A Line in the Sand

On 2 Aug 90, tank led Iraqi troops stormed into Kuwait after months of arguments over oil pricing. Kuwait was overcome in less than a day. On 6 Aug, the United Nations Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Iraq. On 7 Aug, President Bush ordered U.S. armed forces into Saudi Arabia to prevent further aggression.

FORSCOM issued its Operation Desert Shield deployment order to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at 0023 Zulu on 10 Aug 90. The 101 st was going to war for the first time since Vietnam. The division issued FRAGO 90-1 at 0445 Zulu. This FRAGO provided guidance to the division's units on leave cancellations and the postponement of permanent change of station moves. Also on 10 Aug 90, the division's Assault Command Post (ACP) personnel began processing for deployment.

Before deploying, the 101st had to pull back to Fort Campbell numerous units from far-flung training exercises. The division had an aviation element supporting the US Southern Command with JointTask Force Bravo in Honduras, the 2-187th Infantry task force at the Jungle Operations Training Center in Panama, and the 3-327th Infantry task force training cadets at the United States Military Academy.

A third battalion task force, the 2-502nd Infantry, was preparing to deploy as part of the United Nations' peacekeeping force in the Sinai. Additionally, the 101st had air defense artillery soldiers from A and HHB/2-44th Air Defense Artillery at Fort Knox, KY, training West Point cadets, and selected leaders involved in the training and evaluation of National Guard and Reserve forces.

The training in Honduras and Panama was cancelled on 10 Aug 90. The next day, the 2-502nd peacekeeping mission was cancelled. By 17 Aug, with the return from West Point of the 3327th Inf, most of the division was back at Fort Campbell preparing for war. The last of the helicopters serving in Honduras would not return until 24 Aug.

The division staff had also just returned from an offpost deployment when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 Aug 90. They had been at FortBragg, NC taking part in the INTERNALLOOK command post exercise. The US Central Command had based the INTERNAL LOOK scenario on an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. This exercise not only foreshadowed the coming crisis, itprovided the division staff with a valuable familiarization of the Persian Gulf region.

The first 101st Abn Div soldiers to deploy to Saudi Arabia were the five troopers of the division's Advon Party. The Advon reported to Fort Bragg on 12 Aug 90 and departed for Saudi Arabia at 2150 Zulu on 14 Aug 90. They arrived in Saudi Arabia on 15 Aug 90. Major Huber, Chief, G3 Operations, and Captain Lake, of the G4 staff, simultaneously stepped onto the airport tarmac at Dhahran so that they could both claim to be the first Screaming Eagles in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The first combat force to deploy from the division was the first Division Ready Brigade (DRB-1). The DRB-1 was made up of an aviation task force and the Second Air Assault Brigade Task Force. Two C5A and three C 141 Air Force jets carrying the first wave of the DRB-1 equipment departed Campbell Army Airfield at 2230 Zulu on 17 Aug 90.

Transport

It would take thirteen days for fifty-six C 141s and fortynine C5As to transport the task forces' 2,742 personnel, 117 helicopters, 487 vehicles and 123 equipment pallets. This strategic deployment was done multiechelon and started well. However, several last-minute adjustments to the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) were made by higher commanders. This caused the deployment to become hectic and required constant re- configurations for transportation. Once in Saudi Arabia, the DRB-1 force was configured to provide division command and control and a brigade task force with attack aviation and sustainment support.

The DRB-1 movement, as well as the movement of the rest of the division and the 101st Support Group (Corps), was coordinated and controlled primarily through the division's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Fort Campbell. The EOC monitored movement requirements and progress, requested transportation assets, and positioned liaison officers at the Jacksonville port. The EOC also coordinated the movement of the 2229th Aviation Attack (AATX) Battalion from Fort Rucker, AL, and the movement of OH58D Kiowas from the 1-9th Cav from Fort Lewis, Washington. These forces were attached to the division throughout the conflict.

