The Development of the Tank
Through World War I

The Quest for Mobility,
Firepower, and Shock of Impact

Battle of Cambrai

by Russ Lockwood
www.magweb.com

If the Somme and Arras showed the potential of what the tank could do in bad conditions, Cambrai showed what it could accomplish in good conditions. In September, now General Elles met with 3rd Army commander General Sir Julien Byng to investigate the use of tanks in his planned operation. On October 13, 1917, the plan was tentatively approved by Haig, with a start date of November 20.

Unlike past offensives, this time the plan called for no preliminary artillery barrage (although follow-up and counterbattery fire would be used) and selected particularly good "tank terrain" to operate over. Furthermore, the British committed 378 Mark IV fighting tanks: 216 with III Corp, 108 with IV Corps, and 54 in reserve operating across the entire front. In addition, 54 of the new "supply tanks," nine "signal tanks" with wireless sets, 32 tanks with barbed wire grapplers, two with bridging material, and one with HQ Telephone cable were included in the attack. In all, the British fielded 476 tanks.

Because the section of German line used particularly wide trenches, 350 tanks carried fascines (bundles of brushwood bound by chains) that could be dropped into the trench and create a temporary bridge. Three-tank teams used carefully choreographed steps to cross the German trenches. The first "Advanced Guard Tank" would roll up to the first German trench, turn left without crossing it, and shoot up the German lines. The second "Infantry Tank" would rumble up to the first trench and drop in its fascine, cross the trench and turn left and shoot up the trench lines. The third "Infantry Tank" would roll over the fascine, drop its fascine into the second trench, cross over and turn right, shooting up the trenchlines. The "Advanced Guard Tank" would meanwhile circle back and cross the first and second trenches over the fascines and drive to the third trench, where it would drop its fascine into the third trench.

Meanwhile, special infantry teams would follow up in three parts: the "Trench Clearers" would work with the lead tanks to wipe out any Germans left in the trenches. The "Trench Stops" would try to bag as many prisoners who retreated to dugouts and redoubts, or clear them out if they would not surrender. And the "Trench Garrisons" would man the trenches to repel the expected counterattack.

RAF close support aircraft would strafe the enemy lines and bomb enemy HQs, and regular horse cavalry would make the follow-up pursuit once all trench lines were breached. A measure of secrecy was used, with trains running only at night, tank concentrations placed in woods, no additional aerial or artillery activity, and no widespread knowledge of the plan.

Another ruse, as clever as selecting "tank" as the name, was concocted to allay suspicions of commanding line officers. A room at 1st Tank Brigade HQ was labeled with "NO ADMITTANCE" and plenty of topical maps and plans were strewn about. It was hoped that curious officers would indeed enter the room and look for themselves at the plans--all of them fake.

Finally, General Elles planned to lead the attack in his own tank--to increase morale on the tankers. Elles' tank, Hilda, would run the same risks as all others, in addition to mounting a flag for all to see. Indeed, the night before the attack, November 19, 1917, he issued Special Order No. 6:

    1. Tomorrow the Tank Corps will have the chance for which it has been waiting for many months, to operate on good going in the van of battle.

    2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in the way of preparation.

    3. It remains for unit commanders and for Tank crews to complete the work by judgment and pluck in the battle itself.

    4. In light of past experience I leave the good name of the corps with great confidence in your hands.

    5. I propose leading the attack of the Centre Division.

At 6am, the attack went in with great surprise. Although the Germans had raided British trenches and captured a number of infantrymen the night of the 18th, little was done to strengthen the sector other than post a few machine guns from reserve to forward areas. As the tanks approached the first trench, some measure of panic gripped the German infantry. When the fascines went down and the tanks began to cross, mass panic ensued. The trenches were cleared with relative ease.

Still, here the Germans realized a counter to the tank--the anti-tank gun. It was not an official gun, just the work of German artillery officers improvising during the attack. At Lateu Wood on the right flank of the attack, one 5.9-inch howitzer fired and hit the right hand side of the tank, knocking out the sponson. However, before the crew could reload the howitzer, the tank turned and crushed the gun beneath its tracks. At another point, an officer named Kruger supposedly manned a gun singlehandedly and destroyed 16 tanks as they filed past his position. Later analysis provided a figure of five tanks knocked out by this gun and other tanks nearby knocked out by other German artillery--but he still merits mention for such an impressive accomplishment.

By noon, two main trenchlines had been overrun, but the possibility of a complete breakthrough dwindled as the day continued. Although efforts at infantry-tank cooperation paid off, complete training was not available, so the infantry and tanks often did not work as closely as possible. Also, Byng had no real reserves of infantry or tanks to exploit the hole until Haig decided to include the recently arrived V Corps. The attack continued for a week, but little else was grabbed as the Germans fed in two divisions on the 21st (notably the 107th just arrived from Russia and sent in piecemeal), assembled three more that were arriving, and prepared six more for transfer.

The German counterattack began on November 30, just after the tanks had been withdrawn for a re-fit and the British gains weakly held. On the British left flank, the counterattacks fizzled, but on the right, the counterattack supported by waves of German planes and a brief bombardment of gas and smoke not only regained lost ground, but pushed into British held territory. The tanks were called out and succeeded in blunting, but not stopping, the German counterattack. On the night of December 4-5, the British pulled back to shorter and more defensible lines. By the 7th, the front stabilized with about an equal exchange of territory--British gains on their left offset by German gains on their right.

Still, the initial impressions were overwhelming: a 6-mile penetration in 12 hours yielded 8,000 prisoners and 100 guns in exchange for 4,000 British casualties and 179 tanks (65 hits by guns, 71 mechanical failure, and 43 ditching and other causes). The tanks had proven their worth.

