PETER HANSEN (251-LIFE-1987) spent time working for the ABWEHR (the German Secret Service) during World War II and he has information that is known to a mere handful of people. He gives this secret information exclusively to SHARKHUNTERS. Here he tells us:

He was 200 days at sea without touching a port, but with re-supply in the Indian Ocean on this voyage of U-198. A man with a reputation of a lucky fellow when hit with depth charges and bombs, they turned out to just make dents into the U-Boat's super-structure but not to explode. A man venerated by his men, though usually rather strict, he had a sunny disposition and liked to laugh if there was a good story or a great joke told. During a seminar presentation on the then latest development on radar and electronic warfare, Werner Hartmann told me afterwards:

"Young man, you probably know what you are talking about and these newfangled things can really do amazing things, but I am just an old sailor who prefers to rely on his eyes and ears and most of all, to my luck as a salt who has muddled through many situations. I just don't understand these modern technical things at all and frankly speaking I am too old to even try to do so!"

In early 1944, Werner Hartmann became F.d.U. Mittlemeer (Chief of the U-Boat Flotillas in the Mediterranean) replacing Rear Admiral Leo Kreisch and when that job folded, he became commander of the 6th Regiment of the 2nd Navy Infantry Division, which was thrown together from surplus people that could not be used anymore on ships.

His luck continued to hold firmly while eventually fighting around Stettin and the Lower Oder River front in early 1945 when his entire staff was wiped out several times, but Werner Hartmann was never even scratched by anything. During the last few weeks, he was in charge of ground defenses of the Kiel Kanal until Capitulation.

Also operating in Spanish waters were the TYPE VII-A boats U-27 under Hans Ibbeken Class IV/1918 and Johannes Franz, Class of 1926. U-28 under Hans Heinrich Ambrosius, Class of 1926 and Günther Kuhnke, Class of 1931. U-29 under Heinz Fischer, Class of 1926 and also OTTO SCHUHART (1366-+-1990) Class of 1929. U-30 under Hans Cohausz, Class of 1926. U-31 under Rolf Dau, Class of 1926. U-32 under Paul Buechel, Class of 1925 and Klaus Ewerth, Class of 1925. Naturally also U-33 under Otto Heinrich Junker, Class of 1924 and Hans Wilhelm von Dresky. U-34 under Ernst Sobe and Hans Pauckstadt, Class of 1926. U-35 under Werner Lott, Class of 1926. Finally U-36 under Hans Michelles and Wilhelm Froehlich. Also U-37, the first TYPE IX-A one patrol towards the very end of 1938 under Heinrich Schuch, Class of 1925 (returning in 1939).

As mentioned, several U-Boats made two, some three and one even made four patrols in Spanish waters and Captains did change periodically.

Naturally, both Admirals Hermann Boehm and Wilhelm Marschall had been U-Boat Commanders in World War One and consequently were particularly keen on these operations as offering better training than trips around the Baltic. These two Admirals were also the only ones who did endorse the 1939 request for 300 U-Boats and the reasoning for same that Kapitän Karl Dönitz submitted through channels to the OKM and Erich Raeder, which was however deadfiled in Berlin.

Whilst Admiral Wilhelm F. Canaris, who had also been a U-Boat Commander in the Mediterranean in the First World War amongst other things, felt training in the North Atlantic and Barents Sea, away from shipping lanes, would be preferable in order not to provoke the British, as this would surely backfire regardless how strongly he otherwise supported and pushed in many ways the cause of Francisco Franco and the Whites in Spain because he loathed the Reds (Communists) and anything from Russia or connected with the so-called Eastern Real Politik. But he considered these U-Boat Operations as giving the British more excuses to re-arm rapidly and modernize the Royal Navy and thus doing in the end, a lot more harm than what could be gained in practical long distance operational experience and testing of equipment and material. Canaris did not believe in public relations or political propaganda actions, unless these were strictly covert matters and handled entirely discreetly and without press publicity because once matters got into the 'NEWS' they almost invariably did boomerang somehow.

But even though as late as in 1938 permission was sought from Erich Raeder to test the electric Ge-7 torpedoes in Spanish waters, which had only been tested in trial situations and never with a warhead. This was refused again by Raeder. Perhaps, if it had been done, some of the failures that occurred in 1939 and 1940 especially could have been avoided because these failures were indeed disastrous, even if used against fixed targets such as obstacles, rocks, bridges or port installations rather than ships and crews.

More Peter's Page: Ursula

German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#111)
German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#112)
German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#113)
German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#114)
German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#115)
German Subs in Spanish Civil War (#116)