I have come to the opinion that the battle of Agincourt should not be factored in when developing a French army list for the French army after Poitiers. In order to explain my objection let me describe the battle using primarily 15th century sources. These sources have been collected into an excellent book The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations by Anne Curry, 2000, ISBN 0-85115-802-1.

When Charles realized that the English had invaded France, he sent out the notices such as this for the city of Amiens.

"Charles by the grace of God, king of France, to the bailli of Amiens or to his lieutenant, greetings. Whereas by our letters we have commanded you to make a proclamation throughout your bailliage for all nobles and others accustomed to bear arms and to all other men of war and archers living in your bailliage and on the borders of the same, to arms themselves and to come quickly before us and our very dear and well-beloved son, the duke of Aquitaine, whom we have nominated our captain general of the kingdom.'” [Monstrelet]

Similar notices went to other cities and to the major nobility throughout at least Northern France. Right up to the time of the battle, French knights continued to ride into the French camp as if going to a tournament.

“If the battle had been on the Saturday there would have been an even greater number so on all sides men were flooding in as if they were going to a festival of jousting, joust, or a tournament.” [Monstrelet]

In other words, Charles raised the arriere-ban. This was to be a fatal mistake.

Earlier in the campaign a a general tactical plan had been drawn up by the French by which the English, once they were forced to fight, would be attacked. Two battles should be drawn up, one behind the other, with archers and crossbowmen to the front. Two more mounted units were organized on both flanks who were to take out the archers.

What happened was very different. Rather than an organized and well led advance to battle, the French army degenerated into a mob of young noblemen whose major experience was on the tournament circuit and out to prove their manhood.

“Almost everyone in the camp flattered themselves in a vain hope, especially the young men who headed nothing but their own excessive ardour. Thinking that they could control at their own will inconstant fortune, they persuaded themselves that the sight of so many princes would strike terror into the enemy and would cause them to lose their courage, and that, in order to win the day, they had nothing to do but charge quickly and boldly. The leading lords forgot on this occasion that, whatever confidence could inspire the boldness of youth, the experience and authority of old age should prevail in the making of decisions. Accepting the least wise advise, they formed two other bodies of men who were to follow their lead and decided that they would put themselves in the front and approach the enemy from about 2,000 paces, a movement in which they had to overcome difficulties of all kinds.” [Histoire de Charles VI]

These young inexperienced hot-heads wouldn’t listen to the senior commanders or stay in their assigned positions. They forced themselves to the front and drove out the archers, who had been designated to lead the attack.

“The French thought that they would carry the day given their great numbers, and in their arrogance had proclaimed that only those who were noble should go into battle. So all the men of lower ranks, who were enough to have beaten the English, were pushed to the rear.” [Chronique normande]

“ ... All the lords wanted to be in the vanguard, against the opinion of the constable and the experienced knights. On the day of Saint Crispin, 25 October 1415, they engaged in battle, and the French were defeated.” [B 2. Geste des nobles francois (?late 1420s, French)]

At this point nearly all command organization broke down. Even experienced noblemen left their men in the rear leaderless in order to participate in this great attack.

“Anthony, brother of the duke of Burgundy , a young prince who was well loved on whom one had placed great hopes for the well being of the kingdom, if he had lived, and who, abandoning the command of the troops placed under his orders in order to distinguish himself by some act of prowess, had gone off to join the leading barons who had flocked to the front in their rash and imprudent haste, and finally the duke of Alencon who stood out from all the other princes by virtue of his agreeable personality and by his immense wealth, and who until then had enjoyed a great reputation for wisdom. But carried away by a foolish passion and by an overwhelming desire to fight, he had left the main body of the army over which he had the command and had thrown himself boldly into the middle of the melee.” [Histoire de Charles VI]

What had been a well thought out approach degenerated into a mob. To make matters worse, the weak mounted flank attacks failed and streamed back into the advancing men-at-arm . This made a bade situation worse.

“But at the first volley of arrows which the archers caused to rain down upon them they turned and fled, to their eternal shame, leaving their leaders stranded in the midst of danger with only a small number of brave hearts. They piled up in great haste towards the centre of the French army and, as if they had fled before a tempest, spread terror and confusion amongst their companions.” [Histoire de Charles VI]

It is this almost total breakdown of the French attack that is a-typical of the ability of most French armies. The professionals, who normally faced the English, were pushed to the rear and left leaderless. The cross-bowmen and archers were denied any role in the attack. One can find no other post-Poitiers battle in which military discipline, command and organization broke down this badly.

There are several interesting other problems with this battle. The first is the issue of the placement of the archers during the battle. As most of you know there is a debate among military historians as to the placement of the English archers. Some believe the archers were placed between the three English battles and on their flanks. Others, that the archers were placed on the flanks only. In an article recently published in SAGA and Wargamer’s Digest the author clearly in agreement with the first view.

Longbow

To begin with, it’s important to understand how the longbow was used in battle. Many historians have compared the English longbow to the English musket.

“So, in conclusion, there is a link to be made between the English archery of the Hundred Years' War and British musketry of the Napoleonic Wars. But it is not soley 'firepower' that matters; it is the combination of missile fire and the shout - the first to shake the enemy, the second to let him know that you are still confident enough to close with him, which often decided the day.” [Bennet]

According to this view the longbow, like the musket, depends for it’s success on direct fire. This misperception probably derives from the 20th century experience with the overwhelming power of direct fire weapons. Nevertheless, this was not how the longbow was used, The effectiveness of the bow was accomplished through arching fire not direct fire.

The words used by the chroniclers to describe the flight of the arrows fired from longbows leaves no doubt as to how they were fired. They described the flight of the arrows in terms of: “showers of arrows, stinging hail of missiles” [Gesta Henrici Quinti], “great storm of hail”, [St Albans Chronicle] “darkening the air, shedding as a cloud laden with a shower”, [Vita Henrici Quinti] and “rained down” [Histoire de Charles VI]. Arrows were shot high in the air and then fell like rain on the enemy. These are terms which describe arching fire.

This arching fire was particularly effective against the horses. According to the chroniclers, it was horses which were injured by this fire.

“The archers simultaneously shot arrows against the advancing knights so that the leading horses were scattered in that great storm of hail. ... The horses were pierced by iron; the riders, turning round by means of their bridles, rushing away, fell to the ground ....” [St Albans Chronicle]

“But there, the warlike bands of archers, with their strong and numerous volleys, darkening the air, shedding as a cloud laden with a shower, an intolerable multitude of piercing arrows, and inflicting wounds on the horses, either caused the French horsemen (...) to fall to the ground, or forced them to retreat, ....” [Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti]

“When the horses felt themselves pierced by arrows, they could no longer be controlled by their riders in the advance. The horses turned and it seems that those who were mounted on them fled, ....” [Histoire de Charles VI, roy de France]

“Their horses had been so troubled by the arrow shot of the English archers that they could not hold or control them.” [Monstrelet]

Again and again, the victims of the longbow fire were the horses. Drop the horse and the man had no where to go. However, it was not easy to drop the horse head-on. At Poitiers, for example, a portion of the English army seemed to be falling back. The French saw it and attacked. According to Jonathan Sumption the archers on that flank fired directly at the oncoming French cavalry,

“But their arrows glanced off the steel plates and leather fringes of the horses' armour. While the rear units of Warwick's division bore the brunt of the French attack, the Earl of Oxford ran along the river bank with the archers until they were able to fire at the flanks and rumps of the French horses. The animals were not as well protected there. The arrows inflicted terrible carnage among them.” [Sumption]

The trick of the effectiveness of the longbow against cavalry was to position themselves so that their arrows would strike the least protected parts of the horse: the flanks and rump. This is the reason why archers were placed on the flanks of the dismounted men-at-arms and thrown forward of [in the manner of horns] of the men-at-arms. As the mounted foe approached the dismounted men-at-arms they exposed their horses’ flanks and rumps to the fire of the archers. The bowmen did not have to defeat the mounted attack, only disrupt it. Once disrupted, the mounted attack lost much of its power.

The armoured man-at-arms was not so vulnerable. This was especially true for the dismounted man-at-arms. This was noticed as early as the battle of Auray [1364]. Froissart wrote:

“And so at the first encountre there was a sore batayle, and truely the archers shot at the beginnyng right fiersly; how-beit, their shotte dyde lytell hurt to the Frenchemen, they were so well armed and pavysshed.” [Froissart]

At Agincourte itself, the lack of effect of the archery fire on the attacking dismounted men-at-arms is described by Jean Juvenal des Ursins: “The French were scarcely harmed by the arrow fire of the English because they were well armed.”

The English archers were never able to stop a determined attack of armoured men-at-arms assaulting on foot. This, plus the effectiveness of archers against mounted troops, gives us a clue as to where the archers were placed at Agincourt.

Only one chronicle positions the English archers in between the English battles: Gesta Henrici Quinti (c. 1417, Latin).

“..., he [the King] drew up only a single line of battle, placing his vanguard, commanded by the duke of York, as a wing on the right and the rearguard, commanded by Lord Camoys, as a wing on the left; and he positioned 'wedges' of his archers in between each 'battle' and had them drive in their stakes in front of them, as previously arranged in case of a cavalry charge.” [Gesta Henrici Quinti]

The French chronicles only mention archers on the flanks. For example, Monstrelet:

“He had his battle drawn up by a knight grey with age called Thomas Erpingham, putting the archers in the front [in advance of] and then the men-at-arms. He made two wings of men-at-arms and archers, and the horses and baggage were placed behind the army. The archers each fixed in front of them a stake sharpened at both ends.” [Monstrelet]

For Monstrelet, the archers were placed in advanced of and on the flanks of the men-at-arms. The Gesta Henrici Quinti positioned the archers between the battles of men-at-arms.. So, which was it - between the battles or on the flanks?I think both are correct.

The key, I believe, is the ending comment in the Gesta Henrici Quinti “..., as previously arranged in case of a cavalry charge.” When Henry IV first came upon the French army the enemy troops to his front were mounted.

“The king saw that his men had advanced with alacrity, and immediately led forth his host into a field which was newly sown with wheat. Here it was extremely difficult to stand or to advance because of the roughness as well as the softness of the ground. Equally unsluggishly on the great morning did the French send out the vanguard into the field, comprising strong men arrayed in shining arms, with horsemen preceding them on noble and handsome horses; ...” [St Albans Chronicle]

What Henry IV saw to his front were knights on ‘noble and handsome horses.’ Expecting a mounted attack, I believe Henry IV placed his archers on the flanks but also in between the battles.. This would be in keeping with the effectiveness of archery fire against a mounted foe. Now archers in the open cannot withstand a mounted attack thus the stakes. However, it was never the plan of the French to launch a mounted attack on the English men-at-arms.

“Because the French were holding their position without moving , it was necessary for the English, if they wished to come to grips with the enemy, to traverse the middle ground on foot, burden with their arms.” [St Albans Chronicle]

Flank Attacks

It was at this point that the French commanders of the two mounted flank attacks were ordered to prepare themselves and their men for the flank attacks on the English archers. When the attacks went in they contained less than half of the men originally planned. The vanguard was ordered to dismount and prepare their frontal assault.

“When the French saw the English come before them, they put themselves into battle order each under their own banner, placing their helmets on their head.” [Monstrelet]

It was also at this point the young French knights forced themselves to the front and they also pushed out the crossbowmen and archers. All battle order was lost as these hot-head jostled themselves to the front..

