by Peter Hansen
PETER HANSEN (251-LIFE-1987) spent time working for the ABWEHR (the German Secret Service) during World War II and he has information that is known to a mere handful of people. He gives this secret information exclusively to SHARKHUNTERS. Here he tells us: Kurt Freiwald (at right) later on became the adjutant of Erich Raeder and also for a brief transfer period of Karl Dönitz when he (Dönitz) became Chief of the German Navy on January 30th, 1943. Thereafter he was given command of the TYPE IX-D2 boat U-181, which he took over from Wolfgang Lüth and commanded on a long patrol ending up in Penang-Maysia and Singapore. U-181 was eventually taken over by the Japanese on May 8th 1945, when Germany capitulated. HARRY’S NOTE - OTTO GIESE (45-1984) was II W. O. on this boat on her run to Penang - and into Chang-Gi Jail when Germany surrendered! That story later. Captain Freiwald became senior officer of the German prisoners in Japanese Camps and in Malasia, after these were taken over by the British in August of 1945 and eventually repatriated with the U-Boat crews of the Southwestern Asia Command. Kurt Freiwald also was activated again for the Bundsmarine and retired eventually as a Flotilla Admiral and died in 1975. He kept his oath of silence regarding Operation ‘URSULA’ until he departed from this world. He also commanded U-7 prior to Operation ‘URSULA’. Harald Grosse had been Captain of U-8 and U-22 and during the war was assigned U-53 and was sunk with all hands on the first war patrol that he made with U-53 off the North Channel on February 23rd 1940 by the British destroyer HMS GURKHA. Operation ‘URSULA’ begins On November 20th, 1936 both U-Boats U-33 and U-34 departed jointly from Kiel Wik and proceeded together through the Kiel Canal to Brunsbüttel Lock where they entered the North Sea and traveled together towards the English Channel transiting same during darkness. Operation ‘URSULA’ was off and running. Prior to departure from Kiel each crew member including the two new captains had to read and sign this written declaration: "
A special radio communication circuit and code had been assigned to this operation, called ULME - or Elm tree. Spanish Republican ships were to be referred to as ‘ORANGES’ and Sowjet flag ships as ‘SOYBEANS’. U-33 was assigned the code name ‘steamer TRITON’ and U-34 the code name ‘steamer POSEIDON’. Kurt Freiwald was to be called ‘Supercargo Frei’ and Harald Grosse ‘Supercargo Gros’; surely a somewhat infantile disguise. The U-Boats also had instructions to radio false positions and to avoid all shipping. In Berlin, both captains had only received verbal instructions and orders for this operation, including the specification to sink without warning, Spanish Republican or Sowjet warships or merchant ships if this could be done unobserved. But as it was anticipated that once Spanish waters were reached, that these U-Boats could not avoid being sighted entirely, to paint over numbers and identification marks and to circumnavigate close inspection, pretending to be British submarines and hoisting the Royal Navy flag if necessary. Originally they were to pretend to be Spanish Republican submarines and a supply of Spanish Navy hats was furnished to strengthen that impression, but Erich Raeder blocked and vetoed that particular scheme and it was scratched consequently. During the night from 27th to the 28th of November 1936, both U-Boats passed through the Straits of Gibraltar unobserved and continued into Spanish coastal waters along the sector allocated to the British Navy by the International Control Commission. In order to avoid incidents, instructions had been given to mainly operate within the three mile zone or close to the Spanish shore because the Control Commission assigned warships were to operate outside that three mile zone while patrolling their sectors. Both U-Boats initially moved toward Cartagena and Almeria and were told not to proceed further north than Valencia. Admiral Boehm had added that the captains ought to consider all darkened warships as Red Spanish or Sowjet Russian automatically and thus hostile, because Franco Spain did not have any destroyers as yet and the warships on Control Commission assignments had orders to travel fully lighted and with special strong spotlights illuminating huge painted flags and similar national identity signs on both ship sides. All attempts to sink such Spanish or Sowjet ships must take place within the three mile zone so that no problems would be incurred with British or French warships by mistake. On December 1st, U-34 under Harald Grosse was positioned during the early evening just off Cartagena harbor, one of the main bases of the Spanish Republican Navy, and fired his first torpedo at a darkened destroyer but missed it, though the end-of-the-run detonation was heard eventually. Grosse was able to observe three different Spanish destroyers, but was unable to reach a suitable attack position, as these destroyers moved about a lot because they were protecting Sowjet Flag ships entering Cartagena. U-33 was unable to reach a suitable attack position due to the irregular rapid movements of the protecting destroyers off Malaga and Almeria. Admiral Boehm felt it was essential and important to sink some of these destroyers to frighten the rest and discourage the entry of Sowjet Russian supply ships, his instructions were thereafter changed to attack only convoys not warships travelling alone. But to the chagrin of the various admirals involved, no successes were obtained, both U-Boats were forced away from the small coastal convoys by the escorting warships during the following night. Then U-34 and Harald Grosse missed with his second torpedo and finally on December 8th, with his third torpedo again. Were these the shades of the torpedo disaster to come in 1939 to 1942???? The involved admirals wired complaints and morale support, but at that point apparently Erich Raeder got cold feet and instructed Boehm to order the captains of the two ‘URSULA’ U-Boats NOT TO BECOME DANGEROUSLY AGGRESSIVE because their presence by itself was already a considerable hindrance to the Red Spanish supply traffic and therefore their mission had already been partially accomplished. Under no circumstances were the captains to endanger their secrecy cover by reckless attacks or irresponsible actions! More Peter's Page: Ursula
German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#112) German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#113) German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#114) German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#115) German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#116) Back to KTB #116 Table of Contents Back to KTB List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Harry Cooper, Sharkhunters International, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com Sharkhunters International, Inc., PO Box 1539, Hernando, FL 34442, ph: 352-637-2917, fax: 352-637-6289, e-m: sharkhunters@hitter.net |