Simultaneous with the DRB-1 airflow, the rest of the division was moving vehicles and aircraft to the port at Jacksonville, FL, for shipment to Saudi Arabia. The division received its call to port order from the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) at 1930 on 13 Aug 90. MTMC directed the division to move its vehicles, equipment and aircraft to the port at Jacksonville, FL. The vehicles were to report to the port's Blount Island Terminal. Enroute to Jacksonville, self-deploying helicopters were to land at Camp Blanding, FL, for shipping preparations.

Operations at Jacksonville went smoothly as the division organized, prepared and loaded 5,258 pieces of equipment. During the convoys to Florida, the 101st had a glimpse of the tremendous public support the military would enjoy throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Throngs of flag waving people lined interstate overpasses all along the route to the port at Jacksonville.

Once at Jacksonville, the equipment was loaded on ten ships of various sizes. The American Eagle, the first ship carrying 10 1 st equipment to depart Jacksonville (19 Aug) for Ad Damman, Saudi Arabia, had also carried the division's equipment to Vietnam. The American Eagle departed Jacksonville on 19 Aug 90. Each of the ten ships, had on-board a handful of 101st soldiers serving as equipment supercargoes.

The ten ships crossed the Atlantic Ocean, moved through the Mediterranean Sea, and transited the Suez Canal into the Red Sea. They then made the turn around the Arabian Peninsular the Persian Gulf port of Ad Damman, just north of Dhahran. The average trip took 23 days. The sea transport was not without problems, as a number of the cargo ships of the Navy's contingency fleet were in poor repair.

While posturing for movement, the division implemented an extensive training plan to prepare its soldiers for duty in the desert. The 101st placed emphasis on NBC training, weapons skills and increased physical training. A key component of this training plan was the division's pre-deployment schools, which provided additional training to approximately one third of the division's soldiers in such critical areas as field sanitation, M60/M249 techniques and combat lifesaver skills.

The bulk of the division's manpower deployed from Campbell Army Airfield to Saudi Arabia in commercial aircraft from the Commercial Aircraft Reserve Fleet (CRAF). Thirty-six aircraft deployed 13,500 soldiers over a twenty day period, from 5 to 25 September 1990. They arrived in Saudi Arabia at Dhahran Airport, and were then transported to King Fahd International Airport (KFIA), an incomplete international airport located 35 miles north of Dhahran.

Heat

The soldiers stepped off of the aircraft into intense heat. Temperatures ranged from 120 to 140 degrees Fahrenheit on the airfield surface during the hottest part of the day. Brigadier General Shelton, the division's Assistant Division Commander for Operations (ADC(O)), was credited with saying that Hell could not compete with the heat in Saudi Arabia. The division avoided mass heat casualties through the implementation of an acclimation period at its KFIA reception center.

The division built its base camp at KFIA. The camp was called Camp Eagle II in recognition of the 101st Airborne's Vietnam base camp, named Camp Eagle. Camp Eagle II resembled nothing so much as the Civil Was era's massive fields of white tents. Row afterrow of tents provided the living quarters for the division's soldiers. Camp Eagle II provided such life support systems as showers and latrines. Camp Eagle II also provided the division a link to key logistical nodes. The base camp was critical to the division in the earliest days of the deployment, for the air assault troopers had to be prepared to fight immediately upon their arrival.

As the Screaming Eagles began arriving in Saudi Arabia, the division staff started to shift their planning focus from strategic deployment to tactical employment.

With the 101st capabilities in mind, the XVIII Airborne Corps was already tasking the division to participate in defensive operations well forwarding Saudi Arabia as early as 30Aug90. On 1 Sep, the division deployed an aviation task force with an infantry platoon and combat service support elements to the vicinity of An Nu Ayriyah. The division was to establish a forward operating base (FOB) there in order to support covering force operations. The corps had named the base FOB Essex. On 2 Sep, the division received permission to rename the base FOB Bastogne in honor of the site of the division's historic stand in World War II.

The division officially assumed control of FOB Bastogne from the 82nd Abn Div on 4 Sep 90. The mission included an aviation screen in Area of Operations (AO) Apache. A day prior, the division was relieved of a mission it had had to provide medical evacuation helicopter support to the Corps.

First Operational Plan

The division issued its first operation plan (OPLAN) of Operation Desert Shield, OPLAN 90-1 (Eagle Defense), on 11 Sep 90. The mission statement read: "when directed 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (-) defends King Fahd International Airport (KFIA) to protect the airport and key facilities."

In developing this plan, the division staff proposed two possible courses of action. Both courses of action took into account the division's then current strength and unit locations. the 101st had its Aviation Brigade TAC, B/1-101 AATIC, B/3-502d Infantry and a platoon minus from B/426th Supply and Transportation Battalion forward in FOB Bastogne. The rest of the division then in theater, to include the I-502d Infantry (-), the 3502d Infantry (-), 2-44th Air Defense Artillery (-), 2d FASCO, 1320th Field Artillery (-), 1-101AATK (-), 2-229th AATK, and TF 9- 101 st Aviation, was located in Camp Eagle II. Both courses of action also took into account the continued arrival in Saudi Arabia of the division's combat power. Both proposals called for a defense strengthened over a period of three weeks by newly arriving troops.

Course of action one proposed that the division defend with the Aviation Brigade and the Second Air Assault Brigade Task Force conducting a delay between phase lines Stone and Cantaloupe. One infantry battalion would conduct a cluster defense while an infantry brigade (-), would establish anti-armor positions along likely Iraqi avenues of approach. Another infantry brigade would eventually establish blocking positions along the main highway leading to KFIA.

The second course of action proposed that the division integrate into the right flank of the 82nd Abn Div's defense of Dhahran. This proposal called for a battalion air assault north to establish blocking positions along likely avenues of approach. The division commander selected course of action one, which was developed into OPLAN 90-1.

OPLAN 90-1 directed that the division's troops in FOB Bastogne conduct covering force operations in sector with the bulk of Aviation Brigade prepared to attack in support of this defense. Meanwhile, each unit at Camp Eagle II would prepare to augment the base defense. Three battle positions were to be established outside the base perimeter, with priority of manning going to Battle Position 1. Each infantry brigade, as they arrived in Saudi Arabia, was to be prepared to establish anti-armor ambushes along the avenues of approach to KFIA. Each infantry brigade was also to be prepared to provide a platoon sized reaction force. 2-71th Cav would provide aerial observers to adjust artillery fire forward of the battle positions. DISCOM was to provide all 2 1/2 ton and larger trucks not carrying ammunition to the infantry for troop transportation.

The 101st would have probably been hard pressed to support this defensive plan due to the lack of adequate ammunition stocks and late echelonment of Corps and EAC combat service support elements into the theater. This late arrival strained the ability of combat forces to sustain themselves through the first few months of Operation Desert Shield. The division was forced to be self- sustaining from a bare-bones General Support Supply Base for much of the operation. Host nation support proved to be absolutely essential for providing various types of required equipment, transportation and life support services.

The division suffered from an initially low supply of ammunition due to an unrealistic ammunition basic load. The Division Ready Brigade ammunition package maintained at Fort Campbell was insufficient to meet the needs of a deployment involving the entire division. The Forces Command plan to have necessary ammunition meet the division at the port of debarkation was never realized.

As more and more of the division's forces arrived, the division amended OPLAN 90-1 to reflect the increase in strength. During Sep 90, the division staff developed an updated plan, OPLAN 90-2, for the conduct of the Corps covering force mission vicinity An Nuayriya. OPLAN 90-2 proposed that the 101st conduct screening and covering force operations in AO Apache, provide attack helicopter support and fire support to the Eastern Province Area Command (EPAQ forces (deployed between the 101st and the Kuwaiti border) to disrupt and delay Iraqi forces and assist in the passage of lines of EPAC forces. On order, the division would screen the west flank of the 18 Abn Corps, revert to the corps reserve and prepare to defend KFIA.

