Just after 2:00 AM on the 2nd, the exhausted reinforcements were welcomed into the fort. Stevani now assumed overall command. Since the 22nd of February, when the Mahdists had attacked Bullusit, the garrison's battle casualties had been 18 dead and 31 wounded. There had also been 2 killed and 9 wounded among the civilians. Major Cossu and his battalion had arrived at Sabderat at 8:15 PH on the 1st. The Major allowed his men only one hour's rest, then ordered the march to continue in a square formation. At 2:30 AM the exhausted battalion arrived at Mt. Mokram pass, having covered sore than 40 miles in 20 hours. Ignorant of his commander's change of plan, Cossu and his son advanced into the pass and proceeded to occupy the southern slopes of Mt. Mokram as ordered. While the Askaris were beginning the ascent at about 2:45, the presence of a large body of troops in the pass was suddenly signalled. At first the white jibbas were mistaken for Askari uniforms and their wearers were believed to be men of Stevani's column. The Mahdists, however, abruptly removed any doubts as to their identity by opening heavy rifle fire on Cossu's men. Although taken by surprise, the Askaris did not panic and quickly took position in the high rocky ground and began returning the fire. The Mahdists, not knowing the exact strength of their enemy, believed they were confronted by the entire relief force and did not dare to attack. Instead, they were content to keep up their rifle fire throughout he night. As soon as the first shots from Mt. Mokras were heard at the fort, Stevani dashed to the rescue with all five Askari battalions and two sections of mountain artillery. In this hurried night march, exhaustion took its toll on the troops. Many of the Askaris straggled and lost their way. Units became so scattered that it was not until full light before they could be reorganized. The whereabouts of the Mahdists was not precisely known and in the general confusion the 3rd and 8th Battalions mutually mistook each other for Mahdists and opened fire. Quickly realizing their mistake, they stopped firing, but not until a few men had been hit, including Major Amadasi, commander of the 8th, who was severely wounded. Eventually, with the daylight, Stevani managed to deploy his troops and reinforce the 6th Battalion with the 3rd and 7th and the four mountain guns. The 2nd Battalion was posted in a position to guard the south of the pass and the track from Kassala. The unlucky 8th was held in reserve on Mt. Mokram. Meanwhile, the Mahdists, seeing the reinforcements sallying forth, lost heart and were in full retreat by the time the Italian attack had deployed. A few Ansar made a stand in the pass and it took an hours' fight to overcome their resistance. Mahdist losses were about 50 dead and 30 prisoners, the Italians lost 15 dead and 64 wounded. While the fight of Mt. Mokram was taking place, the fort was attacked by several bodies of Mahdist infantry and cavalry, but they were easily repulsed by fire from the 90mm guns and Capt. Speck's Chitet irregulars. By the time Stevani and his troops marched back to the fort, the Mahdists had completely abandoned their siege works and were now all assembled in their 'dem' near Tucruf. The route to Agordat was now clear and safe; and on the afternoon of the 2nd the camel caravan and the non-cosbattants could at last free the fort of their encumbering presence. Colonel Stevani was now determined to follow up his victory without delay and decided to attack the Mahdist des the following day. Although the des was hidden from view by some scrub, and therefore the strength of the entrenchments unknown, Stevani rashly decided not to waste time on reconnaisance. At 6:00 AM on the 3rd he set out from the fort with the five Askari battalions, the platone of the Karen Squadron, a few irregulars and the two mountain gun sections. In all 62 officers, 31 Italian NCOs and about 2600 native troops. From the fort the 90mm guns covered their march firing about 50 shells at their maximum range (about 5,000 yards). Most fell short and damage to the Mahdist des was minimal. Meanwhile, Stevani's force, arranged in a square formation with the four mountain guns at the front corners and the cavalry in the center, advanced towards the dem at a slow pace. In order not to be hit by the guns firing from the fort, they made a wide circuit to their right and then swung round to the left. At 7:30 the square halted a little sore than one mile from the entrenchments, and the mountain guns case into action. Suddenly two large masses of