Henry seeing that the French would not advance conducted his own advance. Such an advance would be covered by the archers already stationed in front of his men-at-arms. The English often placed archers in front to cover an advance when attack by the enemy was likely. This was certainly the case when crossing rivers:

“From 8am until nightfall the English did not cease in trying to make a crossing and so the men got across in dribs and drabs. First the archers went across with out horses.”

“It was said that there was a crossing near to the River Somme. His scouts told him about it. However before he came to cross that river he had to cross the marsh. A stream enclosed his men by a flow of water. There were two shallows close together over which were two long, narrow causeways. Scarcely one horseman could walk in front of another. A troop of nobles crossed over the first. By the foresight of the king, it was decided that it would be a good idea to have a guard of infantry with bows and missiles in the front of his army. He made a wider path over the broken causeways by means of wood and straw. By such means, a cross was effected.” [Liber Metricus de Henrico Quinto]

At his second position he realized that his men-at-arms were threatened not by mounted troops but rather dismounted troops. Archers to the front would be a liability. As we’ve seen, their fire was not that effective against dismounted armoured men-at-arms. Therefore, archers placed between the battles would not be able to stop a determined attack. Their stakes would have have hardly slowed down the men-at-arms with their swords and axes. The next step would be to penetrate and hit the English in the rear. Thus to place archers, even with stakes, between the battles in the face of an dismounted men-at-arms attack would have been to invite disaster. Therefore, I believe, he recalled them and sent them to reinforce his archers on the flanks. This is why, when the French sources describe the dismounted assault the English archers were on the flanks.

“The king of England, having faith in Our Lord, for he could not expect victory from his numbers of men but only by true virtue of a divine victory, ordered his battles as wisely as he could to meet the French, to wit the archers on one side and the men-at-arms on the other.” [Chroniques des ducs de Brabant]

Why the French Lost

There is, however, another issue with Agincourt that few historian seem to want to discuss: how did so few men-at-arms defeat so many French knights? The quick answer most historians give is the attack of the archers. This is nonsense. Archers would never had been able to stand up to formed men-at-arms. Jean Waurin and Jean Le Fevre, who there, both say that the archers entered the battle once the vanguard was broken up. They were not the cause of the break up.

“And soon afterwards, the English archers, seeing the breaking up of the French vanguard, came out from behind their stakes) all together and threw down their bows and arrows, taking up their swords, axes and other arms and weapon.” [Jean Waurin and Jean Le Fevre]

The archers acted more as jackels around a wildebeest herd waiting for those who had strayed from the herd. They would surround and bring down those knights which had become separated from the mass.

Another reason given was that the field was so difficult to cross that the French knights were worn out. “But when they engaged, the French were out of breath because of the difficult going.” [Jean Juvenal des Ursins] And, “They were already exhausted by a long march and were suffering under the weight of their armour.” The Religieux (Monk) of Saint-Denis The Chronique anonyme du regne de Charles VI puts it this way:

"The French were in newly worked land which made it very difficult for them to cross. They were heavily armed and the ground was soft, so they were exhausted and much troubled in their advance, for they were on foot. When they engaged with the main battle of the king of England, many of them were so worn out that they could scarcely move."

This sounds a bit of ‘sour grapes’. If the French were so darned exhausted by their march, where did they get the strength to drive back the English?

“And in the melee of spears which then followed, they hurled themselves against our men in such a fierce charge as to force them to fall back almost a spear's length.” [A 1. The Gesta Henrici Quinti (c. 1417, Latin]

Well, I think I know where they got their strength. Monstrelete wrote: "So they [the French] advanced a little against them [the English], but then made a retreat."

It would seem that the French stopped short of contact and then fell back. Why? It seems they stopped to not only rest but to divide up into three groups so they could go fore the three standards of the English.

“But the French nobility, who had previously advanced in line abreast and had all but come to grips with us, either from fear of the missiles which by their very force pierced the sides and visors of their helmets, or in order the sooner to break through our strongest points and reach the standards, divided into three columns, attacking our line of battle at the three places where the standards were.” [Gesta Henrici Quinti]

After this short rest, they then attacked and drove the English back almost 20 ft. Yet the English line held and defeated the French even though vastly out numbered. How? We’re told that the English battle was four ranks deep. The French were 20-30 ranks deep.

