Although the siege of Kassala was a rather unimportant affair and a sere postscript to the Italian-Mahdist campaign (see US Vol XV No 3), I think that it would make a good wargame campaign because the opposing forces were quite well balanced (as it will be seen, the real campaign ended in somewhat of a draw). In this article I have summed up the events and tried to include as many details regarding units, fortifications, etc. as are available to me. The capture of Kassala was a relatively cheap achievement, but keeping it proved rather onerous for the meagre resources of the Italian colony of Eritrea. General Baratieri, however, wished to keep the town in spite of its great distance (125 miles) from the westernmost Italian stronghold of Agordat. He judged that Kassala would be a most useful frontier outpost against the Mahdists. Accordingly, he ordered a small fortification designed for a garrison of 1,000 son to be built around the old cotton mill of the town, a few hundred yards from the right bank of the river Bash. The fort, duly named Fort Baratieri, was completed in a few days. It consisted of a pentagonal enclosure about 220 yards wide and 110 long, with a perimeter of about 550 yards. Its mud-brick ramparts were 8.7 feet high and 3.6 thick and there were two emplacements for six guns each. In the middle stood the cotton factory; its machinery had long been destroyed, but the substantial building formed the central keep of the fort. The tall chimney had become a convenient look-out post and the lightning rod acted as a flagstaff. The fort was surrounded by a thorn zeriba, an 8.8 yard wide barbed wire entanglement and a ditch about 16 feet wide and 10 deep. The front gate was provided with a drawbridge. A telegraph line linking Fort Baratieri to Agordat was built and a water station was established at Sabderat, 19 miles east of Kassala. Other smaller stations were scattered between Sabderat and Agordat. In addition, once a month, a huge caravan under a strong escort was to be sent from Agordat carrying supplies to the remote garrison. At the end of 1895 the Italians were to fight a longfeared full-scale war with the Abyssinians and the affair immediately turned out to be far sore serious than had been their cheap victories over the Mahdists. After two severe defeats in December of 1895 and January of 1896, the Italians attacked the Abyssinians on the 1st of March in the depression of Adowa and in the ensuing battle set with the bloodiest defeat in their Colonial history. The sensational news of the Italians' disaters spread quickly and soon reached Omdurman. As soon as the Khalifa was informed of the outcome of the first two battles, probably thinking that the Italians were now too weak and busy to cope with his Ansar, he decided to attempt to recapture Kassala. The expedition was to be led by the Emir Ahmed Fadil, governor of the South-Eastern Sudan, who at once set out from Bedaref with an army of about 6,000 men (4,000 riflemen, 1,000 spear and swordsmen and 1,000 cavalry) organized in four r'ubs and a reserve.(1) When the first rumors of the Mahdist advance reached Fort Baratieri, Major Hidalgo (the commanding officer) ordered the destruction of the ruins of the old Egyptian fort (which obstructed the field of fire to the southwest). The view to the south was also limited by thick vegetation (the orchards grown wild, see map). Major Hidalgo's garrison consisted of his 2nd Askari Battalion, one section of Askari mountain artillery and details of Italian artillery, engineers and commisariat department; in all 20 officers, 82 Italian NCOs and men and 1225 Askaris. Artillery included four 90mm field guns, two 70mm mountain guns and four "two-barrelled machine guns.' There were about 500 shells for each gun, 40,000 machine gun rounds and 725 rounds for each of the Askaris' Vetterli single shot rifles. The Europeans had a good supply of ammunition for their new 6-round magazine rifles (Model M.1891). The garrison had food for two months and 'dhoora' (a local grain) for five. A good supply of water was ensured by one large and four smaller wells inside the fort. On the 22nd of February the Mahdist advance guard (500 infantry and 200 cavalry) appeared at the dhoora fields of Gullusit, about 12 miles north of Kassala. The fields were guarded by a detachment of 100 Askaris under a jusbashi (native sub-lieutenant). After a brisk skirmish the Askaris were forced to fall back on Kassala, abondoning the fields to the Mahdists. On the 25th the entire Mahdist army reached Bullusit. Here they halted for several days, establishing themselves in a strong 'des' (entrenched camp) and reaping the dhoora. Upon hearing of the capture of Sullusit, Major Hidalgo had withdrawn into the fort with all his forces and the civilians (over 2,000 people, mostly families of the Askaris). Seeing that for the moment the enemy did not show any intention of advancing from 6ullusit, however, he decided to establish small outside posts and send daring reconnaissance parties to spy on the Mahdist movements. Although the Askari patrols came across small parties of Mahdists almost daily, often engaging them in brisk skirmishes, they reported that the main army still remained queitly camped at Sullusit. So, on the 6th of March, Hidalgo telegraphed the new governor in Massowah (6eneral Baldissera) reporting that the situation was under control. He added, however, that he would need three more battalions and 1000 camels if the general decided to order the evacuation of the fort. General Baldissera preferred abandoning the town, but, due to the emergencies of the Abyssinian war, was not in a position to send the force required for a safe evacuation. So he chose to send a large caravan carrying food and ammunition to Fort Baratieri in the hope that, if well-supplied, the garrison would be able to hold out until it would be possible to organize a relief force. While the caravan was being assembled at Agordat, the Mahdists launched an unexpected attack against Sabderat on the 8th. The gorge