Napoleon in Syria

Isolated in Egypt
General Bonaparte
Strikes into Syria

From Egypt to Acre

by John Dunn and Melanie Byrd
with artwork by Jacques Domange and Ray Rubin

Napoleon's original plans for the expedition to Egypt, as understood by the governing Directory in Paris, did not include an invasion of Syria. But after French Admiral Brueys' fleet was annihilated by Admiral Nelson's fleet, the links between Paris and General Bonaparte's Army of the Orient were limited to a few ships that snuck through the British blockade. Thus the idea of invading Syria originated with Bonaparte. The scheme was not without merit.

First, Syria was the gateway to Egypt. Military leaders from Alexander the Great to the Ottoman Sultan Selim all had conquered Egypt by moving through Syria. After the French invasion of their territory, the Ottoman Turks declared war and the Syrian pashas of Damascus and Acre mobilized armies.

Pre-Emptive Offensive

With Ottoman forces slowly assembling against him, Bonaparte wanted to launch a pre-emptive offensive to defeat his enemies in detail before they could combine potentially overwhelming numbers. A French victory in Syria also offered several possibilities beyond guarding the land entrance to Egypt, as it also denied vital ports to Napoleon's opponents.

Aware that an Ottoman force on the island of Rhodes was preparing for amphibious operations against his flank or rear, Napoleon remembered that the Turks had landed 25,000 troops off Alexandria in 1786, which had led to the fall of Cairo. It would be much more difficult to repeat this effort without controlling the nearby ports of Acre and Jaffa. Furthermore, the Royal Navy's blockade made communications and receiving supplies and reinforcements almost impossible between France and Egypt. With French control of Jaffa and Acre, it would be more arduous for the British to maintain their blockade.

Capturing supply centers in Syria would improve conditions for the French as well as delay the Ottoman offensive. There was also hope, that the area's minorities such as the Jews and Christians, might collaborate with the French, providing much needed auxiliary troops. Finally, although there is little evidence that Bonaparte seriously considered marching on to India, control of Syria was a potential threat to British holdings on that valuable sub-continent.

French-held Syria could be a useful bargaining item in any negotiations with Great Britain. Bonaparte sent much of this information in a dispatch to Paris. Telling the Directory that Ahmad al-Jazzar, Pasha of Acre, was prepared to invade Egypt, Bonaparte insisted that he would strike first. He reported that General Louis-Antoine Desaix had driven Murad Bey, the most powerful remaining Mameluke leader, further into Upper Egypt. Desaix's 5,000 men began a pacification campaign, while the fortifications at Cairo, Alexandria, and Rosetta were greatly improved. With Egypt reasonably secure, an offensive into Syria was now possible.

An invasion of Syria would be a difficult undertaking. To avoid desert travel, armies had to hug the coast. East-west movements must cross mountainous terrain. Faulty maps and hasty planning led Bonaparte's staff to underestimate these problems. Also, a lack of spies limited their knowledge of enemy strength, especially the condition of the fortifications the French would face.

In order to obtain water on the march, the army split up, each division traveling by a different route. Even then, the French could literally drink wells dry. The only other alternative was water bags made from animal skins. In many cases, hot sunny days converted the water inside poorly cured skins into a repulsive and undrinkable soup. Carrying heavy loads and marching in the oppressive heat, it is easy to understand why some soldiers stole from their officers' rations. As civilian quartermaster Jacques Miot recalled, "It would have been dangerous and pointless to stop them."

Bonaparte argued that Syria could provide his army with some of its needs. He expected to find rations, cash, and recruits. At this time, "Syria" was a geographical expression that included the modern state of Syria as well as parts of Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. Inhabited mostly by Arab Muslims, the land was rural and undeveloped.

Bonaparte was confident that, barring surprise, his army's superior firepower, discipline, and leadership could run off any number of "Orientals" in Syria as the French had beaten the Mamelukes in Egypt. As large numbers of Ottoman infantry were poorly equipped and unmotivated, defeating the enemy cavalry was the key to victory. French infantry carried four and a half foot long double-pointed stakes. With a chain attached to one end, these could be planted in the ground and joined together to form barriers against mounted charges.

Fortress of El Arish

Napoleon led a significant portion of the Army of the Orient into Syria. These 13,000 veterans of the campaign in Italy and Egypt faced their first challenge at the frontier fortress of El Arish. In the words of General Jean Kléber, this town was one of "the two keys to Egypt." Bonaparte calculated that dragging siege artillery overland would impair his timetable. Thus he directed a small naval flotilla, under Captain Standelet, to take the heavy guns by sea for a rendezvous in Palestine. Hassan Agha, the dizdar [fortress commander] of El Arish, prepared for a fight. His garrison contained 1,000 Arnauts (Balkan light infantry) and Maghribi (Moroccans), plus about 100 Mamelukes. Bonaparte's schedule required the desert march completed in eight days, so he planned to quickly storm the fort.