Mahdists, led by two emirs, surged out of the scrub and charged the right side of the square but were soon swept back by artillery and rifle fire. The Mahdists scattered in a disordered retreat and soon a large dust cloud was seen behind the Mahdist camp. The Italians thought the entire Mahdist army was retreating (it was actually just their camp followers), so the square was ordered to advance to within 500 yards of the des. Stevani sent out a cavalry patrol to see if there were any Mahdists still in the camp. The Askari cavalrymen did not venture into the dem, but reported that it appeared to be empty. Stevani sent forward a company of the 2nd Askari battalion for a sore accurate inspection. As the Askaris got within 250 yards of the first line of defences, the Mahdist riflemen - who had been lying concealed in their trenches and rifle pits - opened a heavy and deadly fire. In a few seconds the company was decimated, including their Italian lieutenant being killed. Colonel Stevani, surprised but by no means discouraged, quickly ordered a general assault. Under a hail of bullets the companies forming the front and sides of the square wheeled into line and, after a crashing volley, began the advance at the double, extending out into a crescent shaped formation. The fire from the des was furious and very effective, but despite heavy casualties, the Askaris eventually managed to reach the entrenchments. The stockade surrounding the camp was now discovered to be exceptionally solid and the attempt to stars it was a complete failure. The ground before the camp had been carefully cleared of brush and the Askaris, subjected to a gruelling fire, were thrown back along the whole line. Only on the extreme left, where the stockade joined the bank of the river, did a few men succeed in fighting their way across the defences, but they too were eventually killed or repulsed. At the same moment, a body of Baggara cavalry turned up at the back of the force and charged the troops left in reserve Itwo cos. of the 8th Battalion, one of the 2nd and the irregulars). Facing an impending disaster, Stevani was forced to order a retreat; and under a blistering fire the attacking companies began to fall back. Thanks to the reserve troops who were successfully keeping the Baggara at bay, and to a good deal of luck, the officers managed to reform their men in a square and start a slow march back to the safety of the fort. At intervals the square halted to fire volleys at some groups of Mahdist who, for a while, attempted a half-hearted pursuit. In the end the Mahdists returned to their camp and Stevani's beaten force got safely into the fort. The unsuccessful assault had lasted no more than 20 minutes but had cost the Italians 4 officers dead and 7 wounded and 157 Askaris dead and 344 wounded. Mahdist losses were unknown, but believed to be very light. Despite the severe casualties and exhaustion suffered by the troops, the reckless colonel was firmly determined to re-attempt the assault the next day, if he could manage to take the 90mm guns with him. Baldissera, however, upon hearing of the unsuccessful attack, forbade Stevani from taking any more offensive action and instead ordered him to evacuate Kassala as soon as possible and retire to Agordat. The whole of the 4th and the 5th were spent in the preparations for the departure. On the 6th the first convoy carrying the sick and wounded left the fort. In order to discourage the enemy from an attack on the convoy, Stevani decided to fire off all the remaining 90mm shells in the direction of the Mahdist dem. The new bombardment started at dawn and went on incessantly until 8:00 AM. During the night of the 6th/7th, when everything was being readied for the evacuation, a constant beating of "noggara" copper drums was heard coming from the Mahdist camp. At dawn some friendly natives came in with the sensational news that the Mahdists had left. Stevani immediately sent out patrols who returned reporting that the Mahdists had indeed abandoned their camps at Tucruf and Gullusit and their whole army was marching back in the direction of Bedaref. It is not precisely known why Ahmed Fadil, despite the successful defence of his des, suddenly decided for a withdrawal. It has often been written that he was recalled by the Khalifa in view of the impending invasion by Kitchener's army. More probably, however, he simply thought the Italians would not abandon their fort and that the fort was too strong for his force to take. In addition, the prolonged bombardment of the 6th, although ineffective like the