Napoleon in Egypt

Alliance and Assembly

by Melanie Sue Byrd, Matt DeLaMater, and Yves Martin
artwork by Steven Palatka, Keith Rocco, and Ray Rubin

The French Army of the Orient that departed for Egypt on 19 May, 1798 had been assembled with remarkable speed and secrecy.

This illustration by Martinet shows the difficulty in loading horses aboard the French transports. No more than 20% of the horses required by the Army of the Orient could be taken, and many of them did not survive the 43-day voyage (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library).

Carrying orders to seize Malta and Egypt, the French armada set off on a highly risky expedition that would lead ultimately to military failure, but also, ironically, to the dazzling political success of its young commander, General Napoleon Bonaparte.

Only a few months before, Napoleon had been assigned to command an invasion of England itself. An inspection of the invasion force in January 1798 led him to conclude that France would require control of the English Channel, even if for only a period of time, for it to have any chance of success, and the French navy was unequal to the task. Napoleon duly informed the five members of the Directory that ruled France that an invasion was not possible without substantial investment in the navy, something unfeasible for the financially troubled government.

The Directory therefore looked for a more viable method to strike at the Republic's last formal enemy. At one time, four major powers Spain, Prussia, Austria, Great Britain - plus several minor monarchies were joined in a coalition to suppress the French Revolution. Now, in 1798, only implacable England remained at war with France.

The Directory therefore looked for
a more viable method
to strike at the
Republic's last formal enemy [England]

Napoleon, long-fascinated by Alexander the Great, immediately proposed an alternative objective to invading England: seize Egypt. It was a plan he had given considerable thought to since his victories in Italy in 1796-97. The Directory accepted the proposal, probably at the urging of Foreign Minister Talleyrand. In early March, 1798 Bonaparte outlined his plans for the campaign, and in early April the government issued the orders to prepare for the expedition.

The idea of conquering Egypt, a reverie of French strategic thinkers since Louis XIV, offered some intriguing possibilities, particularly if it could be colonized and turned into a base to strike at British holdings in India. Also, due in large part to the embellishments of imaginative travel writers, Egypt had acquired much more allure than it deserved. Images of the Nile of antiquity led to the supposition that Egypt could be a very profitable colony, full of easy plunder and rich treasures.

Militarily, of course, invading Egypt was only marginally less risky than invading England proper. Historian Adolphe Thiers judged it more reckless than Napoleon's attempt to take Moscow in 1812. That such a high risk idea took hold and became a reality so rapidly speaks to the Directory's condition; it was starved for ideas, anxious to divert public attention away from its floundering domestic policies, and absolutely impotent to deal with the British nemesis. This situation made the insecure government susceptible to ambitious visionaries like Talleyrand and Bonaparte, who had united to promote the expedition to Egypt.

The Alliance of Talleyrand and Napoleon

The most zealous political proponent of the plan to colonize Egypt was the clever, scheming and ambitious 44-year-old French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, who took office in July 1797. Shortly thereafter, he met with Charles Magellon, the French consul general who had just returned from Egypt. Magellon indicated that France could take Egypt with relative ease.

The response of the European powers to the decline of the Ottoman Empire - referred to then as the "Eastern Question" - stimulated French interest in Egypt in the late 1700s, and probably influenced Talleyrand's views. As the Ottoman Empire began to lose control of its vast territories, European states vied with each other for control of parts of this land. Some French officials believed that if France did not take Egypt from the apparently moribund Ottoman Empire, a rival power -- like Austria, Russia or Britain -- might seize it.

By the end of 1797, France had defeated all of its continental enemies so the seizure of Egypt appeared attractive. Not only would Egypt give France control of trade in the Levant (Syria), but the French could also use Egypt as a center of operations against the British in India. French agents had contact, through a French naval base at Mauritius, with Tippoo Sahib, Sultan of Mysore. The Sultan had a long history of leading insurgents against British forces in India, and attempting to enlist French support for antiBritish intrigues. Furthermore, the mere presence of a French army in a province of the Ottoman Empire might encourage the British to finally negotiate with France.

After his victorious Italian campaign, Napoleon began to formulate plans for eastward expansion. The treaty of Campo Formio, which Bonaparte negotiated with Austria in October, 1797, gave France control of the Ionian Islands, which could potentially offer domination of the Adriatic. In order for France to maintain its growing power in the Mediterranean, seizure of Malta seemed necessary; as control of Malta would facilitate taking Egypt.

... both Talleyrand and
Napoleon cooperated to
push for the invasion of Egypt...

Moreover, as early as the spring of 1797, Bonaparte met with diplomat Raymond Verniac, who had just returned from Constantinople with exaggerated claims that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was imminent and Egypt would be an easy acquisition.

Bonaparte wrote to the Directory, stressing that, "The day is not far off when we shall appreciate the necessity, in order really to destroy England, to take Egypt. The vast Ottoman which is dying day by day, forces us to think, while there is still time, of the measures we must take to maintain our trade in the Levant."

To Talleyrand, with whom he also corresponded, Napoleon emphasized that Egypt "...had never belonged to another nation," implying perhaps that France should be the first to claim it. Moreover, while still in Italy, Napoleon began to make specific plans for the invasion of Egypt with General Louis-Antoine Desaix, his ablest division commander who would be a vital member of the expedition.

With remarkable speed and secrecy
Bonaparte assembled an invasion force...

Thus, both Talleyrand and Napoleon cooperated to push for the invasion of Egypt, beginning the strange and often Byzantine political partnership that would be at the center of European affairs for the next 17 years. (Somewhat ironically, this first effort turned out to be a disaster that none the less propelled their careers to new heights -- Napoleon, wrapping himself in the Oriental mystique, portrayed only his victories and captured the public imagination; Talleyrand, on the other hand, usually would deny that he ever had anything to do with the project in the first place!).

More Napoleon in Egypt

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