Part I: A Line in the Sand

Command Report 1 July 1991

Sergeant First Class Williams was on duty as the shift noncommissioned officer at the 101st Abn Div main command post at Camp Eagle II, King Fahd International Airport, Saudi Arabia. He received a phone call just before 0200 on the 17th of January. The call was from Major Martin of the 18th Abn Corps G3 staff, who informed SFC Williams that the US Navy had launched 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles toward Iraqi targets at 0152 that morning. He also passed a verbal order from ARCENT that stated "OPERATION DESERT STORM is in effect."

With this order, over five months of waiting had come to an end. The Command Group and Staff were notified, as were all units assigned or attached. The defense of Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression, OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, had been completed. The division immediately began implementing its role in the liberation of Kuwait, OPERATION DESERT STORM.

The 101st was already playing an active role in that first night of attacks into Iraq. TF Normandy, with its two teams of four Apaches and two Air Force helicopters was in Iraq preparing to make the first kills of Operation Desert Storm. It was to be an exciting night.

Red Team had departed the staging base just prior to 0100. Team White followed seven minutes later. Flying at high speed, with the assistance of night vision goggles and forward looking infrared radars (FLIR), the two teams crossed into Iraq at two different points at roughly 0200. The ninth Apache, along with the Blackhawk, had also launched, but they remained on standby over Saudi Arabia.

Encountering only sporadic small arms fire from Iraqi border posts, TF Normandy quickly arrived at its objectives. In fact, they arrived at their objectives a little early. LTC Cody commented that the waiting after they were already in Iraq made him old before his time.

The radar sites were still lit when the Apaches began closing on them. The Iraqis did turn off their lights eventually, but it did not matter. The Apaches had already locked onto their targets with laser beams.

In order that the Apaches' hellfire missiles would impact at exactly 0238, the predesignated engagement time, the task force fire commands were back-timed. With the commands "Party in 10" and "Joy" Team Red and Team White unleashed their firepower. They deluged the radar sites with Hellfire Missiles, 2.75in. rockets and 30mm bullets.

Within thirty seconds the Iraqi radars were no longer capable of functioning. Within four minutes the radar sites and their bunkers were completely destroyed. Mission accomplished, TF Normandy turned for home.

The task force took some small arms fire and was the target of one surface to air missile on the return trip. None of the helicopters were hit. By 1600, the aircraft from the 1-101st had rejoined the division at Camp Eagle II.

As the Apaches were departing Iraq, the Coalition's air forces were entering. Sortie after sortie of jets flew north to their targets along the safe corridor established by the destruction of the Iraqi early warning radars. The dismantling of Iraq's infrastructure was underway.

On D-Day, the division began moving its pre- positioned forces from Logsite Romeo into TAA Campbell. A and C Companies, 326th Engineer Battalion closed into TAA Campbell by 2130 on 17 Jan 91. These forces were quickly joined by the Division's Assault Command Post (ACP) and quartering parties, which had been located at FOB Bastogne on D-Day.

Prior to D-Day, Third Brigade TF was the only brigade positioned at Camp Eagle II. On D-Day the division began to pull combat forces back from AO Normandy to Camp Eagle II for deployment forward. First Brigade TF was relieved of its covering force mission in AO Normandy at 0709 on 17 Jan 91. The brigade began convoying to Camp Eagle II by bus and military vehicle. Second Brigade TF at Al Qaysumah, would remain under tactical control (TACON) of the 1st Cavalry Division for several more days.

The division's main body movement to and occupation of TAA Campbell, Phase II of OPLAN 90-5, began on 18 Jan 91. Movement was conducted by air and ground. The first ground convoy departed Camp Eagle II at 0846 that morning with 24 vehicles. The convoy route took them from Camp Eagle II to the Riyadh exit onto MSR Toyota. They travelled down MSR Toyota to the Thumamah exit onto MSR Sultan. The continued down MSR Sultan until turning west onto MSR Dodge. Forty miles down MSR Dodge, they arrived at the rendezvous point. They were met at the rendezvous point and led into TAA Campbell. The total route was 615 miles in length.

