by Rudy Scott Nelson
The First war between Britain and Burma can be regarded as a war of underestimation. The British planners failed to consider several key factors during their pre-invasion planning. One was that the despotic Burmese rulers could mobilize numerous tribal levies to form an Army on the border with India quicker than would have been expected. A second factor was the weather of Burma and that the upcoming tropical monsoon season would make it impossible for campaigning troops to forage and very difficult for a sea-borne supply route to be maintained. The practice of underestimation was not limited to the British. The Burmese failed to realize the vastness of British resources in both India and world-wide. The Burmese army while capable of overwhelming native forces would be woefully inadequate to fight the professional and veteran troops of the British Empire and the Sepoys of the East Indies Company. The conduct of the war would become characteristic of the type campaigns that would be waged by the British throughout the 1800s. Such features included lack of pre-invasion preparation, underestimation of the enemy capabilities, many more casualties caused by climate and environment than enemy combat and more guerilla style skirmish actions than set piece battles. Skirmishes between the Burmese and the Indians had been a fact of life long before the British had exerted an influence in India. Piracy between the ports of Indian Ceylon and the Arkanese kingdoms was common. Raids between the independent Indian Eastern provinces and those of the semi-autonomous Burmese Upper north were frequent. A raid for plunder and slaves by one side would often result in retaliatory campaigns by the other side. Neither side needed much motivation for going to war with each other. The thoughts personal wealth and loot to expand their empire existed among the Generals and rulers for both armies. The potential cost in human life was not even a consideration. It was a minor factor in the computations for profit and personal glory. British sources indicate that the British declaration of war in 1824 was in response to the Burmese Invasion of India in 1823. Burmese sources suggest that the Burmese ‘invasion’ was in response to continued raids by autonomous Indian tribes along the Burmese Northwestern border. An activity blamed on the British authorities as a lack of control problem. Their concept of economics did not allow for any understanding of the British situation in pre- Mutiny India. According to various sources the following engagements were regarded large enough to justify comment in various British records.
Donobyu = March 7 – April 2 1825 Arracan March 26 – April 1 1825 Naaf River (Chittagong Island) = May 18 1824 Tantabain = ? Bishenpur = ? Donaben =? Seimbyke = ? Napadi = December 2 1825 Pagan = February 9 1826 Ava = January 17 1824 – February 24 1826 Anglo-Burmese War of 1824
Burmese Empire During the 1700s Burmese Army of the 1700s and 1800s British-Indian Army of the Early 1800s Back to Time Portal Passages Summer 2004 Table of Contents Back to Time Portal Passages List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by Rudy Scott Nelson This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |