The preliminary moves were made on a map until contact of troops was made.
No. 1. Looking down the Line from Union centre Sykes Line in background. Part of McCalls in middle ground (near wagons). Morell's (right) in foreground.
No. 2. Attack of Whiting (and Ewell) at apex of Morell's line.
No. 3. Longstreets Division (or what there was left of it) storming Morell's line.
No. 4. Part of D.H. Hill's Division with Trimble's brigade on their left attacking McCall and Sykes.
Ewell's 4th brigade (Elzey's), moving on to New Cold Harbor, sending a skirmishing line out (1st company 12th GA) to cover their front, made first contact with the Union outposts. As the various columns came into sight, the Federal artillery began to "feel" for their targets. "I" battery 5th U.S. artillery doing some good work playing on Whiting's flank regiment (18th Ga) (Morale Factor O.K.) and causing it to fall back a short space to the cover of New Cold Harbor; the rest of Whiting's command falling into line on Ewell's right.
D.H. Hill made slow progress on the Confederate left wing, getting his entire division thoroughly mixed-up with Trimble's brigade (Ewell), who had moved too far to the left, after receiving no orders other than to press on as originally directed. (Chris Beaumont's system was working alreadyl) It was not until the third (!) game-move that Hill managed to disentangle his command sufficiently to come into line opposite the McGehee house, which at this time was only protected by one company 6th U.S. Regulars (Chapman's brigade). Sykes sent a message (A.D.C. cards being drawn) off to Porter, requesting the support of "A Brigade at least" to protect his flank; but before this could be delivered other matters were occupying the Union commanders attention. After much shuffling and marching, Longstreets' Division extended its line on Whiting's right flank; forming his two brigades into long battle lines facing : Morell's position on the Union-held ridge. Longstreets orders were to make a "mock" attack against the Federal loft, thus giving time for D.H. Hill to come into action against their right, This, however, proved to be "not so much a mock attack, but a mass slaughter."
The two brigades came out to attack at the same time. This was bad planning to begin with, as the Union guns would have a dense mass of troops to fire into. The attacks would (or should) have been made better if they were short, sharp, stabs at the Union left wing, each brigade sending out one or two regiments into the open then falling back on their own lines. It was never the intention of the Confederate High Command that an all-out assault should be made.
The mustering of Longstreet's brigades was an impressive sight. Each brigade had to cross a wide expanse of open ground which was covered by almost twenty Union guns, behind these again there was almost as many Union troops as there were Confederate attacking and even if Longstreets men reached the crest, they would unquestionably have been cut to pieces by musket fire, As they came up, Kemper's brigade, three strong regiments: 1st Va, 7th Va, 11th Va, were hit by enfilading fire from 3rd and 5th Mass.Batterys as well as a blistering rain of shells from L and M battery's U.S. artillery.
Morale had to be checked under this kind of treatment, but as luck would have it, it proved to be good (each regiment having to throw one dice per company!!!), and a good show of dice put a smile back on the Confederate commander's face.
However, the loss sustained by this fire was almost as bad as Burnside's assault on Maryols Heights! The 1st Va went into action with 150 officers and men, now here it was at the foot of the Union held ridgev still with a lot of ground to cover, scarce 65 strong! The 7th and 11th Va were in not much better shape, The former down to 100 men, the latter 151. On Kemper's right Pickett's brigade also reached the lower slopes of the ridge, much the weaker by the loss of 75 officers and men and a very wide gap which had been made in his line when the two regiments had to separate in order to cross Powhite creek.
Things did not look good on the Confederate right, as now Longstreet's division was too weak to press an attack, and to pull them back would have meant crossing the same ground under that massive concentration of gunfire. Lee now decided to form a counterbattery to oppose the Federal guns on the ridge, and also to send Jones's division in to aid Longstreet. At the same time Whiting's command would make a strong attack on the Union left centre which Ewell's troops would support. Last, but by no means least, D.H. Hill's division would "wait for Whiting's attack to show some signs of draining the Union reserves then strike at their extreme left flank and rear!
Captain Batthis artillery was now concentrated in a long line opposite Porter's H.Q. at Watts house, his batteries consisting of North Carolina battery, 1st Va battery and Staunton Artillery, as well as the Pee Dee Artillery pulled over from Magruder's command. In all some ten guns. Their fire soon forced the Union batteries to seek coverp and as they did so, Whiting's troops launched their attack.
Porter had by now called in most of his reserve division (McCalls) as well as two-thirds of his reserve artillery, which he formed in a large battery just in the rear of Sykes line, Had had also sent two urgent messages back to Slocum's division urging him to come as soon as possible. (Commanders Chance Cards being used).
