This is based on an article that I submitted to Spearpoint years ago. At the time the Seleucid military was one of my favourite wargaming armies and I had acquired one in 6mm, 15mm and 25mm scales. One reason for writing the article was to present my own interpretation of the composition of the army. This differed in some areas to the existing army lists and later I used this information in the development of the AW army list. Most of my research remains relevant, as there have been few additions made to the information database available to the academic researcher.

Sources

The main problem I have had in doing this research is the lack of good source material from which to extract information. There are some good books on the subject including the detailed study by B. Bar-Kochva (Cambridge University Press, 1976); however, it has some holes in which the author has used supposition to fill. I am not satisfied with all of his conclusions (and nor was Nick Sekunda, The Seleucid Army, Montvert Publications, 1994). There are some problems with these two books, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars (Duncan Head, WRG, 1982) and others that I have been able to read.

The primary one is that much of the information is drawn from non-Seleucid sources, which is not surprising as there are few original Seleucid sources. This is a problem because the main sources can and have been accused of bias. Three of the major sources concerning the Seleucid Army are the Old Testament book of I Maccabeus (not included in the King James version of the Bible), and Polybius and Livy, who wrote for Roman audiences. Another source, Josephus, utilised Jewish sources for his history of the Maccabean kingdom. All of these writers had access to contemporary works, which have not survived for us to study. Therefore we must rely on what has been extracted from these other sources by those authors who are known to us. So below are my thoughts on the Seleucid ground forces and how they fought.

Capabilities

Anyone who has read these surviving texts will recall that there are obvious errors in recording the numbers involved in the campaigns and descriptions of who fought and how they fought. There are several examples of how this information has been anti-Seleucid. Polybius, according to Bar-Kochva (pg 128), used a pro-Ptolemaic source to describe the Battle of Raphia. The author of I Maccabeus is a firm supporter of the Maccabean leaders and often tries to rationalise why the Seleucids were successful or not. He credits the Jewish defeat at Elasa to the huge disparity of numbers, 800 versus over 20,000 Seleucid soldiers. It hardly seems believable that a capable commander like Judas Maccabeus would allow himself to accept battle against a stronger opponent on ground unfavourable to a Jewish army of only 800. The battle of Magnesia is recorded by Livy and Polybius, who may have exaggerated the Roman victory, for very good reasons as what Roman would read about a defeat or even a Pyrrhic victory.

In fact most of the detailed accounts of battles in which the Seleucid Army fought cover defeats. This alone could generate a bias concerning its fighting prowess. Considering only Raphia, Thermopylae, Magnesia and several battles against the Maccabeans, it would be easy to view the army as inferior military organization. This is at odds with the fact that the Seleucid kingdom survived against some worthy opponents for over two hundred years and its demise was due more to internal strife than external foes.

There are several more limited accounts of the Seleucid victories such as Ipsus (albeit a joint victory shared by several of Alexander’s successors), Panion, Mount Casios and Corupedion. All these were major battles but there are few detailed accounts, which provide information concerning the Seleucid Army. In terms of major campaigns, Antiochus III was very successful in most of his wars prior to meeting the Romans. He had re-conquered the eastern satrapies, which had been seized by the Parthians, Bactrians and local dynasts. Antiochus VIII Sidetes also achieved some success in his attempts to re-conquer this region before being defeated by a resurgent Parthian army. These victories would suggest that the military forces of the Seleucid monarchs were not effete, luxury-loving organizations, which were incapable of maintaining a vast kingdom.

On the contrary, the make-up of the army as put forward by Bar-Kochva was one of professional soldiers drawn from warlike ethnic groups and areas, and long serving regulars who provided a central core. Many of the soldiers were loyal to the state and rendered it good service. Even the irregulars and mercenaries proved their worth on many occasions. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of detail about the troops who comprised these armies or how they fought.

The army did have its problems in that its diverse troop types and exotic weapons (elephants and chariots) were often hindrances and helped to ensure that the army was defeated many times. There have been few truly successful armies, however, and they owe their victories as much to a combination of factors just as the Seleucid army owes its defeats to the same. Despite the legacy of Alexander, none of his successors were able to achieve his record of success. The military forces developed in this period were insufficient by themselves to guarantee victory and good leadership was necessary to clinch a victory. The reverse is true as well, as several good generals were let down by their troops.

I would argue that the Seleucid army was much better than what the historical accounts suggest and a review of the tabletop variants is in order to reflect this. Its core troops were loyal to the state and fought well under decent leadership. Their defeats can be attributed in part to being outclassed by their opponents in terms of leadership and tactical abilities. Their victories were gained often because of these factors.

Argyraspides, Chalkaspides and Other Seleucids

Introduction and Capabilities
Composition and Organization
Seleucid Military Units
Cavalry
Numbers and Conclusion