On 8 February, the French advance guard was repulsed. A day later, General Reynier renewed the assault, driving defenders from several stone houses. The fortress held, causing a critical delay, which, in the words of historian David Chandler, "...compromised the success of the entire campaign."

The siege of El Arish consumed precious time and cost hundreds of casualties. Starting on 14 February, field artillery bombarded the citadel, while sappers began to dig a mine. Neither effort was successful. The French field artillery's 8-pounder cannon lacked battering power, and on 17 February, a counter-mine halted the French underground attack. The same day, Bonaparte instructed artillery commander General Elzéar Dommartin to deploy all possible guns, including large 12-pounders from the army reserves. These heavier guns pounded the citadel for two days.

Finally a breach opened, convincing the dazed defenders to capitulate. A few Arnauts and some Maghribi entered French service, but most surrendered on terms of a safe conduct to Syria. Bonaparte, arguing they would only rejoin Ahmad's forces, broke this pact, sending the prisoners to Egypt instead.

The next target, Gaza, presented a different situation. On 24 February, the French easily brushed aside a small screen of Mameluke horsemen. No effort was made to defend the city, nor remove its significant supplies. The French captured 15,000 pounds of gunpowder and almost 100,000 rations.

Jaffa

The first major opposition encountered by Napoleon was at the port of Jaffa. An important town of 7,000, it was walled and possessed several gun towers. Orange and lemon groves grew close to the defenses, a fatal flaw which would be exploited by the French. Jaffa's garrison included 1,200 Janissary infantry, 2,500 Arnaut or Maghribi infantry, and 300 Mamelukes.

Abdullah Agha, the commander of Jaffa, ordered his gunners to bombard Kléber's advance guard on 3 March. Shortly after, Bonaparte arrived, ordering the divisions of Generals Louis Bon and Jean Lannes to invest the town. The lack of a moat, the orchard groves, plus broken ground close to the walls, encouraged him that his troops "...could approach the fortress within half a pistol shot's distance without being seen." He directed construction of trenches and batteries in the south, and designed a set of false works to distract enemy attention in the north. Between 3-6 March, French artillery fired into the city.

Learning from their errors at El Arish, heavy 12-pounders were employed from the start. On 5 March, sappers pushed to within 150 feet of the walls. At this point, Bonaparte wrote to Abdullah that if the defenders did not surrender, Bonaparte promised an attack which "will destroy you all." Abdullah refused, sending back his answer by killing the French envoys.

He launched two weak sorties on 6 March, which, due to the plethora of colorful uniforms, Bonaparte described as "...a charming spectacle." After these sorties were repulsed, the French artillery continued pounding a breach in the walls. By 4:00 p.m. Bonaparte unleashed General Lannes and the carabiniers (elite company) of the 22nd Light Demi-Brigade, who cleared the breach, captured a gun tower, and hoisted the Tricolor. They repelled Abdullah's disorganized counter-attacks while General Bon's men demonstrated against the northern walls, preventing the transfer of reinforcements.

The fighting continued on the next day when General Bon converted his diversion into a successful breakthrough. Infiltrating troops along the weak seashore defenses, he captured the northern walls and moved to support Lannes' attack. The French then rushed the harbor and captured several ships. Only thirty French soldiers died in this assault, while the Ottoman defenders lost over 1,000. Bonaparte explained that having refused to surrender, Abdullah's men paid the price for forcing their opponents to storm a breach. "The soldiers' fury," he noted, "was at its height; everybody was put to the sword."

Everybody, that is, except for Abdullah Agha and about 3,000 men still holding out in several fortified positions. French officers promised to spare their lives if they quickly surrendered. On 8 March, the Turks accepted this arrangement and marched into captivity. Bonaparte refused to honor the parole, and after ordering 800 Egyptians sent home, directed General Bon's division to execute the rest. Many historians consider this a major black mark against Napoleon's character, and the atrocity discouraged Ottoman forces from surrendering to the French again.

Almost as if such a crime demanded justice, retribution descended on the French in the form of bubonic plague. An earlier outbreak in Egypt encouraged those not yet affected to join the Syrian expedition and depart since medical science then had no cure. As mortality rates from the disease at Jaffa increased, Bonaparte forbade his medical staff to use the word "plague." He also tried to dispel fears among his soldiers through risking his own life by visiting victims in their quarantined hospital, an incident commemorated by Baron Antoine-Jean Gros' famous painting.

The plague drove the French away from Jaffa quickly. As they moved north, they encountered upwards of 5,000 Palestinians at the battle of Kakoon on 15 March. The cavalry, mainly Dalat mercenaries (Syrian light horse), fled after one volley from Kléber's division. Next, Lannes turned on the yarliyya (auxiliary) infantry, chasing them into the hills. About 200 yarliyya died in exchange for thirty French losses. Although a victory, Bonaparte called off any pursuit. His primary goal was Acre.

Napoleon in Syria, 1799

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