SCUDs

As the division was repositioning north, the blistering air bombardment of Iraq continued. The Iraqi Air Force was not foolhardy enough to challenge Coalition pilots in any large way, but Iraq did try to strike back. Iraq's tool of choice was the long range Scud missile, its main weapon of terror.

The division had its first Scud alert of the war at Camp Eagle II on 18 Jan 91. The division's soldiers promptly masked and prepared for the worst until the all clear signal was given All seven of the Scuds in this attack were launched toward Israel. None contained chemical warheads. Later that day, a Scud was launched towards nearby Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. It was destroyed by a US Army Patriot air defense missile. Scud alerts would become a frequent occurrence at Camp Eagle II over the next few days. After the first strike, the soldiers of Camp Eagle II only masked for attacks launched towards the Dhahran and Riyadh areas. Soldiers at Camp Eagle 11 could easily observe the contrails of the Scuds fired towards Dhahran. They also witnessed Patriot antimissile missiles streaking up to engage the Scuds and destroying them in tremendous explosions of light.

The division continued its relocation to the northwest over the next several days. Third Brigade TF closed in TAA Campbell on 23 Jan 9 1. Two days later, Second Brigade TF was released from the Ist Cavalry Division's tactical control and began moving by ground convoy from Al Qaysumah to TAA Campbell.

On 25 Jan 91, the 101st assumed responsibility for screening along Phaseline Razor, which ran northwest to southeast, north of and roughly parallel to the Tapline Road. Elements of First Brigade TF positioned on the left while Third Brigade TF secured the right. The defacto border, which is where the actual Saudi and Iraqi guard posts were located, was approximately ten kilometers to the north. The 18th Abn Corps line of departurc ran roughly along the defacto border. Elements of Second Brigade provided security for division assets in the rear half of TAA Campbell.

First Brigade TF closed into TAA Campbell on 26 Jan 9 1. As 1st Brigade was closing, the division continued its focus on upcoming offensive operations with the first in a series of subordinate commander briefbacks to MG Peay. The brigade and separate battalion commanders briefed the Commanding General on their concepts of operations, as derived from OPLAN 905.

The movement of the division's combat power forward to the TAA ended with the closure of Second Brigade TF on 29 Jan 91. Not including Second Brigade's movement from Al Qaysumah, the division's deployment forward required 358 C130 chalks and the convoying of 1910 vehicles. The remainder of the division's equipment was transported on flatbed trucks. The division proved its self-deployment capabilities by selfdeploying all of its helicopters from Camp Eagle II to the TAA.

However, the division's deployment was delayed for several days due to an ad-hoc transportation management system that violated unit command and control. External transportation assets were piecemealed to the division from a pool of assets belonging to a variety of units. The movement would have gone more efficiently had entire units, with their own leadership, been provided to complete missions per established movement priorities.

With the completion of this intra-theater deployment, the division had massive combat force positioned on the Iraqi border. At its call, the division had three air assault infantry brigades, three battalions of 105mm howitzers, and an aviation brigade of three attack helicopter battalions; one air cavalry squadron; one utility, three assault and one medium lift helicopter battalions. The division also had the usual support of its air defense, engineer, signal and military intelligence battalions, as well as the Division Support Command (DISCOM).

Tactical Assembly Area Campbell was impressive, not only in the power of the force assembled there, but also in size. The TAA encompassed approximately 3200 square kilometers. The division's combat power was dispersed across this great expanse.

Isolation One gained an understanding of the relative isolation of the division's units when one viewed the TAA from the air. The unit positions appeared to be little clusters of activity with acres ofbarren desert separating them from each other. Unit positions were easy to spot from the air despite the extensive use ofdesert camouflage nets. The nets did serve a purpose in masking the type ofunitin each position. The main terrain features in theTAA were Tapline Road and the oil pipeline from which the road took its name.

Tapline Road had earned the nickname "Suicide Alley" due to the treacherous volume of traffic during OPERATION DESERT STORM. Local drivers weaved violently through slow moving military convoys. The 101st Military Police Company took up Positions along Tapline Road to enforce safe. speed limits. The incidence of accidents involving 101st soldiers and equipment was in fact remarkably low throughout both Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, given the tremendous amount of movement and maneuver by vast numbers of forces.

