German-Japanese Cooperation

Interrogation of Vice Adm. Weneker II

by Capt. Ken Beyer


Impressions and Lessons of the War

About the Battle of MIDWAY, not so many people knew how things had gone there but there was some depression among those who did know. However, they were still too proud about their early success and these people simply said that they would work harder and would be O.K. again.

The Japanese were just not fitted for as large scale operations as other countries. GUADALCANAL was an example, where they just kept putting in their strength little by little to see it all destroyed without any benefit.

SAIPAN was really understood to be a matter of life or death. About that time they began telling the people the truth about the war. They began preparing them for whatever must happen. Before that, they had been doing nothing but fooling the people.

It was ridiculous the way the Japanese Army planes made exaggerated reports of enemy ships they had sunk. I think it must have been because they felt they had to report successes to compare favorably with the Navy. This foolishness I think had bad results.

After the Battle of LEYTE the Japanese surface Navy was destroyed and it was decided to make the Navy only aviation. Most of the remaining ships were put out of commission in various places and the crews were used for all kinds of aviation work. Those who could not be used for naval aviation were transferred to the Army. This was in preparation for the final battle, but of course it was too late and it was not pushed ahead enough. It was the idea that the Special Attack Forces would be trained especially to attack your (US Navy) carriers.

There was no real Headquarters. The Chief of Staff of the Navy and of the Army would get together to discuss some matters where both were concerned. That then was a meeting of the Imperial Headquarters; but when they adjourned the Headquarters was no more.

Miscellaneous

Of course the Japanese over-estimated their own strength and underestimated the enemy. Then, they had very long supply lines which they could not protect; they admitted this in a pre-war statement. These were basic reasons for their failure to do better in the war. After that, I would say the reason for their disaster could be classed about as follows in order of importance:

First, and by far the worse, were the attacks of the highly efficient American submarines on the merchant shipping. Most serious of all here was the sinking of tankers and hence the loss of oil from the south.

The second factor in importance was the destruction of the Japanese Navy. so they knew they could not stop the enemy from coming up to these vital areas.

The third, which no doubt had some effect to close the war, was the air bombing attack on this country (Japan).

This was predominantly a naval war, and although JAPAN lost the war I do not think their Navy lost prestige with the people who know. The Army was very poor in cooperating. I heard there was much friction because the Army sometimes had to protect their own transports on the sea, but then the Navy had no escorts except some small boats such as converted fishing vessels and the like which were not much good. I have heard what you suggest, namely that the Army was building its own escort carriers. I think perhaps this is not true because I would have known about it.

This was a subject which you might say was of mutual interest. The Japanese desired GERMANY to make peace with RUSSIA. Of course this was impossible. Then they wanted to make some agreement with RUSSIA which would possibly assist them, that RUSSIA at least should withdraw three-quarters of a million men and her planes from MANCHURIA so the Japanese could employ their opposing forces elsewhere. To reach an agreement with RUSSIA, the Japanese were willing to sacrifice MANCHURIA, CHINA and KOREA. Next they would reach an understanding with the UNITED STATES, the plan being like this:

    A) JAPAN would renounce her position in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and generally in the south;
    B) They would keep their armed forces except in the areas renounced.
    C) The bargaining for a compromise peace would be based on the desirability of both sides stopping the war to avoid the heavy losses which would result if the war should continue. These early negotiations for peace I understand were handled through STOCKHOLM.

It was because of General Ott’s efforts towards peace that he got in trouble with von Ribbentrop and was forced out of his position as German Ambassador to JAPAN. This came about because of reports sent to BERLIN by Meissinger who was the Party representative here and who had access to direct communication with the head of the Reich. Ambassador Ott was then replaced by Stahmer and went to PEKING, CHINA where he now is.

German Raiders

In 1943 a passenger liner was fitted up as an auxiliary cruiser, with German crew. She went around the world to the west, down to MADAGASCAR and around the Cape, up in the Atlantic around Cape HORN and got back as far as an island near CHICHI JIMA where she stopped to refuel. She had fair success on the trip, destroying some ships. But shortly after leaving this last port for KOBE, at the end of her voyage, she was suddenly torpedoed in September 1943. We later picked up some 70 - 80 of the crew who said that the submarine had surfaced after sinking the ship and had taken two German prisoners. Since we never heard from them again we wonder if possibly the ship may have been sunk by a Japanese submarine.

More German Japanese Cooperation


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