With part 1 we had an opportunity to get a close look at Agincourt. In order to show how Agincourt was not typical of French Hundred Years' War, the next step would be to compare the French lack of tactical ability at Agincourt with other battles of the Hundred Year's War. For the most part we'll exclude battles prior Poitiers. After this battle the French had to completely reorganize how they raised forces and had to change their battle tactics.

The first thing the French had to do was to change how they raised their armies. The arriere ban could not raise the professional troops needed to fight the English professional troops. They, like the English and Italians began to contract with troops. However, unlike the English and Italians, the French crown contracted with the noblemen and men-at-arms individually. Contracting with nobles to raise troops and then lead them meant these troops already had a sense of unity prior to combat. The French method meant that units were raised on an as-need basis. They would be composed of men-at-arms, which may or may not have worked together before. Thus, they tended to lack the unity of the English troops. Of course, after they had fought together for a time they would have developed a unity equal that of the English.

It has become common to view these men-at-arms as knights. This, however, is incorrect. Even as early as 1358 the French crown was ordering townsmen who could afford to equip themselves as cavalry to attend musters as cavalrymen. When they were called up, they fought, as did the rest of the men-at-arms. This was nothing new. At the battle of Bouvines [1214] these non-noble cavalrymen were called Sergeants. They had always existed during the middle ages but historians have been so focused on knighthood and nobility that few even acknowledge the existence of these mounted warriors. In any event, these non-noble warriors joined the few nobles and the many gentry of lower nobility to makeup the French men-at-arms.

Bouvines also demonstrates how the late medieval French army had changed. At Bouvines the French had nobles and non-noble cavalry but also bowmen and shock infantry in the form of pikemen. However, by the time of the Hundred Year's War the noble and non-noble mounted warrior were no longer distinguished as separate types but rather now worked together as men-at-arms. However, it wasn't until the Poitiers campaign that the French army finally jettisoned the urban pike-armed soldiers. What was left was the men-at-arms and crossbowmen (with their shield-bearers). The crossbowmen were composed of professionals and those raised from the town militias. Theses two troop types made up the bulk of the French armies of the Hundred Year's War. Later, longbowmen were raised primarily from around the area of Picardy.

The Use of Bowmen

My discussion of the battlefield efficiency of the French army will begin with a look at how the French bowmen (crossbowmen and later longbowmen) were used on the battlefield. Given the propensity of the French for attack bowmen were very frequently used to screen the advance of the men-at-arms. Crecy [1346] had the infamous event of the Genoese crossbowmen being run off by the English longbowmen. At Constance [1356] the crossbowmen had their pavises with them. They simply waited until the longbowmen had run out of arrows. When the longbowmen fell back the French crossbowmen covered the attack of the French men-at-arms. The French men-at-arms overran the English position.

At Nogent [1359] the French men-at-arms attempted to ride down the English forces (men-at-arms plus archers). The initial attack was driven off. At this point the French commander called up his crossbowmen with their pavises. They defeated the longbowmen. The French commander then sent in his mounted men-at-arms. This time they overran the English position.

Of course there was also the French battle plans, discovered not long ago, which were written up shortly before the battle of Agincourt. These plans had the bowmen, both crossbowmen and longbowmen, advancing in front of the main attack on the English position.

However, this was not the only way in which the French used bowmen. At the battle of St. Remy [1412] The French royal army faced the rebel Armagnacs. The Armagnacs attempt to strike the royalist before they could form up. They failed. The royalist forces were set up with dismounted men-at-arms and archers/crossbowmen on the flanks. The Armagnac attack was disrupted by the bowmen. At this point the French remounted and destroyed the Armagnac force.

Finally, the French would use the archers as an independent attack force. At Formigny [1450] the constable of France sent his archers to attack the English right flank.

Bowmen were an integral part of the French army. And, they were used quite effectively. When allowed to use their pavises they were quite capable of driving off the vaunted English longbowmen. Bowmen, when used in the attack generally led or were used as an independent flanking force. In defense they were used, as the English used bowmen, on the flank of dismounted men-at-arms.