Assumptions

OPLAN 90-2 was based on the assumptions that all of the division's forces would be in Saudi Arabia by 6 Oct 90 and that there would be eight to twelve hours warning prior to the initiation ofhostilities. Italso assumed thatonebrigade wouldbe located at Camp Eagle II at the start of hostilities. OPLAN 90-2 was never published, but it did serve as a foundation for the development of OPLAN 90-3.

OPLAN 90-3 (Operation Desert Destiny) was the division's mature theater OPLAN for the defense of Saudi Arabia. Published on 15 Oct, OPLAN 90-3 was extensively rehearsed and would have been executed had Iraq attacked into Saudi Arabia.

The division based OPLAN 90-3 on intelligence predictions that an Iraqi attack would have the objective of seizing and controlling the petroleum handling facilities at Dhahran and Abqaiq within 72 and 96 hours. Of the nine divisions that Iraq then had in forward positions in Kuwait it was expected that Iraq would commit six to the initial assault.

One mechanized division and two armor divisions would make the main attack while one each mechanized and armor division would make a supporting attack. A third infantry division would make a fixing attack and Republican Guard Force Corps forces would exploit any successes within 48 hours after the initial assault. The 101st expected to be hit head on by one division, followed twelve hours later by a flank attack by a second division.

The l8th Abn Corps had the on order mission to establish a defense in sector to defeat attacking Iraqi forces, defend approaches and critical oil facilities vicinity Abqaiq-Al Hufuf and defend the approaches to the Ad Damman-Dhahran enclave. TheCorps wasalso to ensure theintegrity ofARCENT'S western flank and facilitate the transition to offensive operations. The 101st's plan supported the Corps' mission.

Op Plan 90-3

The 101st mission in OPLAN 90-3 was similar to that in OPLAN 90-2. The division's mission was to, when directed, conduct covering force operations in sector, provide attack helicopter and fire support to EPAC forces to disrupt and delay Iraqi forces, and assist in the passage of lines of EPAC forces. On order, the division was to guard in sector to protect the western flank of the 18th Abn Corps. The division was also to be prepared to conduct future operations as required.

In order to conduct this mission, the 101st was given operational control of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), with its 123 Abrams tanks, 116 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles, 26 Cobra helicopters and 24 self-propelled 155mm howitzers. The attachment of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade further augmented the division with 37 Apaches, 7 Chinooks and 22 Iroquois helicopters. The division artillery was reinforced by the 75th and 212th Field Artillery Brigades.

The division developed a five phase plan based on the Commanding General's intent to execute the covering force mission with maximum use of the division's mobility and tank killing capabilities. Highly mobile forward operating bases and forward area refuel points would support the covering force mission.

The first phase of the plan called for the movement of the 101st from Camp Eagle II to AO Normandy, the covering force area (CFA). AO Normandy covered 4600 square kilometers of land. Movement would have been by air and ground with priority of movement going to the infantry brigade task force (TF) at Camp Eagle II, DIVARTY, the division main command post, the two aviation brigades and then DISCOM. Two infantry brigades and the 3d ACR would already be positioned in the CFA.

The covering force operations, phase II of the plan, would have begun with the initiation of hostilities and ended with a battle hand over to the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The 101st Abn Div (Air Assault) was to provide Aviation Brigade's attack helicopters in support of the EPAC forces. The rest of the division was to cover in sector with two brigades abreast in the north and three abreast in the south. First Brigade TF and the 12th CAB were to be positioned along Phase Line Shovel, with First Brigade TF covering in the west and the 12th CAB covering in the east. South of Phase Line Axe, Second Brigade TF would take up position in the west, Third Brigade TF in thecenter and the 3rd ACR in the east. The 3rd ACR, operating out of FOB Bastogne in defense of An Nu Ayriyah, would have been the main effort of the covering force operations.

