Operation Crusader was intended to destroy the Axis armored formations and to recapture Cyrenaica. The relief of Tobruk would follow. The armored elements of the British XXX Corps were to move round the south flank and either destroy the enemy armor or prevent it from interfering with the British XIII Corps operating in the North. Within this plan, the task of the 7th Armoured Division was to advance to the airfields at El Adem and Sidi Rezegh. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was to be on the left of the division.

At dawn on 18 November 1941 the 22nd Armoured Brigade advanced with 4th CLY Regiment on the left, 3rd CLY Regiment on the right and 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Regiment in the center. 11th Hussars Regiment's Humber armored cars were patrolling up to 20 miles in front of the Brigade. The Libyan border was crossed at 9:00 am and by the end of the day the brigade had reached an area 20 miles south East of Bir el Gobi. During the 80-mile march there were many breakdowns of Crusader tanks due to mechanical failures.

On the morning of the 19 November the 22nd resumed the advance, even if 4th CLY Regiment was short of fuel. 4th CLY C squadron's commander, Lord Cranley, ignored the order to resume the march and remained waiting for the supply lorries. C squadron caught up soon afterwards. 2nd RGH's regimental history says: '[T]he advance was continued in the same order as the previous day. A short halt was made at Bir el Duedar and we continued toward Bir el Gubi. There was no sign of the 3rd and 4th CLY regiments or of Brigade HQ, but they seemed satisfied with our position, though it appeared to us that we were alone in the desert.'

First contact with the enemy, elements of the Italian Ariete Armored Division, was made around noon by the 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Regiment.

At 3:00 pm Lt. Lindsay, commanding the leading troop of 3rd CLY's A squadron, spotted five M13/40 tanks to his front. Major Willis, A squadron commander, was then ordered to attack. In a quick fight all the M13s were destroyed, without any loss among the British. Meanwhile, 3rd CLY's B squadron (Major Godson) on the left flank came under anti-tank fire from Bir el Gobi. Major Godson's tank was hit two times and put out of action, while Godson himself was seriously wounded. Another of B squadron's tanks was then hit and three of its crew were killed. Shortly before 6.00 pm 3rd CLY Regiment withdrew into -close leaguer.'

The 4th CLY Regiment's part in the day's fighting was more intense. The regiment attacked Bir el Gobi itself, along with 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Regiment, which was on the right of 4th CLY.

2nd RGH's G and H (Major Reinhold) squadrons were ordered to attack. The 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars broke into the enemy position with what has been described by a witness as -the nearest thing to a cavalry charge seen during this war.' Soon H squadron took losses and was disorganized, then G squadron took the lead, with H squadron on the left and F squadron on the right.

2nd RGH history says: -After passing through considerable shell fire we came upon numerous slit trenches, some with small AT guns, filled with Italians all holding up white handkerchiefs and doing their best to surrender. We were unable to deal with them, however, and pressed on. ' [H]ere we encountered some Italian lorries, which we shot up with our Besas.'

Later, still in the position near the burning lorries, the 2nd RGH had a fight with seven M13s, all destroyed in a few minutes.

Around 1:00 pm 'a large force of enemy tanks was seen forming up to our North, and the regiment, less H squadron, advanced to engage them. As we drew nearer we could see that they were Italian M13s interspersed with German Mk. IVs, and numbered about one hundred sixty. There was also an enormous gun in the background, which turned out to an 88mm, our first experience with that formidable weapon.'

Actually, the Hussars saw the one hundred M13s of Ariete's 132nd Tank Rgt. No German soldiers or German equipment were present at the battle. The '88mm' they were going to experience was indeed a 'formidable weapon,' but it was an Italian 102/35 truck mounted piece!

'[T]he enemy now closed in a tight box formation and came slowly at us, halting at about three thousand yards ' his tanks came on again and at about two thousand yards engaged with AP shots ' what was clear was the fact that the enemy could penetrate our tanks at fifteen hundred yards, while our shells were bouncing off his and continued to do so down to eight hundred yards.'

This is a very interesting note, making short work of the often systematic underrating of the M13s in many tactical games !

'[I]t was now obvious that those tanks that were left in action were heavily outnumbered and outgunned and the order to withdraw was given.'

The 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Regiment was the British formation most heavily involved in the fighting, losing about 30 tanks. What was left of the regiment, 19 tanks, was formed into an ad hoc squadron under Major Trevor the following morning.

2nd RGH history closes the chapter on the battle with a totally untrue, but self-consoling statement: '[B]ut, to our credit, the enemy were reported to have lost seventy tanks, and though this was never confirmed, the Ariete Division did not again appear as a fighting force.'

In reality, the Ariete continued to fight. On 23 November, a combat group of the division fought at Bir Cremisa, fought at Gabr Salech on the 24th, and fought at Sidi Rezegh on 29 November to 1 December. During this last battle, the records of the Ariete list 1,500 prisoners taken, along with 40 armored cars and 25 tanks destroyed or captured. The Ariete was again in action on 13-15 December at Gazala.

Of the 4th CLY Regiment Lord Onslow writes: 'The attack was launched and at last the regiment had its first taste of real warfare, moving forward strictly according to the drill book and full of confidence. I can see them now, A squadron leading, B squadron echeloned back on the left and C squadron on the right.'

Soon A squadron (Major Nichol) was fired on and halted to give battle. B squadron (Major Walker) was to make a wide sweep into the enemy's rear. C squadron (Lord Cranley) was to attack the enemy's left flank where a stationary column of what appeared to be transports could be seen in the distance. As C squadron attacked, A squadron was ordered to retire. Two troops of C squadron overran the enemies in their trenches.

The Sharpshooters history says: '[T]he whole of C squadron was thoroughly involved ' and all around hundreds of Italians waiting-indeed eager-to surrender.'

As we will see, there is no evidence of this episode of 'mass surrender' in the many accurate Italian accounts of the battle. The Italians involved here were the well-trained Bersaglieri of III/8th Battalion, just arrived on the field of battle with their trucks-the 'transports which could be seen in the distance.' While the III/8th's sector was badly shaken by the British attack, it is highly unlikely that 'hundreds of Italians were eager to surrender,' even in the light of what the Sharpshooters history reports about C squadron: 'Number 1 Troop was not heard of again for some months when the whole Troop was reported by the Red Cross to be either killed or captured.' Number 2 and 3 Troops were badly mauled too. How could men eager to surrender could do such damage to the forces attacking them?

The Sharpshooters history also says: 'By now many of the enemy were giving themselves up, but, since most of the tanks had been knocked out and there was no infantry to consolidate the position, it was not possible to take advantage of this surrender.' (!) From his position to the West of Bir el Gobi, 4th CLY's commander, Lt.Colonel Carr, ordered the regiment to disengage and most of it was able to follow the order.

The Sharpshooters history ends the chapter on the battle saying: '[T]he wisdom of putting in this attack on a heavily fortified position with dug-in gun emplacements and anti-tank artillery may be doubted in retrospect. ' It would be possible, but pointless at this distance of time, to examine mistakes made and lesson learned. Fruitless also to try to apportion responsibility for losses suffered. Sooner or later all fighting regiments must be blooded and the process is never painless.'

General Norrie, XXX Corps commander, wrote about the day: '[I]t had been an encounter battle ' carried out too enthusiastically against prepared positions ' not seen or recognized until after the attack had been launched.'

More Bir el Gobi

Introduction
The Battle: British Point of View
The Battle: Italian Point of View