Foreword

The intention of this article is to present an area of interest to ancient and medieval wargamers researched using only readily available ancient sources.

An Iberian loose order warband composed of Caetrati. Figures 15mm by Essex. Painted by Joe Nacchio. Photo by SFP.

Thus, any information herein can be easily verified by the reader and hopefully this will lead to increased interest in ancient armies sadly and undeservedly neglected by most wargamers.

The People of Spain

Rome had many enemies in her long history, some of them driving her almost to destruction. The Celts and the Germans are famous in this respect, but the Spaniards - or Iberians, as the Romans called them are less well known because they never posed such a threat alone. This is not because the Iberians were less effective than the other races. Indeed the Spanish tribes were successful in driving off the Cimbri and Teuton migration which gave Romans so much trouble at the time of Marius. It is worth bearing in mind that the Iberians fought for 200 years against some of Rome's best (and not so good) generals. However, they eventually lost.

For the Spanish - whatever their virtues - suffered from a fatal weakness - that was disunity. It proved impossible for Spanish leaders to unify more than a few tribes at a time and it was left to such foreign generals as Hannibal, Scipio and the unlucky Sertorius, to show what could have been had a great leader like the Gallic Vercingetorix been able to unite the tribes of the Iberian Peninsula.

Previous migrations had introduced Celts into the Spanish Peninsula. In the central highlands the two races had intermixed to produce the Celtiberians. The combination of the elan of the attacking Celt with the stubborn hardiness of the Iberian produced a distinctive and outstanding warrior people. These four tribes could put around 30,000 to 35,000 men in the field and were the most frequently hired fighters. Further West the Celtic influence was stronger but the Romans considered these people - Astures, Cantabri, Luistani and Vascones plus smaller groupings, as Iberian. With the possible exception of the more civilized Turdetani living in the South of Spain, the tribes of the Peninsular were a turbulent and warlike people. The mountainous nature of Spain developed warriors strong of wind and limb, who were accustomed to a life of brigandage. This activity in turn made things more difficult for the would be raider\invader as Livy comments: "There are in Spain a number of towers, built on bills and used by the natives as both look outs and defenses against brigands." (Livy "History of Rome" Book XXI 1, 19.)

This was a point that drew Caesars comments when he served in Spain: "Here too, on account of the frequent incursions of the natives, all the places remote from great towns, are fortified with towers and castles, covered as in Africa, not with tiles but with earth, on these they place sentinels, and their high situation commands an extensive view of the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest part of the towns of this province are built on mountains, and places exceedingly strong by nature, the approaches to which are extremely difficult. Thus sieges are rare and hazardous in Spain, since it is not easy to reduce their towns by force." (Caesar Bellum Civilum XXXIX. 2)

Cities and towns tended to be in good fortified positions, difficult to approach and resolutely defended. Sieges were often resisted with ferocity that the Romans were not to encounter until they subjugated the Hebrews. During the Second Punic War the citizens of Astapa resisted the Romans until there was no further hope, then they sallied out and fought to the last man, surrounded by Roman troops. Not satisfied with this, the warriors left 50 men behind to kill the women and children and throw them on a massive bonfire. This grisly task complete, the bloodstained warriors threw themselves into the flames.

Even in less fanatical sieges, Spanish were most aggressive. When sallying forth to attack siege engines they were well noted for the prolific use of fire and showers ofjavelins (many of these being set alight before throwing.) "The Saguntines included in their armory a sort of javelin called a falarica. It had a rounded shaft of fir and an iron bead. Just below the bead the shaft was square, as in the Roman pilum. Round this portion of the shaft they bound tow smeared with pitch. The iron head of this weapon being three feet long, was capable of going through a man's body, armor and all: but the most alarming thing about it was that even if it struck a man's shield without penetrating flesh, the tow and pitch lighted before it was hurled and fanned by its motion through the air to a fiercer flame, compelled the victim to drop his weapons." (Livy XX 1, 8.)