On order, First Brigade TF was to conduct a battle hand over to Second Brigade TF and then move to AO Carentan, which occupied 6200 square kilometers of land along the corps western flank. Also on order, the 12th CAB was to conduct a battle handover with Third Brigade TF and the 3rd ACR. The 12th CAB would occupy Assembly Area (AA) Clarksville and become the division reserve, with priority of supportgoing to the 3rd ACR. The 2-17th Cav would screen northwest of the division along Tapline Road. Upon completion of EPAC support, Aviation Brigade would put one aviation attack battalion under the operational control of First Brigade TF, move to FOB Oasis and become the division reserve with priority of commitment to the west flank.

During Phase III, the 101st would withdraw from the covering force area, conduct a rearward passage of lines through the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and move toward its guard positions in AO Carentan. Following the passage of lines, the 3rd ACR would become attached to the 24th ID and the 12th CAB would be released to the 18th Abn Corps. Aviation Brigade would remain the division reserve with priority of commitment to deep attacks against high value targets along Tapline Road.

Phase IV called for the division to occupy its guard positions with Third Brigade TF in the south, First in the center and the Second in the north. Third Brigade TF was to be prepared to become the Corps reserve. The 2-17th Cav would maintain its screen along Tapline Road and Aviation Brigade would continue as the division reserve.

Phase V, the future operations phase, provided for a counterattack against theIraqi secondechelon forces. The 101st was to support the Ist Cavalry Division, which was the main effort for the counter attack. The division conducted a field training exercise in Oct 90 to rehearse the passage of lines phase of OPLAN 90-3 down to the company level.

On 10 Nov 90, the division issued Change I to OPLAN 90-3. The major change was that the 12th CAB would remain under the division's control throughout the plan. The 12th CAB was to conduct a counterattack in support of the division's passage of lines. Following the passage of lines the 12th CAB was to move to FOB A Shau or FOB Dak To and prepare for future operations.

Aggressive Plan

This aggressive plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia required an equally aggressive logistical support plan. The Division Support Command (DISCOM) was task organized to provide support to all assigned and attached units. A division support area (DSA), located at Camp Eagle II, would support division forward operating bases (FOBs), which in turn would support logistic assaultbases (LABs) ateach brigade. Each of these light, tailored bases would be resourced from DISCOM's assets.

LABs are designed to provide the smallest capable element forward to support logistical requirements. LABs are supported through the more robust FOBs. 3d ACR, which was only under the division's operational control, would have been supported by either the 24th ID or the 1st COSCOM.

During Phase I of OPLAN 90-3, two FOBs, FOB Bastogne and FOB Oasis, were to support the division's brigades' LABs. FOB Bastogne was to support the Third Brigade TF and the 12th CAB LABs, while FOB Oasis was to support the First, Second and Aviation Brigade LABs. In Phase II, DISCOM was to establish two additional FOBs, FOB A Shan and FOB Dak To. During Phase III, DISCOM would have displaced the FOB Bastogne assets to FOB Dak To, and the FOB Oasis assets to FOB A Shau. These FOBs would continue to support the LABs during Phase IV while the 1st COSCOM would be providing throughput supply of cargo and equipment to the FOBs. The division's external support from the lst COSCOM would have been primarily supplied by the 101st Support Group (Corps). DISCOM was to be prepared to support the division using the DSA/FOB/LAB concept throughout future operations.

During November, the division conducted a second field training exercise to rehearse the defense of Saudi Arabia. This exercise rehearsed the division's command posts on the critical phases of the defensive plan and the timing of the 3rd ACR and 12th CAB counterattacks. The counterattacks were executed on a scaled down size.

In addition to the field training exercises, the division established a very rigorous training program to prepare for battle. At all times, two thirds of the division was deployed forward in the covering force area, while the other one third was refitting at Camp Eagle 11. A unit spent thirty days forward for every fifteen spent at the base camp. During this time, the division improved and adapted many air assault techniques. The division also made extensive use of training areas and ranges established in Saudi Arabia. This training plan paid large dividends in preparation for combat.

