The Gibralter force consisted of almost 7000 Mujahidin (freedom fighters) from Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir). Within the short time available before the start of this operation, this force was given some training in sabotage tactics, but overall, were ill-trained in infantry tactics.
This force was light, very mobile, and had no trouble penetrating into the valley on a very wide front. They raided enemy communications, airfields, ammunition, and storage dumps in some parts of Indian-Occupied Kashmir. The typical attack force numbered 50 to 60 men, armed with rifles, grenades, light machine-guns, mortars, and wireless sets. It was hit-and-run affairs causing some material damage. The mujahidin fought with courage and determination, but overall failed to accomplish their mission.
Why?
Because the necessary preparations and detailed long-term strategic planning had not been done. Kashmiri leaders in Indian-occupied Kashmir had not been consulted about this operation. A base had not been prepared in the valley and no co-ordination existed on a short-term or long-term basis between the mujahidin and the Kashmiri leaders wishing Kashmir to be part of Pakistan.
The Kashmiri people had not been warned about the operation and were not prepared for helping and supplying the Azad Kashmir fighters. Plus, the presence of five Indian infantry divisions and strong civil armed forces made it close to impossible for the unprepared Kashmiri people in the valley to help and supply the Azad Kashmiri freedom fighters.
Yet Operation Gibralter was not a complete failure. A large force of 7000 armed guerrillas had managed to slip across the border--a border guarded by the Indian army. It also achieved a certain amount of surprise and did manage to perform sabotage on several military targets. In some areas, it took strong detachments of the Indian Army a considerable amount of time and manpower to eradicate local administrations which the freedom fighters had created. All in all, it was a Indian intelligence failure of a high magnitude.
But once the Indian Army knew about the infiltration, they reacted strongly. Certainly they attacked and drove out the mujahidin. At times, they traded fire across the cease-fire line with the regular troops of the Pakistani Army. In addition, they launched their own raids into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir with the objective of capturing the freedom fighters' home bases.
With their counterattack underway, the Indians increasingly tried to capture Azad Kashmir. The Indian Army increased pressure along the whole cease-fire line and made strong attempts to break through to Muzaffarabad on the Tithwal front and to link up the towns of Uri with Poonch. All attacks were blunted by the Pakistan Army, except in the Haji Pir Pass, which the Indians managed to capture after nearly three weeks of tough fighting against the outnumbered Pakistani defenders.
Battle of the Bulge
The Indian Army's success in this area enabled them to link up Uri with Poonch and cut off the Bedori Bulge. Small pockets of Pakistani defenders, outnumbered on average 15:1, not only resisted steadfastly, but brought interdictive fire on the critical Uri-Poonch road. This road needed extensive repairs, which Indian Army engineers could not make due to the Pakistani detachments holding the ridges west of the road. Thus, the Indian Army was unable to extensively use the road for vehicles or supplies, blunting the offensive.
The Pakistan Army High Command now moved to launch a strong counterattack, code-named Operation Gland Slam, to retake lost territory. The main thrust would come from Bhimber and timed for the night of August 31st-September 1st, with a view of reducing the pressure in north by capturing Chhamb and threatening Akhnur.
Pakistan's Thrust into Kashmir 1965
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© Copyright 2002 by Shahram Khan.
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