I will cite mainly the works of Greene & Massignani, because they should be considered credible also by non-Italian readers, although there are a lot of Italian accounts on the battle saying, sometimes in more detail, the same things. Greene & Massignani, in Rommel's North African Campaign, wrote: 'Rommel was ignoring the growing body of intelligence that suggested a British counterattack, and was determined to finish off Tobruk 'it had become an obsession.' In fact, the Italian intelligence was aware of an imminent attack toward Tobruk and warned the Germans, but with little success.

During the first days of November, the Ariete division moved to Bir el Gobi. It was part of General Gambara's RECAM Corps, along with the Motorized division Trieste and the Recam Group. On the evening of 18 November, men from the 132nd Tank Regiment saw tens of enemy fighters and bombers flying overhead. The following morning it appeared that the that the enemy attack was to be expected very briefly.

Greene & Massignani describe the battle this way: 'The battle opened with Ariete's artillery and the Bersaglieri deploying into three strongpoints, while a company of their tanks advanced to meet the approaching 22nd. In this the Ariete's tanks suffered a check and they fell back on their strongpoints.' It was 1st Company/VII Tank Bn, under Lt. Murer, which was sent scouting west early in the morning.

'The Ariete's tanks next deployed to the north of the three strongpoints and supported by a battalion of 105/28 guns under Major Pasquali and the Milmart of seven truck-mounted naval 102mm guns with armor piercing shells designed to fire against ships' armor under Captain Priore. ' At noon the 22nd Armoured Brigade began the attack with the British tanks advancing in a large semicircle. The main thrust was centered at the middle strongpoint. ' The Italian defense was well organized and could effectively react from defilade positions from which they could hit the 22nd's tanks at an angle. The strongpoint on the Italian right was able to frustrate the 22nd Armoured which moved across their front, suffering their fire in the process, to reinforce the attack on the center, which made little progress. On the Italian left, the Bersaglieri had just arrived and went into immediate combat in the open.' They were the men from the III/8th Bersaglieri battalion already mentioned before.

'By 1330 the Italian position on the left was beginning to crack and tanks of the 22nd were among the defenders. Some of the defenders surrendered, but with no one to receive their surrender ' they went back to their guns and the fight. This was a common occurrence in the course of the war in the desert.'

As I said before, no mention of sizable part of III/8th trying to surrender is to be found in the Italian accounts I read, and it is interesting to note that Greene & Massignani in Mare Nostrum wrote, -W.F.G. Jackson in The North African Campaign claims that elements of the 8th Bersaglieri tried to surrender, but they had no one to surrender to and so took up their guns again ' there is no record of this in any Italian history consulted.'

'By 1500 the 22nd was massing to continue the advance, having captured the Italian left position, but the stand by the Bersaglieri had allowed the tanks of the Ariete to form up behind them, supported by the guns of the Milmart. The British advanced with the sun in the eyes of the Italians, but the high profile truck mounted 102mm guns (mistaken for 88s) played havoc among the Crusader tanks. ' Finally a battalion of the Ariete hit the flank and rear of the disordered 22nd, and forced it to retreat, which they achieved with their greater speed.' Piscitelli Taeggi Oderisio wrote: 'At 5:00 pm there was no more bullet whistle, no more shell burst. Here two tanks clashed with bow locked, they remained suspended like rampant lions. Together they burned.'

Greene & Massignani close the part dedicated to the Bir el Gobi battle with, -The Italians lost 34 tanks, 8 47mm guns, 1 75mm gun, 15 dead, 80 wounded and 82 missing. The Italians claimed that the British lost about 50 tanks and other support vehicles.

'Three British accounts during and just after the action state that they either won the battle or the Italian unit was officered by Germans (see G. Le Q. Martel Our Armored Forces) or, in one account, that Pz.IV tanks fought alongside the M13s and German infantry were present! Germans were not present and Rommel was unaware of the action for hours. In The Desert Generals Corelli Barnett states the loss at 52 British tanks, while General Verney, divisional historian for the 7th Armoured, gives the loss as 45 tanks.'