Once in place, the division focused on preparing for offensive operations in Iraq, while continuing local security of the TAA. In order to plan an air assault mission, one must first conduct an intelligence preparation of the battle field (IPB). The first stages of the division's IPB involved extensive analysis of maps and satellite photography. The IPB also included interpretation of intelligence gathered by the 311th Military Intelligence Battalion, to include that gained by monitoring Iraqi radar use. The division also kept abreast of intelligence provided by Corps and higher sources. More thorough information would be gained by the aerial reconnaissance of the "G minus 7" operations but in late January, that was still several days off.

OPLAN 90-5 was fine tuned to reflect the information gained during the IPB, though no major changes developed. First Brigade TF would still lead into Iraq to establish a forward operating base, followed by Third Brigade TF blocking along the Euphrates. Second Brigade TF would then either attack into Objective Strike (the Tallil airfield) or into a critical choke point at Objective Gold. The strikes into Iraq would be preceded by several days at aerial reconnaissance.

The staff developed a reconnaissance plan that called for aerial recons beginning on the seventh day prior to G-day, the start of the ground war. This plan was labeled the "G minus 7" plan. It would prove to be very influential in the preparation of the battlefield for the coming ground war.

In preparation for combat, continuous training always complements planning. The division used the precious few days of late January and early February to polish its air assault and common task skills.

The brigade task forces practiced sling load techniques, conducted air assault rehearsals, discussed rules of engagement and used sand tables to talk through their planned air assaults. Their direct support field artillery battalion emphasized crater analysis and fire direction control procedures while the engineers practiced breaching minefields and rigging demolitions.

The division's airdefenders perfected CH47D Chinook internal delivery methods for the Vulcan air defense cannon. DISCOM fine tuned resupply procedures while the 7-101st Aviation tested the flow rate for a rapid refuel point to be used in upcoming aviation operations. While conducting plenty offlying training missions, Aviation Brigade was careful not to fly much to the north, to avoid disclosing the division's location and power.

Training

As unit training was being conducted, continued emphasis was placed on common task skills. Particular emphasis was put on perfecting NBC defense and decontamination skills. The threat of Iraqi use of chemicals was never forgotten. Each soldier was issued P13 pills to help build up a tolerance for nerve agent antidote.

Soldiers continually practiced basic marksmanship skills. 326th Engineer Bn built small arms ranges in the brigade sectors of TAA Campbell.

The division tied all of the plans and training together through its daily staff update meetings and its bi-weekly updates for brigade and separate battalion commanders. The second in the series of unit back briefs to the Commanding General was conducted in early February.

The division prepared to sustain combat operations. Ammunition, water and food was stockpiled and rigged on unitconfigured pallets for slingloading. Intensive coordination was conducted with the 18th Abn Corps for throughput of supplies and the use of Main Supply Routes.

One of the most notable of the support activities was the complete change out of the division's CUCV truck fleet for more than 500 new, more capable HMMWV trucks. TF King, named after its convoy commander, made several round trips between Camp Eagle II and TAA Campbell in order to ferry new trucks to the gaining units.

As preparations for the coming ground war continued, day to day life in TAA Campbell was full of contrasts between old and new. Soldiers continued to perform such age old tasks as digging fighting positions and filling sandbags. We continued to live and work in tents, bunkers, vehicles and home made shelters (hooches). At the same time, there was a decidedly modem air to our operations. Every command post, down to at least battalion level, had at least one computer. Electronic messages were passed from laptop computer to laptop computer via multichannel telephone lines. There were also a large number of fascimile (fax) machines and photocopiers in use.

Units had to be creative in preparing their defensive positions and perimeters. One could only dig down a few feet in the sand before reaching hard rock. Soldiers dug down as far as they could and then built up with walls of sandbags. Engineer earth moving equipment was very useful in digging deep trenches for bunkers. They were also used to pile large berms of dirt around tents and positions. Where possible, units gained extra security by positioning themselves in the deep wadis (dry river beds) of the area.

The weather in the TAA was not what the average person would expect from a desert. From Jan 611 the latter half of Feb it was relatively pleasant during the days, with highs usually in the upper sixties. At night, though, temperatures dipped into the lower thirties. Soldiers were thankful their leaders had insisted they pack their sleeping bags when they left Fort Campbell.