“When they came upon the English army with as much military diligence as they could, they exceeded the English in number so much, coming thirty-one deep in their battle line. And when they came to fight, this great multitude was so wide in extent that the field was not able to hold the whole force. The English were scarcely four deep.” [Vita Henrici Quinti] “For the English army, in all its line, was fortified sideways by only four ranks of men, one behind the other. All the French lines were strengthened with ranks of twenty or more fighting men, one behind another, throughout. ...” [A 5. Psuedo Elmham, Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti (c. 1446-49, Latin)]

The Thebans at Lectra indicated that the army with the greatest depth should win the battle. But the French lost. Why? The secret lies in the lack of organization within the French battle (or battles).

“I have learned from a reliable source that each side fought until mid day in the most bitter fashion using all kinds of weapons, but that the French were too restricted and weighed down in their movements. Their vanguard, composed of about 5,000 men, found itself at first so tightly packed that those who were in the third rank could scarcely use their swords.” [Histoire de Charles VI]

“But before they could engage together, many French were hampered and wounded. When they came together they were so closely packed one against the other that they could scarcely lift their arms to strike their enemy, save for those who were in the front who struck with their lances which they had cut in the middle so that they could be stronger and so that they could get closer in to the English. [Enguerran Monstrelet]

This is critical as it seems the battle lasted about three hours [Vita Henrici Quinti , Gesta Henrici Quinti]. It is impossible for a man to fight hand-to-hand combat for three hours straight. In fact, 15-20 minutes is about all one can take. He must then be relieved and allowed to fall back and recuperate. Having maintained their integrity, the English would have been able to accomplish this action. Those that needed the help would have their servants near to come to them and help the to the rear. They would then rest before returning to the front. Thus every 15-30 minutes fresh English troops would come to the fore to continue the fight.

The French, on the other hand, were too packed together and had lost all organization and were thus unable to be relieved. When those at the front went down there was no one to help them as they left their servants at the rear of the army.

“The English were fresh and unwearied as they had not moved from their advantageous position. They began to strike in a most violent fashion against the French and knocked to the ground many who could not get up again. Most had no one with them to help them up because they had not wanted to take with them any of their lower ranks(varlets), for the gentlemen had wanted to have the honour deriving from battle.” [B 4. Chronique anonyme du regne de Charles VI (?early 1430s, French)]

“Also the noble men of the enemy thought themselves so assured of victory that some, through great hurry, left their servants and others, who are generally required in such circumstances, behind them; thinking they were hastening to victory and honour, rushed suddenly to defeat and death.” [A 5. Psuedo Elmham, Vita et Gesta Henrici Quinti]

Unable to relieve the front line fighters, and with no help when a fighter went down, the French were gradually ground down by having to face a continuous supply of rested English men-at-arms. Eventually the French began to break down into smaller fighting groups which became ever more susceptible to being overwhelmed by the swarming light-armed English archers. This, to my mind, is how the English were able to defeat such a great host of French knighthood. Once these battles was defeated, the other battles composed of the lesser men-at-arms but lacking leaders (who had died or were captured in the first attack) fled. Thus ended Agincourt.

This battle was not typical of how the French fought. In part two we’ll discuss how the superior discipline of the French led to English defeats. We’ll read how French men-at-arms defeated the English men-at-arms on foot and on horseback. French men-at-arms came up with ways to counter the effects of the longbow. We’ll discuss how mounted French men-at-arms rode down English archers. And, how French crossbowmen crushed the English longbowmen.

French Chronicles

English Chronicles

Others

More Agincourt

More Agincourt

Part 1 [Saga 83]
Part 2 [Saga 84]
Battle of Agincourt: October 25, 1415 [Saga 82]