The Phalanx, although ponderous, could maneuver. Whenever possible, it maneuvered in open order; whenever necessary in close order. it did not maneuver "with shields locked," since that formation was only used to receive an attack. The hoplites could face right "by spear" or left "by shield," in order to march by the flank. The syntagmas could also execute quarter turns, when after closing up the entire unit would pivot on the right or left hand file leader. A half turn was made by executing two quarter turns. There were also about face and countermarch movements.
Countermarchers were made by file and by rank. There were three kinds of countermarch, the Macedonian, Spartan and the Cretan or Persian. in the Macedonian countermarch, the first rank held its place and the rest marched through, then everybody executed an about face. in the Spartan, the rear rank remained in position, and the other ranks faced about and marched through on either side. Thus, if an enemy were observing the phalanx from the rear, if the hoplites did the Macedonian countermarch, they would seem to retreat; If the Spartan, they would seem to advance. in the case of the Cretan countermarch, the file leader replaced the file closer and the front and rear rank men exchanged places. Similarly, the Phalanx might countermarch by rank, so that the half wings would exchange places in line and so strengthen the center (remember that the best troops were normally posted on the flanks).
The phalanx might also double the extent of the ground it occupied by passing into extended order. On the other hand, it might double its strength on the same ground by interjecting reinforcements between the files of a phalanx in open order.
Normally, light troops covered the march of the columns to the place of battle. The armv might march by wings either in sequence or in parallel columns. in this case, the baggage might he placed in the center, between the columns. Sometimes the army would advance in four divisions forming a great hollow rectangular or square formation, so as to he well protected against attack from any side. This was fine on a plain, but created problems in rougher country, as Xenaphon noted: Now the Hellenes discovered that the square was a bad formation with the enemy following. If the wings of the square drew together where the road is narrow, or where the hills make it necessary, or a bridge, the armed men must be squeezed up and disordered at the same time, so they are not easy to manage because they loose discipline. Again when the wings open . . . the ranks must be separated again, and there are empty spaces between . . .
In order to remedy this Problem, Xenaphon directed certain companies to fall out of the front and rear of the square when the way became constricted, and to fill in again when needed. The army could also march by front, either in battle order which was seldom practical, or with one wing in front of the other, so that by halting the leading wing, marching the second wing, first by flank and then forward; battle order could be formed. The baggage, under its own commander, usually preceded the phalanx when it was marching away from the enemy, followed it when it advanced, or moved on the right or left side of the columns, away from the enemy. When marching in square, it occupied the center.
In general, it was best to have a reasonably compact formation so that the men might quickly form in battle order, but always room had to be left for deployment.
Light troops usually covered the deployment into battle formation. The phalanx could attack its enemies in a variety of ways. However, unless the enemy were demoralized or inferior in equipment, sore form of flank attack was usually best.
When two phalanxes met head on they usually overlapped on the right wing. This occurred because each man tended to crowd behind his neighbor's shield, causing the whole mass to shift right. This made attack in right oblique order a natural one. The right wing would he made deeper than usual and the weak wing wholly or partly refused. Usually if you broke one wing of an enemy's army without disordering one of your own, the enemy would retreat. Such were the tactics of the great Alexander at Arbela (331 B.C.).
Other types of attack were delivered by advancing in convex order to pierce the enemy center, or in concave formation to turn both enemy flanks at once. Onasander declared this a very poor formation. Against such an attack, the commander could divide his army into three main groups, opposing his best men to the enemy wlngs. To the center, Onasander would stand at a halt with light troops posted before the heavy infantry. The enemy's center thus became useless and suffered from fire. If the enemy tried to advance his center so as to go into line, then his phalanx would be crowded together and hopelessly disordered. At that point, the center or reserve division would attack, after the light troops retired around its wings.
It was very advantageous also to attack the enemy's flanks with light armed troops. This was the case because the troops could not protect themselves in front and on the flanks at the same time, either from fire or against an actual charge. Pursuit was also a function of light troops a phalanx was never designed to run races, And to do so ,was to invite defeat. Chariots with "scythes sticking out sideways from the axletrees and under the cars, pointing. Downwards to cut through ant they met," were sometimes used with the idea of breaking and disordering an enemy phalanx. Usually t hey were posted in a long line before the enemy. However, they required level ground, and could he stopped by the least obstacle. Usually, if the troops could kill the drivers or horses, And the phalanx could open ranks to let the chariots pass through.
Elephants were deployed in a similar manner; but like the chariots, they were of limited effectiveness. sometimes, they could be frightened back on their own men.
The Hellenistic armies, like the Romans, were familiar with the ditched and palisaded camp, but they were not always as careful as they should have been to make a habit of constructing fortified camps. Instead this was done only when in enemy territory and sometimes not even then.
More Macedonian Phalanx
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© Copyright 1969 by Pat Condray
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