On the Confederate side, Jones, pushed out his leading brigade (Toombs) to bolster Longstreet's line, while his other brigade (Anderson) moved to a position on the far right in order to this part of the field and thus force the Union troops to extend their line in tLeir direction.
Whiting's brigade came in against Sykes, Longstreet made a wild dash up the slope at Morell's position, with Toombs in close support, D.H. Hill also made his move. The entire Union line was locked in one vast arc of fire, from the house almost to the Chickahominy. The Federal cannon fell silent as Pickett's brigade overran battery after battery coming to rest almost in the heart of the Union position. Porter was forced to evacuate his H.Q. at Watts house and fell back to the Adam's farm. new line with the (McCall) near Adams. Morell made a fighting retreat forming up on a 3rd Pa.
Sykes held his ground for quite a long, time in the face of enormous odds, and finally fell back only when he was left exposed by Morell's withdrawal. McCalls division, which had been used regiment by regiment, along the whole front now fell back with their respective commands, to the line taken up by Morell. All Porter's reserve artillery were pulled back, but some of the crews were so badly "shot-up" that they had to be replaced by troops from 5th Pa. (McCall).
A.P. Hill's division now moved forward to take the place of Longstreet's exhausted men and Ewell replaced Whiting (who had been shot). Trimble (Ewell) after extricating himself from Hill's division moved to the extreme right in order to turn Porter's flank while Jones consolidated his line along the crest of the ridge. D.H.Hill formed his troops in line of battle ready to renew the assault against the Union right.
Drawing a Chance Card on the sixth move, Slocum1marched to the sound of the gunst. This was indeed a lucky break for the Union, Slocum's men arriving three moves sooner than expected. Porter now made preparations for a counter attack aginst D.H.Hill, intending to cut-off these troops from the rest of the Confederate Army, make a half turn to the left and roll-up Ewell's line. For this purpose he formed a strong 'holding force' on his left pulling over Sykes and part of McCalls troops and planting their remaining guns into one large battery. Slocum's first brigade came on the field and were moved to the right where McCall had posted two regiments to support the reserve artillery (2nd Pa, 1st Pa). Slocum's divisional artillery (one horse battery 1st N.Y.) were moved to the extreme right in order to enfilade Trimble's brigade as it came into line. The 2nd brigade of Slocum was due to move on the eighth turn. As Porter made these arrangements, A.P.Hill decided the issue for him.
Drawing a Commanders Card which read "Commanding officer uses own initiative", Hill decided to strike while the iron was at least still warm and launched his entire division at the apex of the Union line. (Viz: the point where Sykes and McCall were linked). This was a do or die attack as his troops were the only body of men at the moment fresh enough to assault the Federal position. (Morale factors being low for other divisions). However worried Lee may be, he knew that Porter's line was on the point of breaking so he concurred with Hill's arrangements, gave him his bearded blessing and sent him in.
The division moved out magnificently, Field's brigade on the right (40th Va, 47th Va), Gregg's on the left (1st S.C., 12th S.C.). The German artillery and Masters Battery coming into action on their left flank while the entire Washington artillery laid down a deluge on the right. Trimble's fresh brigade also moved on the Confederate right but was forced to halt by the concentrated fire of a Union battery in that quarter. No matter! Hill's line proved irresistible; crushing the two slim regiments of Griffin's brigade (Morell) and sending them back in full flight past Porter's H.Q. Morell's other brigade (Martindale) were forced into a vice-like grip with Gregg's troops on the one side and the whole of Longstreet's and Jones' divisions on the other. Of the divisions original strength (715 officers and men) only 247 managed to slip out of the trap.
No.5. Slocum trying to stem the attack on D.H. Hill and Ewell.
On the left it was the same story, Buchanan's brigade (3rd US, 4th US, 12th US) were hit in flank and rear by Field's brigade and their front was peppered by D.G. Hill's artillery sending the whole unit back in flight. All that remained for Porter was to show a brave face with Slocum's division, while the remainder of his army crossed the Chichahominy in a mass of wagons, guns, troops, etc., at Alexander's bridge, Even here they were not out of hot water as Anderson now moved his troops across the Woodbury bridge and fired into the retreating masses,
The Union has lost 1,945 men killed (or wounded) 461 prisoners, 12 guns and 6 wagons. All this out of a total of 3,1151 officers and men at the start, of the battle. On the Confederate side, 2011 men killed (or wounded) the major losses being in Longstreet's and Whiting's commands.
An Outdoor ACW Wargame Gaines Mill
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© Copyright 1975 by Donald Featherstone.
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