Sand was everywhere. It was at its worst when the winds were blowing strongly. Visibility could quickly drop from seven miles to less than a half a mile. Blowing sand placed an even greater emphasis on the preventive maintenance of equipment, especially the division's helicopters.

Morale, already remarkably high, increased as mail began to come forward to the TAA. In addition to the desired letters and packages from home, soldiers continued to receive letters of support addressed to "any soldier" from patriotic strangers. Two weeks was considered a short time for a letter to travel from the States to the remote outposts in the Kingdom.

The intensity of the air war was evident to those living in the TAA. During the day one could see the contrails of the coalition's jets as they flew toward Iraq. At night one could see the flashes from the explosions of their ordnance.

Iraq never let us forget the threat of its Scud missiles. Many days brought Scud alerts. The division's early warning system, provided by the 2-44th Air Defense Artillery, would track the Scuds and broadcast the all-clear. None of the Scuds threatened us directly, but they did get as close as Hafr Al-Batin.

Anticipation for the start of the ground war continued to build. Our soldiers saw it as the beginning of the end of their long deployment and the culmination of their intensive training. Any residual hope that the ground war could be avoided was dashed when President Bush exposed Saddam Hussein's last-minute withdrawal offer as a "cruel hoax."

Anticipation

The anticipation continued to build as we awaited Corps' permission for cross-FLOT operations to commence. That permission was granted on 14 Feb 91. That night the division would penetrate Iraq for the second time.

The 18th Abn Corps authorized the 101st Abn Div to conduct operations across the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on 14 Feb 91. There was still no official date for G-day, but permission to conduct cross-FLOT operations was sufficient for the division to implement its "G minus 7" plans.

Two teams of AH-64 Apache helicopters from the 1-101 AATK crossed the FLOT at 2200 on 14 Feb. The teams conducted an aerial zone recon from the Corps Line of Departure (LD) to Phase Line Charger. One team flew over the western sector, the other the eastern.

Recon

While the Apache teams were conducting their recon, TF S tin gray screened along the LD. TF Stingray was composed oftwo Apaches and two OH58D Kiowas. Two additional Apaches replaced the Kiowas at mid-mission. The near zero illumination made visibility so low that it was unsafe for the single pilot Kiowas. The Apaches, with two crew members each, were better able to adapt to the darkness.

The recon was supported by several units. The 311th Military Intelligence Battalion provided early warning communications and radar intelligence with one of the EH60 Quickfix helicopters under their operational control. The Quickfix took up station south of Phase Line Razor. An Air Force EFI I I also provided early warning support for the mission. C/2-320th Field Artillery displaced forward of Phase Line Razor after early evening nautical twilight (EENT), 14 Feb, in order to provide fire support for the aerial recon.

The two Apache teams returned to the TAA Campbell at 0200 on 15 Feb. The pilots observed no significant enemy activities or dispositions. However, later analysis of video tape from the mission indicated an enemy infantry platoon. Iraqi soldiers were shown emerging from fighting positions located along a small ridgeline near MSR Newmarket. Military Intelligence analysts suggested that the Iraqi movement was a reaction to the sound of the Apaches' engines.

The 1 -101 AATK conducted a second aerial recon from 0100 until 0351 on the morning of 16 Feb. Apache teams overflew the territory between the LD and Phase Line Smash, to include the proposed site for Forward Operating Base (FOB) Cobra. Very little activity, and no weapon systems, were observed.

The third aerial recon was full of activity as the 101st Abn Div took the first of its many enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). Conducted on 17 Feb 91, this was the division's first daylight recon of the G minus 7 operations. The mission, conducted by 2-229 AATK and 2-17th Cav, consisted of a zone recon from the LD to PL Charger, a route recon of MSR Newmarket and an area recon of the proposed FOB Cobra site. Shortly after crossing the LD atO8O3, two Apaches from A/2-229 encountered three bunkers occupied by what appeared to be a squad of Iraqi soldiers. After taking fire, one of the Apaches engaged the bunker with its 30mm cannon. The Apache crew also fired on what they believed to be a BM 21 multiple rocket launcher.