About Warriors

Plutarch speaks thus of Spanish warriors: "Metellus had experience in battles fought by regular legions of soldiers, fully armed and drawn up in due order into a heavy standing fort-nation of lines, admirably trained for encountering and overpowering an enerny who came to close combat, hand to band, but entirely unfit for climbing among the hills, and competing incessantly with the swift attacks and retreats of a set of fleet mountaineers, or to endure hunger and thirst and live exposed like them to the wind and weather, without fire or covering." (Plutarch "Parallel Lives" Sertorius, 12)

Spanish soldiers had a reputation for being fierce and hardy warriors, capable of the ferocity of a Celtic charge, with the added ability to stand their ground and fight if things were going badly, but their natural state of discipline left much to be desired, being liable to be lax even in taking normal precautions for their own safety. Victory could be dangerous, as success brought an immediate loss of discipline. Generously paid and treated properly, Iberians made exemplary additions to many classical armies. This was especially true if they fought for a good leader. But he had to live up to a high standard as a man and warrior to be so considered.

In general, the Spaniards were noted for their treachery and would readily change sides if it suited them. Different leaders dealt with this problem in different ways. Hannibal exchanged part of his Spanish troops for African infantry, thus maintaining useful hostages in Carthage. Sertorius "sponsored" the education of the children of Spanish nobility at a safe town while at the same time convincing the rank and file at least that he was a demigod. The Romans were not very good at arranging the loyalty of the Spanish fighting tribes, but when Iberian troops came over to them they usually stayed and performed loyally. Probably because their value as fighting men was appreciated and they were well paid and treated.

Iberian infantry and cavalry are described by the Romans as carrying large oblong shields (Scutarii) or smaller, circular shields (Caetrati). It would be tempting to assume that closer formation Iberians carried the bigger shield and the skirmishers, bore the smaller version. However, there is no evidence for this and some archaeological evidence to the contrary in the form of pictures showing an armored soldier carrying a Caetrati.

The Scutarii must have been a considerable shield since Livy remarks: " Information was given by Gallic guides that some twenty-five miles upstream was a convenient spot for crossing where the river was broader and shallower as it was split into two channels by a small island. Timber was quickly cut and rafts constructed to carry the men over, together with their horses and gear, the Spanish troops making no bones about swimming across with their shields beneath them and their clothes stowed in leather bags." (Livy XX 1, 27.)

The shield size is borne out by archaeological evidence which shows large shields reaching from chin to mid-calf Livy and Caesar both mention the Spanish using inflated bladders to cross difficult rivers. (BC 1. 48. 4.)

What is most noticeable about these examples is the ease with which the Iberians crossed an obstacle that was usually a tremendous problem to troops. The speed of Spanish infantry movement across rough terrain was legendary and when combined with an ability to concentrate suddenly on enemy troops, would have a devastating effect on the chosen opponent. Iberians were generally superior to other light troops (it would have been interesting to have Thracians and Spaniards fight) and even support by heavier troops was not always enough to discourage the wild warriors from attacking the light armed.

Livy remarks: "When dawn broke there was an engagement near the summit of the range, and the Romans, who were superior in numbers, might easily have cut off and destroyed the Carthaginian light troops, had not a Spanish contingent sent back for that purpose arrived on the scene. The Spaniards were well accustomed to mountain warfare, and well adapted by training and equipment to rapid assaults over broken ground; so what with their speed of foot, the character of their weapons and the mobile tactics they adopted, they had little difficulty in foiling a heavily armed enemy, untrained in guerrilla warfare and accustomed to fight on level ground." (Livy XXI 1, 18)

The operative word here is training. If the Roman or Carthaginian commander could catch a newly raised army of natives, the test was immeasurably easier. However, where other barbarians would be discouraged by a few setbacks. Spaniards would often continue to struggle and become better fighters who were harder to defeat in battle.

Greatest Motivator

The greatest motivator of the Spanish was the Roman exile Sertorius who trained and dealt with his Spaniards in a systematic and inspired way. When Sertorius would receive Spanish volunteers many would clamor loudly for combat at once. Only too pleased to oblige, the general would allow them to take a drubbing from the opposing Romans before whipping them into shape. This would show the impressionable Spanish that it takes more then raw courage to beat Romans. "When now all the cities on this side of the river Ebro also united their forces together under his command, his army grew great, for they flocked together and flowed in upon him from all quarters.