Back to the Drawing Board II

Cambrai had shown the potential of the tank, and the Mark IV had performed admirably. But the British would produce a new heavy tank, the Mark V, and a light tank, the Whippet. The Mark V was similar in size and shape to the Mark IV, but included a larger 150hp engine (vs. the 105hp engine of the Mark I and IV) to increase speed to 4.6mph, thicker armor in front (14mm vs. Mark IV's 12mm), and new epicyclic gearing designed by Wilson so it could be driven and steered by one man instead of three. The range was also slightly increased to 45 miles, from 35 miles of the Mark IV. On the downside, the radiator was moved inside the tank to the detriment of the crew as it reduced ventilation.

The Whippet was the so-called "Cavalry" or "Chaser" tank, designed by Tritton in December 1916 to exploit breaches in the enemy line made by Mark IVs and Vs. It could speed its four machine guns along at 8mph, carried 14mm armor in front, and possessed a range of 80 miles. One disadvantage was that untrained drivers would frequently stall out, as the vehicle had two engines (one for each track) and steering was by varying the engine speed. Unlike the Mark I through V, the Whippet's tracks did not go around the hull, but were self contained in a chassis. The engine and fighting compartments were attached to this chassis, making it a forerunner of the modern tank.

Wilson also created the Mark V Star, a variation of the Mark V with a track base six feet longer than the Mark V to allow for crossing trenches up to 13 feet. The six extra feet also added enough room to pack in 20-25 men and create an armored personnel carrier. Several hundred of these Mark V Stars were produced by the fall of 1918, but the design proved too heavy and cumbersome to deem it a success. Wilson then designed the Mark V Two Stars around a more powerful 225hp engine, but only a single tank was produced out of the 300 ordered by the end of the war.

Two other types, the Mark VI and Mark VII made headway on paper, but were soon surpassed in December 1917 by the Mark VIII, an outgrowth of Stern's new Mechanical Warfare (Overseas and Allies) Department. This 37-ton tank would be fitted with a 300hp engine with a speed of 5mph, but only seven tanks were produced by the war's end.

The organization was altered again to include 576 heavy tanks and 410 light tanks--at least on paper. By March 1918, Tank Corps possessed 13 battalions divided into 5 Brigades.

    I Tank Brigade: 7, 11, 12 bttns
    II Tank Brigade: 2, 8, 10 bttns
    III Tank Brigade: 3, 6, 9 bttns (re-equipping with Whippets)
    IV Tank Brigade: 1, 4, 5 bttns
    V Tank Brigade: 13 bttn (unequipped with tanks)

In addition, the Company Workshops were melded into centralized Brigade Workshops. Broken frontline parts were to be completely replaced with new parts and the damaged part returned to the Workshop for repair. As long as an efficient supply system existed, it made for faster "repairs" to tanks. Special salvage tanks were made with gear to tow disabled tanks back to the Workshops. Tank Salvage parties would also go into No Man's Land to rescue a tank by attempting enough field repairs to drive it back, or, if not, remove working parts back to the Workshops.

As for that supply line, each new tank produced was sent for testing at Newbury, and then to Richborough. Here it was sent to the Channel for delivery to La Havre, transported to Bermicourt for additional testing, and then sent to Central Stores. Battalions would draw tanks as needed. Spare parts were also sent to Central Stores, to be distributed to front line storage units.

US Tanks

The US declared war against the Central Powers in April 1917. In June, US Col. S. D. Rockenbach arrived in France to organize the American Tank Corps. On September 23, 1917, the organization had been hammered out with a per Army strength of five heavy and 20 light battalions, divided into five brigades of one heavy and two light battalions each. The Light tanks would be from Renault while the heavy tanks would be British designs. In actuality, all the tanks used in combat by the US were manufactured in France and Britain, although several thousand US-made vehicles were ready for shipment by the time the war ended. Of note: a Ford Tank arrived in France in October 1918, making it the first US-built tank to appear in France.

The Ford had a crew of two, weighed in at 3.4 tons, mounted one 57mm gun or one machine gun, had 13mm of frontal armor, and was powered by a pair of 22.5hp Model-T engines so the tank could hit 7mph. Although 10,000 (some sources say 15,000) were ordered, only seven were made, including the one sent to France.

The US also constructed one "Steam Tank," a 44-ton steam-powered tank with a flame thrower gun mounted in the front. The Mark VIII would be the mainstay of US-British-French tank design, but as mentioned before, few were made.

The first US brigade, made up of two light tank battalions, was formed under Col. George S. Patton, Jr. early in 1918. Although too late to take part in the German push, by August it had 124 tanks and went into battle on September 12, 1918.

German Tanks

The German Staff was slow to appreciate the tank, even though front line troops certainly did. They investigated captured British tanks in 1916, but did not form a committee until October 1916. A design was available by the end of the year and a wooden mockup crafted in January 1917, but without support from the German General Staff, production was investigated only later in the spring of 1917. The first order, for 100 tanks, was placed on December 1, 1917, no doubt in part due to the surprise at Cambrai.

For security's sake, the Germans called their tank the A7V, a 32-ton, 24-foot long, 10-foot wide design that packed in a crew of 18.

The A7V contained from 15mm to 30mm of armor, two 100hp engines atop spring tracks that would push the tank along at 8mph on level ground, a 20-mile combat range, one front-mounted 57mm gun, and six machine guns. To its detriment, the ground clearance was extremely low, limiting its off road movement. The crew was drawn from three separate services: drivers from mechanics, main gunners from artillery, and machine gunners from infantry. The crew consisted of a commander, driver, gunner, loader, two engineers, and six two-man MG crews.

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© Copyright 2002 by Russ Lockwood.
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