By 1242, the two sides, German/Scandinavian as well as Russian had backed each other into a corner neither could retreat from. Alexander made a move the year before, clearing the German garrisons east of the Nerva River, killing any Estonians and Russians he found fighting for the enemy, but freeing Westerners for ransom (Urban, 97). He then moved on Pskov, as the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle tells us. "He moved to Pskov with many troops…they drove away the two (knights left to hold the citadel along with, presumably, the retainers)…the Germans fled" (Urban, 97), capturing it back before deciding on a punitive expedition into Teutonic Order possessions.

This expedition could only be described as punishing and vengeful. As the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle noted, "There were bowmen without number among them and many marvelous cuirasses. Their banners were splendid and their helmets bright for all to see. Quickly the (Teutonic knights) rode forward to oppose them, but there were very few of them. Alexander had come…to rob and burn" (Nicolle, 66) and perhaps to entice an unwise responsive reaction from the enemy. Alexander wanted to force the Crusaders away from his own lands by raiding the enemy lands--Scipio's strategy used to get Hannibal out of Italy. He also wanted to show the Crusaders that he had the ability to attack at his own whim.

Indeed, the raid probed embarrassing to the Order. Here, the upstart Russians who should be battling the invading Mongols were instead raiding into German controlled territory. As the Novgorod Chronicle noted, "And when (Alexander) came to their land, he let loose his whole force to (loot)…" (Christiansen, 129). The Order was in trouble. The year before, at Liegnitz, they had been badly defeated by the Mongols and now their very conquests were being challenged by…the Russians! But the commander of the Order who had been against the crusade against Novgorod from the first, failed to support any response. Instead, and the chronicles are unclear about who actually determined to chase the raiders back into Russian and punish them for their effrontery. Yet, someone could and did actually rally the Crusaders. And Alexander Nevsky was ready for them.

It must be asked if Alexander had the capability of knowing the problems the Order faced. It was no secret that the Order was stretched thin and that it did not have unanimous support in respect to war with Russia. He must also have had indications of the small number of actual fighters the Teutonic Order could put into the field. All of this leads to the pointed question…did Alexander purposefully entice the Order into a precipitous attack on a 'retreating' army and fight on a battlefield of his choosing with a vast numerical superiority?

The Armies of the Battle of Lake Piepus

Crusaders and Teutonic Order

Most of the knights were Germans, but not all. Many had joined for the prestige and honor of fighting with the Order as well as the fact that they were well taken care of. At the top of the Order were the Brethren or Brothers. There were perhaps 100 of these along with their retainers, at the most available in the immediate area who could respond to the call to arms. Other knights were referred to as 'Seasonal' Crusaders or summer warriors, many of them out for pillage and excitement. For them, the war provided a way to salvation without a long trek to the Holy Land. These numbered perhaps 800 including their retainers. Along with the mounted knights were numbers of foot, including perhaps 400 Germans, 300 Danes and up to 1000 Estonians and Swedish mercenaries (making this in some ways a Scandinavian Crusade).

Some of these troops, notably the Germans, would be trained and better armored, many with crossbows as well as spears and shields. The others were mostly levies or locals, fighting for pillage and even sex…rape being the prerogative of the winners who could capture women accompanying the enemy army. Some of these locals would serve as light or skirmish cavalry, scouting and foraging as well as guarding the flanks of the army (Nicolle, 31). Tactics were normally centered around a thunderous attack by wedging knights supported by massed missile fire, the rest of the army would support the knights. The Crusading army likely numbered from 2000-2500 men.

The Russians

The Russian army was even more diverse than the Crusader. At the top were the military elite, tribal aristocrats of the old ruling order as well as Scandinavian mercenaries (Nicolle, 34). These men had with them their followers and retainers, called druzhina. These men were service bound (not land bound as most of feudal Europe was at this time). Perhaps 1,000 of these were armored and fought mounted. With the military elite came both urban and rural peasant militiamen and tribesmen fighting for love of country, loyalty to their leader or for their faith. Estimates of 3-4,000 total make this the biggest contingent in the army. These men were unarmored but still very useful troops, providing needed bulk and archers to the Russian armies.

Finally, there were reportedly a number of horse archers, perhaps mercenaries or even Turco-Mongols in alliance with the Russians against the Crusaders. Numbers are impossible to figure, but perhaps 500 of these men accompanied the Russian army. The total army likely numbered from 5-6,000 men.

Russian tactics were basically defensive in nature, the Prince Igor epic noting that "You stand on the defense, you pour your arrows upon your foeman, you batter their helmets with swords of Frankish steel" (Nicolle, 39). A logical use of available forces would have the numerous Russian archers fire at an advancing enemy, weakening them as they close. The foot would absorb the initial attacks, whether they held or not was impossible to predict, but this would spare the valuable druzhina for a devastating counterattack against a hopefully tired and disorganized enemy. The horse archers and skirmish cavalry would get their own fire in, as Friar Carpini noted, "(They) begin to shoot before their opponents arrows can reach them [note: by the use of the Mongol composite bow], sometimes even ahead of the time when they are not in range. As soon as their arrows can reach the mark unhindered they are said, owing to the density of their shooting, to rain arrows rather than to shoot them." (Nicolle, 40). This is a prime example of Mongol horse archer tactics.

Battle of Lake Piepus 1242

Introduction
Russia and the Teutonic Order
Campaign of 1242
The Battle: April 5, 1242
Aftermath