But when they continually cried out to attack the enemy, and were impatient of delay, their inexperienced, disorderly rashness caused Sertorius much trouble, who at first strove to restrain them with reason and good counsel; but when he perceived them refractory and unseasonably violent, he gave way to their impetuous desires, and permitted them to engage with the enemy, in such sort that they might, being repulsed, yet not totally routed become more obedient to his commands for the future. Which happening as he had anticipated, he soon rescued them, and brought them safe into his camp." (Plutarch, "Lives", Sertorius 16)

In other matters too, he showed a genius for handling the Spanish: "He was also highly honored for his introducing discipline and good order amongst them, for he altered their furious savage manner of fighting, and brought them to make use of the Roman armor, taught them to keep their ranks, and observe signals and watchwords; and out of a confused number of thieves and robbers he constituted a regular, well-disciplined anny. He bestowed silver and gold upon them liberally to gild and adom their helmets, he had their shields worked with various figures and designs, be brought them into the mode of wearing flowered and embroidered cloaks and coats, and by supplying money for these purposes, and joining with them in all improvements, he won the hearts of all.

That, however, which delighted them most was the care that he took of their children. He sent for all the boys of noblest parentage out of all their tribes, and placed them in the great city of Osca, where he appointed masters to instruct them in the Grecian and Roman learning. That when they came to be men, they might, as he professed, be fitted to share with him in authority, and in conducting the government, although under this pretext he really made them hostages. However, their fathers were wonderfully pleased to see their children going daily to the schools in good order, handsomely dressed in gowns edged with purple, and that Sertorius paid for their lessons, examined them often, distributed rewards to the most deserving, and gave them the golden bosses to hang about their necks, which the Romans called bullae." (Plutarch "Lives", Sertorius 14)

Native Spanish leaders were usually no more aware of the art of war than their men initially. Accounts of two Chieftains, featured in Livy's account of Hannibal and an account of how these two performed in their first action, are illuminating when comparing their initial efforts to combat the Romans with innovative tactics of a later battle. It does appear to confirm that all levels of Iberian warrior had to be bloodied before he would settle down to discipline.

"Secondly the rising led by Mandonius and the former chieftain of the Ilergetes, named Indibilis. These two men, when the Romans left Castulo for the coast, roused their countrymen and raided the peaceful territories of Rome's allies. An officer with a force of light auxiliaries was sent against them by Scipio and had no difficulty in breaking them up, as they were little more than an ill organized crowd: some were killed or captured and most of them disarmed." (Livy)

Of even greater interest is the later performance of Mandonius and Indibilis in battle against the Romans, who are surprised by the different layout of the Iberian army, but are disastrously allowed time for the legions to adjust their formations to meet the slowly approaching Spanish. "At dawn the next day, the Romans were confronted by the entire Spanish force drawn up under arms and in battle order about a mile away. The Ausetam held the center; on the right wing were the Ilergetes, on the left the less important Spanish tribesmen. Between the wings and the center they had left on each side a sufficient gap to allow the cavalry to pass through when the moment came." (Livy XXIX, 2.)

Experienced Celtiberians effectively invaded Carthaginian Spain and independently delivered a series of defeats to Hasdrubal. Understanding that the Spanish armics were often raw will go a long way to explaining why these troops are underestimated by most war gamers. It is too easy to forget the trust that Hannibal placed in his Spanish troops, or to overlook the wonders Sertorius could achieve with his Spanish against greater numbers of supposedly superior troops.

The Iberian was a good warrior for a price, but treacherous. In one recorded case the Carthaginian commander bought off an army of Celtiberians supporting the Romans. The first idea the Romans had of the deal was when the Spanish army pulled up its standards and began to move away. The large numbers of Spanish involved precluded any attempt to stop the departure and the now heavily outnumbered Romans were forced to retreat. In view of such events, Romans tried to avoid having more auxiliaries in an army than native Roman troops. Livy commented that the Spanish would rather be defeated in their homeland than victorious elsewhere. (Livy XXI 11, 29. And XXV, 33.)

More Restive Spanish

Introduction
Infantry and Cavalry Tactics
Wargaming the Spanish