of Sabderat, where the desert track from Agordat passed between steep rocky hills, was not only of the utmost importance for its strategical position, but also because the soil near the gorge was comparatively rich in water. The place was guarded by chief Ali Nurin's band of some 70 'friendlies', well-supplied with rifles. On the top of Mt. Aura, the highest of the surrounding hills, a heliograph station had been established and it was manned by two privates of the Italian Engineers assisted by two infantry Asking and escorted by 20-30 Askaris from the Keren Squadron. In the early morning of the 8th a Mahdist force of 500 infantry and 150 cavalry, having crossed the Bash unnoticed, turned up at the gorge. The 'friendlies' were completely surprised and scattered, taking shelter on the high ground. But the two Italian soldiers and the Askaris promptly took position among the rocky slopes of Mt. Aura. From there they could dominate the ground below, and opened an accurate fire on the onrushing Ansar, killing their leader and eventually forcing them to retire with the loss of 43 dead. Italian losses were 3 dead and 10 wounded (all 'friendlies'). In their retreat the Mahdists paused to disable the telegraph line, which was, however, quickly repaired. That night Hidalgo sent a small caravan escorted by 50 Askaris to Sabderat carrying food and ammunition. They arrived safely at 3:00 AM the following morning. The news of the attack alarmed Baldissera, who on the 13th telegraphed Hidalgo asking if he still deemed it possible to hold the place. Hidalgo replied affirmatively, but urged that it was absolutely necessary to evacuate all the non-combattants who were dangerously cramming the fort. Meanwhile, on the 11th the supply caravan (500 camels) had left Agordat escorted by one 'platone' (25-30 son) of the Keren Squadron and 450 men of the 'Chitet' (native territorial militia; they were conscripted irregulars who did not have a specific uniform and their fighting qualities were generally considered very poor), the whole of the escort being under the command of Capt. Speck. In addition, in accordance with Hidalgo's request, Capt. Heusch with 300 Askaris of the 'Militia Mobile' ('Flying Militia'; they were better trained and organized than the men of the Chitet and were dressed and equipped like regular Askaris) were ordered to proceed to Sabderat to reinforce that place and escort the caravan and the non-combattants back to Agordat. After their fruitless attack of the 8th, the Mahdists had remained quiet until the night of the 12th, when - under cover of darkness - they tried to approach Kassala in three strong columns, probably with the intention of launching a surprise attack against the fort. But they were intercepted by a patrol of Askaris when still three miles from the town. Their surprise having vanished, the Mahdists hastily retired. On the 14th, however, the entire Mahdist army moved from 6ullusit, crossed the Bash near the village of Tucruf. Here, now on the opposite bank, they began building another 'des' in a loop of the river. The Mahdist army was now within 45 minutes of the Italian fort. While the Mahdists were busy building their new camp, the supply caravan arrived at Kassala undisturbed, entering the fort at 5:00 AM on the 16th. This event spurred Ahmed Fadil to action and he ordered a new attack against Sabderat. In the early morning of the 18th a force of Mahdist infantry and Cavalry again approached the gorge, but this time they were sighted in advance. Led by the two Italian soldiers, the Askaris and the irregulars deployed in good order on the rocky slopes of Mt. Aura. Firing steadily from their safe position, they eventually managed to stop the charges of the Mahdists. Showing great courage, the Ansar charged and reformed five times, but each time were repulsed with heavy losses. In the end they had to retire. After the fight, Hidalgo decided to reinforce Sabderat, sending Capt. Bramanti's company (150 Askaris) of the 2nd Battalion and some more food and ammunition. On the 23rd the garrison of Sabderat was further strengthened by the arrival of the 300 Askaris of the Milizia Mobile, who had arrived too late to carry out the evacuation of the caravan and the civilians from Fort Baratieri. The failure of the second assault against Sabderat eventually ade Ahmed Fadil give up all hopes of capturing that place. He did, however, send a strong force on the 17th to occupy Mt. Mokram pass, where the track from Agordat led through a rather narrow passage between Mt. Mokram and the Mounts of Kassala. This move, inexplicably delayed so long, immediately put the garrison of Fort Baratieri in a critical position. The caravan had brought in precious supplies of food and ammunition, but now that the Mahdists were blocking the track in force, the caravan and the noncombattants could not leave the fort as planned. This additional crowding of the fort threatened to breed disease through the increasing insanitary conditions experienced within the walls. Meanwhile, a few days after the disaster of Adowa, large reinforcements had begun to arrive from Italy. Peace negotiations had also been started with the Abyssinians. Baldissera soon felt that he was in a position to spare enough troops for a Kassala Relief Force. Because of the recent death of over 4,000 Italians at the battle of Adowa, however, he did not dare risk any white troops. He ordered lt. Colonel Stevani, an enterprising officer who had commanded the Bersaglieri Regiment at Adowa, to assemble the relief force with the survivors of the Askari Battalions shattered in the Abyssinian war and rush to Kassala as fast as they could. Siege and Relief of Kassala Italian-Mahdist Campaign Kassala Fortification Kassala Relief Force Battles of Mount Mokram and Tucruf Uniform Notes and Plates Back to Table of Contents -- Savage and Soldier Vol. XVII No. 2 Back to Savage and Soldier List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by Milton Soong. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com