previous shelling, is likely to have caused him to fear that the Italians were about to launch a new and sore determined assault against the des. The retreat of the Mahdist army brought about the immediate suspension of the evacuation. On the 8th Stevani left the fort with a large body of troops and went to Tucruf in order to burn the des. Before setting it on fire, he carefully inspected the defence works and had to admit that they were really formidable. The des was a semicircular enclosure with the back resting against the river. Forming the outside barrier there was an incomplete thorn zeriba; behind it there was a double and in some places triple stockade of tall and very strong palm logs, reinforced with mud. Behind the stockade and running all along it there was a ditch and behind it two lines of concentric trenches with thick earth parapets. In order to give maximum protection from artillery fire, the trenches were considerably narrower at the opening than at the bottom. When the Italian government was informed of the events, it promptly instructed Baldissera that national prestige and political reasons required that Kassala should be held. Accordingly, Baldissera telegraphed Stevani ordering him to return, but to leave a garrison at Kassala of two battalions, later reduced to one. However, the Italian 'tricolore' was not to wave long over the ramparts of Fort Baratieri. When, in April of 1891, the Italians had obtained consent from the Egyptian government to occupy Kassala, they promised to return the town to Egypt whenever Egyptian suzerainty should be re-established in the Sudan. So, after the Egyptian reoccupation of Berber in September 1897, negotiations for the return of Kassala were soon started between the Anglo-Egyptian authorities and the Italian government. In these negotiations the Italians turned out to be only too happy to return the town to the Egyptians. The reason for their willingness to get rid of Kassala was that in January of 1897, their colony had been subjected to a new (and final) large scale Mahdist raid, again led by Ahmed Fadil. This time the Ansar advanced along a more southern route and they completely ignored Kassala, trying to surprise the fort of Agordat. Although in fact the Mahdists retired almost without fighting as soon as they were confronted by a stong Italian force, their action had clearly shown that Kassala could be easily cut-of and that, therefore, it was by no means the useful frontier outpost Baratieri had believed. So negotiations soon resulted in the mutual agreement that Kassala should be formally handed over to Egypt on Christmas Day of 1897. The fort was to be occupied by an Egyptian force (the 16th Egyptian Battalion), the Italian stores and armaments to be purchased at an agreed-upon price and the garrison (the 6th Askari Battalion and a force of irregulars) to be transferred to Egyptian service. (2) As Winston Churchill wrote in THE RIVER WAR, 'An imposing ceremony was observed.... The flags of Egypt and Italy hoisted. The troops of both countries, drawn up in line, exchanged military compliments. Then the Egyptian guard marched across the drawbridge into the fort and relieved the Italian soldiers. the brass band of the 16th Battalion played appropriate airs. The Italian flag was lowered, and with a salute of 21 guns the retrocession of Kassala was complete.' NOTES 1) Alford and Sword state that the Mahdist army numbered 10,000, but this figure is likely to have included the usual host of camp followers. 2) It is interesting to note that the distinctive color of the 6th Askari Btn. (green) after its incorporation into the Egyptian Army was adopted by the Sudan Defence Force. BIBLIOGRAPHY Alford, H. S. L., and Sword, W. D., THE EGYPTIAN SOUDAN, ITS LOSS AND RECOVERY, 1898. Bellavita, E., ADUA, 1931. Bernasconi, 6., LE GUERRE E LA POLITICA DELL'ITALIA NELL' AFRICA ORIENTALE, 1935. Churchill, W. S., THE RIVER WAR, 1933 edition. Del Boca, A., 61.1 ITALIANI IN AFRICA ORIENTALE DALL'UNITA' ALLA MARCIA SU ROMA, 1976. Gaibi, A., LA GUERRA D'AFRICA (1895-1896), 1930. Primary source for this article. Giglio, V., and Ravenni, A., LE GUERRE COLONIALI D'ITALIA, 1935. Pini, C. 8., ADUA, 1926. Siege and Relief of Kassala Italian-Mahdist Campaign Kassala Fortification Kassala Relief Force Battles of Mount Mokram and Tucruf Uniform Notes and Plates Back to Table of Contents -- Savage and Soldier Vol. XVII No. 2 Back to Savage and Soldier List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by Milton Soong. 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