Surrender

Either sensing they were outgunned, or merely lacking the desire to further challenge the Apache, ten Iraqi soldiers threw down their weapons and surrendered. Aviation Brigade called forward the Pathfinder Detachment to stabilize the situation. The Pathfinders arrived in UH60 Blackhawks and quickly secured the prisoners, searched the complex and destroyed enemy equipment. In their search, the Pathfinders discovered an eleventh Iraqi soldier. This eleventh EPW was an enlisted man who had been injured, likely be fire from the Apache's 30mm cannon.The suspected BM 21 turned out to be a truck loaded with mortar rounds.

The prisoners, one captain, one non-commissioned officer and nine enlisted men, were flown in the Blackhawks to the Division Rear Command Post. The Blackhawks landed outside the Command Post's perimeter, where brightly painted civilian buses waited. The prisoners, with their hands behind their heads and the Pathfinders' rifles at their backs, made the short walk from the Blackhawks to the buses. The buses transported them to the division's EPW cage, where they were soon joined by several comrades.

Thirty additional Iraqi soldiers surrendered when the 2229th AATK discovered and engaged a second bunker complex. Aviation Brigade brought up a platoon from C/3-502d Infantry to secure the EPWs and search the area. The platoon from C Company had been on standby for any downed aircraft recovery missions.

2-17th Cav sighted a third enemy position. This position was bypassed. Meanwhile, other helicopters conducting a recon of the FOB Cobra site, encountered and destroyed an Iraqi truck. It is believed that at least one Iraqi soldier in the truck was killed.

The forty-one prisoners were from the 2d Company, 2d Battalion, 17th Border Guard Brigade of the 45th ID. The 45th ID was a composite unit of border guards and regular infantry. From its previous duty against Kurdish dissidents, the 45th had gained a reputation as an effective counter-guerrilla force.

The prisoners were in good shape. They wore serviceable uniforms and claimed to have had an adequate supply of food and water. They were cooperative with the Arabic speaking interrogators from the 311th Military Intelligence Battalion.

The captain captured in the group of eleven prisoners stated that his men had not been paid in two months and that the only communications he had with his higher unit was via vehicle courier. The Iraqi company was irregularly resupplied by vehicle. The captain readily gave information on Iraqi troop, command and air defense artillery locations.

The daylight mission was successful in the large number of prisoners taken. Unfortunately, the activity resulting from the influx of prisoners prevented the completion of the MSR Newmarket route recon. Aviation Brigade had planned to conducta comprehensive recon of half of MSR Newmarket's length. Only one fourth of the MSR was recon'd by the end of the day.

New SOP

The unexpected windfall of EPWs prompted the Division to create a new standard operating procedure (SOP). The SOP, given in FRAGO 20 to OPORDER 91-1, tasked each infantry brigade to have a battalion reaction force on two hour standby. Each battalion reaction force was to have a company on one hour standby and a platoon on fifteen minute standby. The reaction force could be used for downed aircraft security, to collect EPWs and to clear enemy positions. MG Peay based the reaction force on his experience with Army Aviation's old "blue platoon" concept. His intentwas to enable the division to quickly develop any situation arising from reconnaissance.

Between 1118 and 1715 hours on the 18th of Feb, Aviation Brigade again flew reconnaissance along MSR Newmarket and in the division's zone between Phase Line Charger and PhaseLine Smash. An Apache from 2-229th AATK used its 30mm cannon to engage two unarmored vehicles carrying six to ten Iraqi soldiers. No damage assessment was available from this encounter.

During this same mission, pilots reported observing approximately 100 Iraqi personnel in defensive positions as well as 50 military and civilian vehicles. Analysis of these reports concluded that there was an Iraqi infantry company (-). The division requested permission from 18th Abn Corps to conduct an air assault raid on this position.

Consistent with air assault doctrine, the division proposed the raid as a combined arms operation using an infantry company, supporting artillery and aviation, and habitual slice elements. Corps granted the division permission to conduct the attack on 20 Feb.

Further route recon of MSR Newmarket was conducted by 2-17Lh Cav and 3-101 AATK on 19 Feb. Simultaneously, 2229th AATK flew a zone re-con from the LD to Phase Line Smash. Sightings from the recon included a small pile of small anns weapons, five to six bunkers and one truck with seven generators. An Air Force AIO in the area observed multiple vehicle positions with personnel digging in, every two kilometers south for fifteen kilometers.