The Use of Men-at-Arms

The stereotypical view of French men-at-arms was that of mounted knights repeatedly attacking the enemy without any ability to learn new tactics. Of course this is false. Shortly after Crecy [1346] the French dismounted and attacked the English formation dismount at the battle of St. Pol de Leon [1346]. At Calay [1349] the French dismounted. The French men-at-arms dismounted at Ardres [1351]. They also dismounted at Mauron [1352], Poitiers [1356], Auray, [1364], Cocherel [1364], Montaubon [1366], Arinez, [1367], Najera, [1367], Aljubarotta, 1385], (Armagnacs) St. Cloud [1408], St. Remy [1412], Agincourt [1415], Verneuil [1423], (Scots in the French army) Rouvroy [p 1428], Pataye [1429], Sandacourt [1431], and Fourmigny [1450].

This is not to say that the French always dismounted. The French didn't get rid of the chargers. However, they did try to use the mounted charge in a more effective manner than just charging in the teeth of the enemy. We've already mentioned the battle of Nogent [1359]. There the French commander combined crossbow fire with a mounted attack that destroyed the English. At La Graville [1422] the French mounted attack went in and was eventually successful, destroying the English. At Arinez [1367] the French attack combined both dismounted and mounted men-at-arms. They were successful and overran the English position. At St. Remy [1412] the French royalist met the Armagnacs dismounted but then remounted to destroy the Armagnacs force.

Where appropriate, the French attacked mounted but frequently they attacked dismounted. They combined these attacks with the very effective use of crossbowmen protected by pavises.

Tactics

Implied in the stereotype mentioned above is the lack of sophistication in the French approach to battle: just point the Frenchman at the enemy and let him go. This is nonsense. Tactical sophistication was frequently shown by French commanders. At Mauron [1352] the French commander dismounted his main body of men-at-arms. However, he designated a small unit to drive off the archers and hit the flank of the English. The tactic was successful.

At Cocherel [1364] Du Guesclin dismounted all his men-at-arms but held some in reserve. It was this reserve, which won the battle for the French. At Verneuil [1423] The French commander dismounted his men-at-arms but held his mounted Lombard allies in reserve. When battle was joined the reserve was sent in, they defeated the longbowmen on their flank but quit when they couldn't make headway against those guarding the baggage. As a result, the French lost. And finally, at Formigny the constable of France threw his archers against the English right flank and another force against the left flank. These attacks were coordinated with the main attack led by the constable.

If any army fought with stereotypical tactics if was the English. The French used reserves, flank attacks and combined arms to very good effect against the English. However, the success of these tactics require an army which had the discipline to follow authority.

Discipline

The discipline of the French army, can be seen in a number of battles. At Constance [1356] the attack held off until the English longbowmen ran out of arrows. At Nogent [1359] the French men-at-arms gave the crossbowmen time to drive off the English archers before attacking. At Cocherel [1364] both the English and the French held their positions for three days. Finally Du Guesclin sent his baggage to the rear and started to fallback. The English attacked. Du Guesclin had such control over his men that he could turn them to face the attack and to set off a reserve, which he latter used to defeat the English. At Formigny, the constable held his men-at-arms in reserve until the flank attacks were ready to go in.

The French army of the Hundred Year's War (especially after Poitiers) was a professional army. In many cases, it was well trained and well led (at least for times they lived in). They exercised a sophisticated use of combined arms. Their tactics were varied and attempted to meet the tactical problem before them. Their discipline and willingness to follow their leaders allowed them to use such these tactics in a successful manner.

None of this was true at Agincourt. Mobs of amateur French nobility who's only experience at war was the tournament fields destroyed the whole plan of attack. Gone was the coordination of combined arms. Gone was the formation of the units of the French. Gone was discipline. Whole units were left leaderless. This was not typical of the professional army of France. Agincourt was not typical of how the professional army of France conducted battle. Had the professionals been in control at Agincourt, Shakespeare would have had one less play to write.

Agincourt was not typical of how the French army of the Hundred Year's War fought (especially after Poitiers). Therefore, as I mentioned with my introduction to Agincourt part 1, I do not believe Agincourt should be taken into account when developing a list of the French army on the Hundred Year's War.

More Agincourt

Part 1 [Saga 83]
Part 2 [Saga 84]
Battle of Agincourt: October 25, 1415 [Saga 82]