Composition

Now I wish to put forward a personal view of the army and suggest its composition on the tabletop. The subject of total numbers and origin of troops has not been included because of the lack of detailed information. Both Bar-Kochva and Sekunda were unable to produce a precise order of battle, to use the modern term, and it is highly unlikely that I can improve upon their efforts in this limited space. They do give enough information to suggest several variants for specific battles, which can be used to compose a scaled down version for our purposes.

Towards this goal, I have concentrated on the armies as recorded for Raphia, Magnesia and the parade at Daphnae. These have been selected, as there was little change in the main components of the army despite the losses between these events in terms of manpower and territory. The army was mustered such that its organization remained the same, which surely is an indicator of its professionalism.

The first point to consider is morale as this was the motivating factor in writing this article. Despite its catastrophic defeats, the Seleucid kingdom did survive and was able to rebuild its armed forces several times before its final demise. This must be due in a major way to the loyalty of specific subject groups, primarily the Greco-Macedonian descendants of Alexander’s army and colonists. The kingdom was able to rely on the support of other ethnic groups, but it was held together by this one body. Notwithstanding how the army was trained and organized, the ability to call upon loyalists would have ensured a enthusiastic core was maintained and replenished as needed. This alone would argue for at least average morale ratings regardless of what rules are used. Bevan illustrates the loyalty of the citizens many times in his book "The House of Seleucus". One theme that is repeated each time the army venture eastward to reclaim lost territory is the support shown by the many non-Greco-Macedonian communities. There must have been willingness on the part of many of the diverse populations to swear fealty to the king in preference to foreign armies or local leaders.

While Bar-Kochva suggests that some ethnic groups were not recruited so that they were not capable of armed insurrection, there seems to be a number of warlike groups who were eagerly employed such as the Galatians and Jews who also fought against the Seleucids. Some of the more ferocious groups were encouraged to maintain their martial habits so that they could provide ideal soldiers. This policy suggests that there was a deliberate system used by the government to ensure a steady supply of troops. What is unclear is the type of formal training, if any, was given to such groups. Most historians assume that the Macedonian organizations were trained and that a cadre of units, particularly the guards, was used to give both training and experience to new recruits.

Preserving the rights and privileges of the groups providing the bulk of the troops strengthened loyalty to the king. Greco-Macedonian communities had vested rights and many were given charters, which clearly stated what had been granted by the king. In other cases, ethnic groups were given self-government or religious freedom (bearing in mind that the spread of Hellenism was fostered by the construction of numerous Hellenic temples and the Maccabees rebelled because they opposed the introduction of Hellenic culture and ideas). In return, the state could expect these communities to provide quotas of soldiers either for specific campaigns (feudal levies) or long service (central army and garrisons).

This system is a continuation of that begun by Alexander in which he tried to fuse Hellenism with Asiatic ideas to create a more homogenous state. This is in contrast to many other imperial forms of government but one, which was embraced by the main western opponent of the Seleucids, Rome. The Romans used citizenship as a reward for long serving auxiliary troops and also offered it to people who served the Roman state in other capacities. That such a concept was used by a foe suggests that there was merit in the practice and also indicates that it had been successful in its application.

Another indicator of the sturdiness of the kingdom and its army was the ability to sustain major defeats and still survive despite being faced with several enemies at the same time. The Seleucids had to first contend with the other successor states, specifically the Ptolemids of Egypt. There was long-term pressure from the Parthians and Romans, even when at peace with these foes. Internally, the Jews, other rebellious ethnic groups and many usurpers ensured that there were few long periods of stability. It could be argued that none of these threats was sufficient alone to bring about the fall of the kingdom. Each in turn ensured that its vitality was sapped but somehow the kings up to Antiochus VIII Sidetes were able to muster a loyal army willing to traverse long distances to rebuild the kingdom after interludes of ineffective rulers.

Therefore it is suggested that the Seleucid Army was a reliable pillar of the state and could be trusted to perform its duties. What is not as apparent is how well it was trained to do its job. Bar-Kochva argues that it was well trained compared to other Hellenic military organizations and many barbarian groups. When faced with the Roman Army, it does not appear to be an equal. This does not mean that it was inferior in all categories as even the Carthaginian Army was unable to beat the Romans consistently. There seemed to be few worthy opponents of the Romans during the transition from city-state to empire. Sekunda suggests that the Seleucids acknowledged the superiority of the Romans, as did the Ptolemies. He argues that Antiochus IV Epiphanes copied the Roman military to reform his army. At least some of the Seleucid troops were equipped in the Roman manner according to Polybius before the Daphnae parade.

This is one example of the Seleucid ability to incorporate new ideas, although not all were successfully integrated such as scythed chariots. These seem to have had a rather poor success rate based on the experiences of the various armies that used them and yet even in the Late Roman era, one writer argued for their employment (the currus drepanus allowed in the WRG 6th Edition list). The Seleucids had success with other innovations such as elephants (credited with defeating the Galatians after they had defeated almost every other army in Greece and managed to cross to Asia Minor (Turkey)) and cataphracts (who broke a Roman legion at Magnesia). Less clear but certainly hinted at by historians is the practice of using national tactics and weapons. Persian archers and slingers, Cretan archers, Thracian peltasts, Scythian horse-archers and many others are recorded in Seleucid armies.

This practice has not always been historically successful as the army of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy is one of the best examples of a unsuccessful fusing of troop types (once again it has been argued that just because the Swiss always beat him, that it was a bad idea but then many armies lost to the Swiss and then slavishly copied the Swiss in an attempt to be victorious).

Organization

There is no army list here as the information is presented for use with any rule set. Numbers have been provided as stated in the sources and these can be used to create the proper ratios for army lists. This list of troop types that follows was inspired in part by Jamie Fish’s lament that some wargamers are not familiar with the historic names of the various armies.

The army consisted of a standing army as represented by the cavalry guard units of the Companions and the Agema, and the infantry component of the Argyraspides or Silver Shields. Only the Agema were a non-Macedonian unit initially despite their Macedonian name. Various garrison forces could be added to these units; however, it is unclear as to whether the garrisons would always supply contingents for the field army. For campaigns, contingents were drawn from Hellenistic colonists, national or tribal groups and mercenaries. These were also probably used to form the garrisons of fortresses and urban centres in addition to the unspecified garrison troops mentioned above. The military parade recorded by Polybius that took place in 168 BC at Daphnae was probably a review of the field army raised by Antiochus IV for his eastern campaign. While there are no other recorded examples of a pre-campaign parade of this type, it may have been a common event following the mustering of a field army. Daphnae is located near Antioch and many of the main bases of the regular army, and therefore would be an ideal concentration point for a field army. Regardless of whether or not the parade of 168 BC was unique, it does give a good indication of the Seleucid campaign army.

Argyraspides, Chalkaspides and Other Seleucids

Introduction and Capabilities
Composition and Organization
Seleucid Military Units
Cavalry
Numbers and Conclusion