The division postponed the air assault raid on the company position at NW526181 for twenty-four hours. The division command group decided to first develop the situation using and armed recon by 3-101 on 20 Feb. The division later decided to include Apaches from the 2-229th on the recon. Intelligence still suggested that this enemy position housed a company minus. There were an estimated 15 bunkers, 30 to 100 personnel, mortar positions, several trucks and two or three antiaircraft guns.

Armed Recon

The armed recon commenced at 0810 on the 20th. Cobras from the 3-101 quickly made contact with the enemy positions. Close air support was called in on the bunkers. After intensive strafing by the Cobras, several white flags appeared among the Iraqis. Believing that the rest of the Iraqi soldiers were on the verge of surrendering, the division sent forward a Psyop team from the 311th MI. The team, flying in a Chinook, dropped leaflets and broadcasted instructions over a bullhorn to the Iraqis, explaining in Arabic what they should do to surrender.

A small number of Iraqis came out of their fighting positions in order to surrender. Some of these were apprehended by our helicopter pilots on the scene. Most of the enemy stayed deep in their bunkers.

The division next flew forward the A and B companies of the 1-187th Infantry, which was the standby battalion. The 1- 187th was placed under Aviation Brigade's operational control and instructed to secure the area, assist in enemy prisoner of war processing and conduct a sweep of the site. The 1-187th had to go from bunker to bunker extracting Iraqi soldiers. Most surrendered without a struggle, but some clearly did not want to give up' The infantrymen took some small arms fire. Nevertheless, there were no friendly casualties.

The large number of prisoners taken, 406, indicated that the enemy strength was nearly a battalion, not a company (-). The prisoners included the battalion commander, eight other officers and one warrant officer. Four of the prisoners had to be medically evacuated for injuries.

MG Peay instructed Aviation Brigade to bring back samples of enemy equipment and weapons, as well as exploitable intelligence. They were to destroy all other captured equipment in place. The division's Explosive Ordinance Detachment and a detachment of engineers were sent in to aid in demolitions. MG Peay authorized the operations to extend into the hours of darkness.

In a continuation of the 20 Feb combined arms strike, Aviation Brigade returned to the same bunker site on 21 Feb, 1- 187th Infantry was again under its operational control. Thirteen additional Iraqi soldiers were captured. Also Laken were four anti- aircraft guns, six 120mm mortars, twenty radios and several dozen each of RPG-7 anti-tank rounds and AK-47 rifles.

Also on the 21st, the 2-17th Cav continued its aerial route recon of MSR New Market up to Phase Line Ram. One aircraft was fired upon, possibly by an RPG-7. The attempt was unsuccessful, and two enemy soldiers were captured at its site. An OH58D Kiowa, suffering from contaminated fuel, was forced to land in Iraq during the same mission. The Kiowa was recovered without incident by 2300 that night.

The division continued to re-position and task organize forces throughout the final days of G minus 7 operations. The 2-327th Infantry, part of the First Brigade task force, secured and occupied the Line of Departure in their sector at 0100 on the 22d of Feb. the 2-502d infantry, of the 2d Brigade task force, relieved 2- 327th to return behind Phase Line Razor and continue to prepare for First Brigade's upcoming air assault into Iraq.

The 1-502d Infantry was detached from the Second Brigade TF and attached to First Brigade TF. The division also attached the 2d Fire Acquisition Detachment to First Brigade's direct support field artillery battalion, the 2-320th Field Artillery.

As we continued our final preparations, two questions persisted. Would Iraq back down before a ground war started, and if not, when would the ground war begin? Few were surprised when eleventh hour diplomacy (including a Soviet peace proposal) failed to sway Saddam Hussein. The second question was finally answered at 0700 Zulu on 22 Feb 91 when the Commanding General issued the following dispatch:

"Subject: Message to all Screaming Eagles 1. (S) Division OPORD 91 -1 is effective for execution upon receipt of this message. G-Day H-Hour is 240600 Feb 91. 2. (S) The division's next rendezvous with destiny is north to the Euphrates River. God speed and good luck! 3. (C) Air Assault. Signed MG Peay"

100 Hours of War