploughed fields will win the war. In 1915, after seeing British artillery tractors haul guns, Estienne proposed a mobile armored vehicle three times to the French Commander in Chief. The third time was evidently a charm, no doubt helped by a number of costly failed French offensives, for in December 1915, he was granted an interview with the sub chief of staff at General HQ. He returned to the artillery, this time the 3rd Corps at Verdun, although he kept in touch with various company and military officials about the armored idea. Granted leave to work with M. Brille of the Schneider Creusot engineering company in Paris, he came up with a preliminary design. On February 25, 1916, the GHQ placed an order for 400 "chars d'assaut" without waiting for a prototype. Shortly thereafter, Undersecretary of Inventions Committee M. Breton, who had been working on his own design, received permission for 400 of his machines to be produced by the Compagnie des Forges d'Honecourt at St. Chamond. The 14-ton Char Schneider (right) packed a 75mm gun mounted on the right front of the tank and Hotchkiss machine guns in blisters on the sides. It could attain 2.5mph on level ground. Armor 25mm in thickness would protect the front, with thinner armor on the sides, rear, and top. The 23-ton Char St. Chamond packed a 75mm gun mounted in the center and four machine guns, had electrically driven tracks, and could attain 5mph on level ground. Armor 17mm in thickness would protect the front, with thinner armor on the sides, rear, and top. Unlike the British design, both French designs were tank over tracks, although the relatively short track length hampered trench crossing. In June of 1916, Estienne visited the British tank outfit for a demonstration. As you'd expect, he was impressed enough to suggest collaboration, which ultimately was not well received by either program. He also noted that the British developed slow, heavy tanks, which made him think the French should develop light, fast moving tanks. He also suggested that the British hold off using their tanks until the French completed their program so as to surprise the Germans with a multitude of tanks. That advice, echoing Swinton's plea for mass, was ignored. Also in June, he laid out the idea of a mass of armored skirmishers, small two-man tanks that would precede the larger Schneiders and St. Chamonds. This was presented to the Renault company, however, French GHQ declined to proceed with the idea until November, when further details were worked out and a small number of machines were ordered for a demonstration. This was made in March, 1917, but it wasn't until June 1917 that 3500 of these light tanks were ordered. By October 1916, Estienne was in command of the French tank unit located at Champlieu. In December, the first batch of tanks were delivered: 16 Schneiders. By April of 1917, the force had been built up to 9 companies of Schneiders and one company of St. Chamonds. Battle of Arras Although the British had originally expected 240 Mark IVs to lead the attack, in fact none arrived in time for the battle. The 60 Mark Is and IIs on hand were divided: 8 for First Army, 40 for Third Army (16 for VI Corps, 16 for VII Corps, and 8 for XVII Corps), and 12 for Fifth Army. The idea, as before, was to use them in small packets against strongpoints. Heavy rains and snow swept the battlefield prior to the April 9, 1917 attack, and again, like the Somme in 1916, most of the tanks ditched, bogged down, broke down, or were taken out by enemy action. Some successes occurred, notably a small contingent of Australian infantry led by tanks capturing Riencourt for a brief moment before being overwhelmed, but the criticism outweighed the praise. On April 23, the offensive was renewed with 20 tanks back in action, and again, most tanks did not reach German lines. May 3rd found another surge with 13 tanks, but again, it petered out. The French tanks debuted in an attack on April 16, but instead of the 800 tanks envisioned, 128 Schneider tanks were employed. In one sector, 80 tanks attacked with good results, cracking the first and second German trench lines, but the infantry failed to follow up. In the other sector, 48 tanks were hit by concentrated German artillery fire and never made it past their own front line. A renewed attack at Laffaux Mill on May 5 with 32 Schneiders and 16 St. Chamonds achieved mixed results. The Schneiders achieved their objective, but the St. Chamonds were a dismal failure. Indeed, this pattern of 50%+ breakdowns and ditchings would continue through the summer months of 1917. When tanks could get to the Germans, they would work wonders in clearing trenches. The trick was to get them there. Preliminary artillery bombardments would churn up the ground, and wet weather would turn it into quagmires--spars or no spars. Dissipated strength didn't help either. In July 1917, the name of the British tank group was changed again, from Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps to Tank Corps, which it would remain through the end of the war and into the 1920s. The name changed again in 1923 when it became Royal Tank Corp. German Anti-Tank Efforts The Germans, having examined the Mark Is from the 1916 Somme battle, found out that their "K" bullet would puncture tank armor. In 1915, they developed the bullet because Allied troops increasingly protected weapons slits in trench lines with armor plating. The Germans subsequently supplied their front lines with such rounds to puncture Mark Is and IIs...and they worked. However, when up against the up-armored Mark IV, the K bullets failed to penetrate the thicker armor. They also developed a 36-pound Anti-Tank Rifle firing a .53 caliber bullet. It was only effective within a couple hundred yards, and was often unused as the troops were afraid to fire it up close and personal. A final development was called the TUF: Tank Und Flieger (Tank and Airplane). This was a special 13mm AT machine gun designed to pierce 30mm of armor. Approximately 60 factories were quickly adapted to turn out these specialty guns, but only 250 were made before the war ended, although plans called for 6,000 by April 1919. British Tanks in Egypt A small detachment of eight Mark I tanks was sent to Egypt to aid the Army in attacking the Turks in Palestine. Departing in December 1916, it arrived in January 1917 and started trials in the sand dunes--in part for show and in part to see that the fears about problems with sand were not justified. On April 17, 1917, the tanks went into action for the first time, and again, the commander parcelled them out. With slightly better luck of reaching the Turkish lines, they did well, but when ditched or disabled, the Turkish counterattack succeeded in pushing back British troops. It would be six months until the next attack. Reinforced by three Mark IVs, and back up to its eight-tank complement, a November 2, 1917 attack in Gaza showed particular success in breaking the Turkish trench lines, redoubts, and strongpoints. However, the attack was made to fix the enemy in place while a wide flanking movement occurred in the Beersheba area. Success with that phase of the battle meant the British shifted to a cavalry followup as the Turks pulled out. By March, 1918, the front had no use for tanks, and so the detachment was ordered back to Britain. More Tank Development Introduction Precursors to the Tank Early Designs: 1332-1912 The British Develop the Tank The First Tank Attack French Development, Arras, and German AT Battle of Cambrai Ludendorff Offensive and the First Tank vs. Tank Battle Conclusion Back to War Lore: The List Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Russ Lockwood. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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