The Iraqis did not simply sit still during the months from Aug through Dec. The Iraqis had established a multi-belted, hardened defense in the eastern portion of the Kuwai ti Theatre of Operations (KTO). Military intelligence expected Iraq to develop strong point defenses in the west in the vicinity of As Salman and An Nasiriyah. The Republican Guards were the Iraqi's reserve force for the entire theater.

The 101st continued in the defense throughout the holiday season. Secretary of the Army Stone, General Powell and President Bush visited with the troops during this period. Also, visits by such celebrities as Bob Hope, Johnny Bench, Jay Leno and Steve Martin were well appreciated by the soldiers. Morale continued to stay high as the soldiers were served outstanding holiday meals and were entertained by the division band. The constant influx of mail, both personal and that addressed to "any soldier," also helped boost morale. The holidays passed rapidly as the division began to prepare for the inevitable attack into Iraq.

Even as it concentrated on the defense of Saudi Arabia, the division was already leaning forward in preparation for any offensive strike to liberate Kuwait. The division developed two offensive OPLANs, OPLAN 90-4 and OPLAN 90-5. OPLAN 90-4, which was eventually shelved, was developed during Nov 90. It called for the 101 st to conduct a wide envelopment from the west, in order to block Iraqi escape routes in the Euphrates River Valley, vicinity of As Sarnawa.

OPLAN 90-4

OPLAN 90-4 supported the 18 Abn Corps' mission, which was "on order, 18 Abn Corps attacks to penetrate Iraqi forward defenses and to occupy blocking positions along the Euphrates River in order to prevent reinforcement of and escape from the KTO by Iraqi forces; on order, continues the attack east to assist in the destruction of the RGFC (Republican Guard Force Corps)." The division's mission statement was "at G-day H-hour 101st Abn Div (AASLT), air assaults to establish a forward operating base (FOB) Viper and attacks by air assault to establish blocking position vicinity Objective Green (As Samawah) to prevent enemy movement through Objective Green, -defeat enemy forces in Objective Green, establish FOB Scorpion and screens corps northern flank. On order, 101st Abn Div (AASLT) attacks Objective Silver (An Nasiriyah) by air assault to defeat enemy forces in Objective Silver and to deny enemy access to crossing sites over the Euphrates River; continues to screen corps northern flank and prepares for future offensive operations."

OPLAN 90-4 defined four maneuver phases. Phase I was a logistics buildup at Logsite Romeo, a logistics base to be established near King Khalid military city. Phase II would be the prepositioning of the division's troops in a tactical assembly area far to the northwest of King Khalid military City. Phase III was to be the seizure of FOB Viper, Objective Green and Objective Silver. At the end of Phase III, the division would consolidate in Objective Silver in preparation for Phase IV, future operations, which called for air assaults either to the south-east or north-west of Objective Silver to destroy enemy forces.

The OPLAN 90-4 mission was feasible, but further analysis showed it would be difficult to reposition forces and sustainment operations that far west. It was replaced by OPLAN 90- 5, which gave the division a zone of operations further east. OPLAN 90-5 supported the 18th AirborneCorps mission, which was "on order, l8th Airborne Corps attacks to penetrate Iraqi forward defenses and to interdict Iraqi lines of communication along the Euphrates River in order to prevent reinforcement of and escape from the Kuwaiti theater of Operations by Iraqi forces; on order, continues the attack east to assist in the destruction of the RGFC."

The 101st Abn Div mission was "when directed, 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault) moves by air and ground to TAA Campbell, and prepares for offensive operations; commencing G-day conducts air assault to establish FOB Cobra and attacks to interdict, block and defeat enemy forces operating in and through AO Eagle; on order conducts attacks to the east to assist in the defeat of RGFC forces."

While the 101st would be air assaulting to the Euphrates, the French 6th Light Armor Division, to the west, would be attacking to seize As Salman. The 82d Abn Div was to support the French. The 24th ID would attack to our east and position their forces north of Phase Line Viking, while the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment was to screen and establish a blocking position along the corps' eastern flank.

