INTERROGATION NAV NO.70
USSBS NO. 359
OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURSE OF THE WAR
KARUIZAWA 11 NOVEMBER 1945

Interrogation of Vice Admiral WENEKER, Paul H.; former German Naval Attaché who left JAPAN in 1937 to command the pocket battleship DEUTSCHLAND. He returned to JAPAN in February 1940 and has been there since.

Interrogated by Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstie, USN

SUMMARY

Admiral WENEKER discusses various features of the war as he saw it there, with particular reference to submarine warfare, both that of JAPAN and of the UNITED STATES.

NARRATIVE: Japanese Submarine Warfare

It was the expressed desire of the German Naval Ministry that every possible effort be made to induce the Japanese to exert their maximum effort in attack against U.S. merchant shipping in the PACIFIC. Notes were repeatedly exchanged between my office and BERLIN on this subject and directives from home instructed me to press the matter further. The Japanese had one invariable answer, namely, that they must conserve their submarines for attack against the U.S. Fleet. They argued that merchant shipping could be easily replaced with the great American production capacity, but that naval vessels represented the real power against what they fought and that these vessels and their trained crews were most difficult to replace; hence were the one logical target. If, therefore, they were to hazard their subs it must be against the U.S. Navy.

The Japanese Navy thought always of the U.S. carriers. They talked about how many were building, and how many were in the PACIFIC and that these must be sunk; but it was always the carriers they talked about. Next after that they would attack battleships and lesser ships but never the merchantmen except under most favorable conditions. On instructions from BERLIN I suggested specifically that they concentrate on certain supply lines, with a chance of attacking the tankers and transports, but they refused. I suggested the desirability of attacking the route between HONOLULU and the West Coast because that would force the use of convoys and would force the withdrawal of many escorts from the Western PACIFIC. Again the answer was negative; the mission was the American carriers and could not be changed on this.

As a matter of fact they had much the same attitude towards the employment of the air forces. They felt they could only be risked against the major threat, which was the American Fleet. The enemy fleet, they said, was bound to attack JAPAN; therefore they must destroy it first.

The Japanese had poor types of submarines in this war. First of all they were too big for easy handling under water when under water when under attack, and consequently were too easily destroyed. Then the asdic and sonic and radar equipment was very far behind in development. We therefore arranged to bring over here a TYPE IX-D boat which would be left for them. We brought it to KURE, to the Navy Yard, where the Japanese studied it very carefully, removing the engines and much of the equipment and looked into every part of the construction. But then they came to the conclusion that this type boat was too complicated for construction in JAPAN at this time.

We arranged for one full Japanese sub crew to be sent to GERMANY (via the west coast of FRANCE), for training. They had, I think, very good training in German boats and in German attack methods; but unfortunately they got caught in the NORTH ATLANTIC in early 1944 while returning here.

Blockade Running by Submarines Between Japan and Germany

Throughout the war, I was in charge of this operation. Usually the boats coming in from GERMANY came to PENANG or SINGAPORE and I arranged to ship the vital Japanese materials down for landing and to bring what came from GERMANY up to JAPAN. I had representatives down south to handle matters there. These people also brought me information on the latest submarine war methods.

We shipped from JAPAN quinine and tin and other vital materials in exchange for some optical goods, plans for airplanes, and machine tool equipment. We exchanged special personnel this way.

But this was not so easy an arrangement because of the American submarines on the route between JAPAN and the South. I knew much of this because of the shipping for which I was responsible, which I have mentioned. It was terrible. Sometimes the entire convoy including all my materials would be lost. It seemed that nothing could get through.

Japanese Attitude and Capability

Early in the war I made a trip through the South Sea Islands (NEI) and up through the MARIANAS to see conditions with my own eyes. I was astounded in the South Seas. The Japanese there were thoroughly enjoying the lush life. They had parties continually and were drinking all the liquor they had captured. I asked them why they did not prepare fortifications and do something to make these places stronger, but they said that the Americans would never come, that they could not fight in the jungle and that they were not the kind of people who could stand warfare in the south. As far as I know all those people in those places, both Army and Navy, once they had got into a place where there was no fighting, would do nothing more about the war.

Obviously, in such time the war effort must be the maximum of the country, but here in JAPAN it was very difficult because of the corruption on every hand and the continued fighting for position. Anything would be done to get power during the war. Sometimes very good men were kept at their work only a few weeks because some one else would get the job through corruption. You cannot be efficient with key positions constantly changing.

More German Japanese Cooperation

American Q Ship (# 117)
Interrogation of Vice Adm. Weneker I (# 118)
Interrogation of Vice Adm. Weneker II (# 119)