The Italian official history Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale - Vol.II, written by General Mario Montanari, about Bir el Gobi says: 'At Bir el Gobi the Ariete was busy redeploying. It had to realize a defensive line about 10 kms south of Bir el Gobi, formed by a semicircle of strongpoints, held by the Bersaglieri and reinforced by 47/32 AT and 20mm pieces and 75/27 guns. On 19 November the fieldworks were still incomplete when at 7:30 am General Mannerini, deputy commander of the RECAM Corps, arrived at the Ariete HQ to attend a meeting with General Balotta. Considering that the British were already very near, it was decided to contract the defensive line. This way V/8th Bersaglieri Bn and II/132nd 75/27 artillery Bn remained where it was, on the trail to el-Cuasc; III/8th Bersaglieri Bn and the 3rd Celere's 75/27 artillery Bn was sent east of Bir el Gobi; XII/8th Bersaglieri Bn and I/132nd 75/27 artillery Bn was sent west of Bir el Gobi. North of the Bersaglieri positions were the Milmart and the 105/28 artillery Bn from 24th Artillery Regiment and further north was waiting the slightly understrength 132nd Tank Regiment, with its 100 M13/40s. '

'Around 11:00 am there was the first clash with the 22nd Armoured Brigade, advancing screened by 11th Hussars Regiment: one M13 company and one 75/27 section had a brief fight at Bir el Dleua a few kms south-west of Bir el Gobi. After sustaining some losses, the Italian unit retired on Bir el Gobi.

'After a short time the 22nd Armoured arrived before Bir el Gobi. General Scott-Cockburn deployed his eight 25-pdrs and ordered the attack. 2nd RGH on the right was charging the V/8th Bersaglieri Bn position; 4th CLY on the left was attacking XII/8th Bersaglieri Bn. V Bersaglieri had been in place a few days and was well entrenched, while XII Bersaglieri hadn't the time to prepare its new position and was virtually in the open. III Bersaglieri was literally arriving on the field of battle with its trucks. '

'All the 47/32s and 75/27s started to fire against the three charging British regiments. In a few minutes everything was submerged in a dense dust cloud. The artillery fire was deadly and accurate and soon 3rd and 4th CLY changed course and tried to attack the Bersaglieri positions from the flanks. XII Bersaglieri succeeded in repulsing the attack of 4th CLY, but III Bersaglieri, attacked by 3rd CLY and 2nd RGH, started to crack. 3rd CLY was able to penetrate III Bersaglieri positions. 8th Bersaglieri HQ, now isolated, had to fight to reach XII Bersaglieri positions. '

At this moment, 3.00 PM, Scott-Cockburn had still good hopes to win the battle, but, suddenly, the Ariete counterattacked. Two kilometers north of Bir el Gobi the 132nd Tank Rgt was launching its 100 M13/40s toward 2nd RGH. In the meantime Milmart's seven 102/35s started firing their devastating anti-ship rounds. VII and VIII Tank Bns clashed with 3rd CLY and 2nd RGH and after one hour of fighting Ariete's last reserve, IX Tank Bn, was launched against the flank and rear of the tired British. That was a little bit too much. The remaining Crusaders of the 22nd Armoured used their advantage in speed over the M13s to retire in disorder. '

Aftermath

Ariete's losses were 12 officers and 193 men in dead, wounded and missing, 49 tanks (15 of them were later recovered), 4 75/27 guns and 8 47/32 guns. ' 22nd Armoured Brigade lost 57 tanks.'

In any event, the 22nd Armoured was repulsed and suffered substantial losses at the start of the battle and left the Ariete in possession of the field. Italians felt that this combat improvement was due to elite units being sent to Africa, lessons learned, and the impact of the Germans in the theater. The weapons were generally the same but better used, and some effort had been made to improve leadership.

I hope you found interesting this brief account of the Bir el Gobi battle and of the forces involved and I hope it spurred your interest in the upcoming Ariete for the TCS.

More Bir el Gobi

Introduction
The Battle: British Point of View
The Battle: Italian Point of View