OPLAN 90-5

Like OPLAN 904, OPLAN 90-5 defined four maneuver phases. Phase I was again a logistics buildup in preparation to support a short duration, high tempo, high consumption ground offensive. Phase II called for the division to reposition its forces from Camp Eagle II and the covering force area into a tactical assembly area several kilometers southeast of Rhafha, Saudi Arabia.

Phase III, offensive operations, of OPLAN 90-5 contained four subphases. Subphase A was the seizure of FOB Cobra, deep in Iraq, by the division's First Brigade TF. Subphase B was the buildup of a robust FOB Cobra by DISCOM in order to support security operations in the FOB and prepare for further air assaults into AO Eagle. Subphase C was an armed aerial reconnaissance into AO Eagle on the second day of the ground war. This attack would cut Iraq's lines of communications along the Euphrates River. Second Brigade TF would then attack into the Tallil Airfield (Objective Strike) on the fourth day of the ground war to prepare for further strikes during Phase IV, future operations.

The Division Support Command (DISCOM) was again to provide tailored direct logistical support to all of the division's assigned and attached units. The division support area (DSA) was to be located in the Tactical Assembly Area (TAA). DISCOM was to establish the FOB Cobra base and be prepared to establish a second FOB as required. The DSA was to move from the TAA to FOB Cobra during Phase III of the plan. Throughput supplies were to be pushed by the lst COSCOM, with the division's primary support again coming from the 101 Support Group (corps).

The division developed several innovative supply procedures. Among these was the use of one fuel, Jet A-1, for both ground vehicles and aircraft and the use of configured support packages for forward deployed troops. Innovations such as these, when combined with the light logistics tail allowed by the tailored FOBs and LABs, were critical to our success during Operation Desert Storm.

Attack

With an offensive plan in hand, and the United Nations' approval for President Bush to attack Iraq if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 Jan 91, the division implemented OPLAN 90-5, Phase 1, the logistics buildup at Logsite Romeo. The first DISCOM forces arrived at Logsite Romeo on 5 Jan 91. The division also positioned engineer assets at thelogsite to assist in the eventual preparation of the Tactical Assembly Area.

As the January 15 deadline drew nearer, there were fears that Iraq would launch a pre-emptive spoiling attack into Saudi Arabia vicinity King Khalid Military City (KKMC). To strengthen newly arrived 7th Corps elements only beginning to deploy near KKMC, the division's Second Brigade TF was put under the tactical control of the 1st Cavalry Division and moved into position in the vicinity of Al Qaysumah, northeast of KKMC. The feared attack by Iraq never materialized.

The 101 st Abn Div was destined to fire the first shots of the coming war. Back in Sep 90, LTC Cody, Commander of the 1- 101 st AATK Battalion was instructed to begin planning for a covert strike into Iraq. The strike was to be against two early warning radar sites in western Iraq in order to open up a twenty mile wide air corridor for coalition jets to use in bombing Baghdad. Cody named the operation NORMANDY, after the site of the 101st Abn Div 's famous airborne insertion on D-Day during World War II.

The pilots selected to conduct the mission were formed into two teams of four Apaches, Red Team and White Team, and trained on the mission for three months. LTC Cody did not brief them on the particulars of the mission until two days before the strike. In addition to these eight Apaches, there was a standby Apache and a Blackhawk to carry four Apache mechanics. The assembled team was named TF Normandy.

On 14 Jan 9 1, the pilots made a 720 mile trip from Camp Eagle 11 to their staging base in western Saudi Arabia. They were joined by Air Force helicopters, to be used for any needed search and rescue missions. The trip was made possible partly by the innovation of a young officer in the 1- 10 lst AATK. The officer, lLT DeVito, recommended a fuel carrying option that allowed the Apaches to carry extra fuel in addition to their heavy load of ammunition.

All last minute diplomatic efforts to avert war failed as the United Nation's 15 Jan deadline came and went. D-Day, the start of the air war against Iraq, was secretly set for 17 Jan 91. The entire world held its breath in anticipation of war. War would come, and the Screaming Eagles would draw first blood.

Next Issue: The Hail Mary and 100 Hours of War.