Battle of the Nile
1798

The British Navy Isolates
the French Expedition in Egypt

French Successes and British Frustration

by Jean Lochet and Virginia Medlen

More French Successes and British Frustration

After Bonaparte took Malta in a bloodless invasion, he left a garrison and the armada sailed on.

Captain Thomas Foley led the British fleet into Aboukir Bay using a map that enabled the British ships to sail inside the French line without running aground.

When the French ships departed from Malta on 19 June, one month after the operation began, no British ships had yet been sighted. Would Napoleon's luck hold for the eleven day voyage to Egypt?

Nelson arrived in Naples on 17 June where he learned of the invasion of Malta. He was now only two days behind the French. Arriving in Messina, Sicily on 21 June, he received the erroneous information that the French had left Malta on 16 June, three days earlier than they actually had. Nelson's letters and dispatches during the chase reveal a growing sense of desperation.

Nelson took counsel with his senior officers. All agreed that Egypt was the likeliest point of the French destination, and the fourteen British warships sailed immediately for Alexandria. Despite the lack of frigates, his ships overtook the French armada during the hours of darkness on 22/23 June. The French fleet was spread over several miles of ocean but avoided being spotted by the British because they were masked by fog for several hours.

Nelson arrived 24 hours ahead of the French. Finding no enemy ships in the Alexandria harbor, and having no intelligence of where the French might be, Nelson departed almost immediately, resuming the search. Had he remained for just one day at Alexandria, or had the night and fog not hidden the French ships five days earlier, the story of the French expedition might have ended before it arrived in Egypt.

Incredibly, Nelson would get another opportunity to catch the French at sea, this time as he sailed back to Sicily. Moving faster than the heavily-laden French transports, Nelson missed the armada by a few hours on 27 June. Two days later the French fleet reached Egypt and disembarked their troops without opposition on Marabut beach.

When Nelson arrived in Sicily on 19 July, Napoleon had already captured Alexandria and completed the conquest of Lower Egypt with his victory over the Mamelukes at Shubra Khit on 13 July.

Nelson arrived 24 hours
ahead of the French.

Information the British received confirmed that Egypt was the armada's destination and Nelson sailed with determination back to Egypt on 24 July. Before he arrived, Napoleon fought the Battle of the Pyramids and captured Cairo. The French conquest of Egypt seemed assured.

A French Blunder Preceeds the Battle

Much historical controversy surrounds the true causes of the French disaster in Aboukir Bay. Was Napoleon to blame, as some contend, or, was either Vice Admiral Brueys or his subordinate Rear Admiral Villeneuve the true culprit in this debacle? Or, perhaps, historians should look more to the daring, luck and determination of Nelson and the British fleet.

It appears that when Napoleon departed Alexandria on 7 July, he left Brueys discretionary orders in regard to the positioning of his fleet. Napoleon desired that the warships take refuge in Alexandria harbor if a safe channel could be found that could accomodate their deeper drafts. Failing in that option, Napoleon outlined two other possibilities, that Brueys could choose to defend Aboukir Bay if the admiral thought it practicable, or, if Aboukir could not be securely held, Brueys could take the fleet to Corfu.

Thus, a ponderous responsibility fell to Brueys. The French admiral did not want to risk moving his heavier ships of the line through the channel entrance to Alexandria harbor, despite assurances by an army engineer that there was sufficient depth to allow his largest vessels to go through safely. Although the unloaded French transports entered Alexandria harbor, Brueys decided to position his warships in Aboukir Bay near the mouth of the Nile. The key to Brueys' motives may be found in a letter from the admiral to Bonaparte dated 7 July (quoted in Jurien de la Graviere): "If we were to find a means to enter the fleet in Alexandria harbor, I would blockaded there by a single enemy ship of the line, and would remain a non active spectator of your glory."

... Nelson did not consider
the French position as hopeless...

Brueys was certainly aware of the poor defensive position afforded him in Aboukir Bay and mentioned it in his correspondence with Bonaparte: "I am going to have the fleet take a formidable position in case I'll be forced to fight while anchored in the bay... That anchorage is much too open for a fleet to resist the attack of a superior enemy." In the same letter (13 July, 1798) he also wrote: "Our sounders have found a channel in Alexandria harbor with no less than 27 feet 6 inches of water. If that is true, our ships of the line could enter that harbor with a favorable wind."

Brueys' decision seems all the more surprising considering that he knew that his fleet was in no shape to fight the British. On 9 July (when his warships were in Aboukir Bay), Brueys wrote to Minister of the Navy:

"Our crews are very weak in number and quality. Our ships of the line are, generally, in very poor shape, and I find that it takes a great deal of courage to command fleets in such poor shape."

Two days later the French fleet was still in Aboukir Bay when Nelson finally caught sight of the enemy he had been chasing for more than two months. Surprisingly, Nelson did not consider the French position as hopeless or grim as many later day commentators do. Nelson wrote: "If I had taken a fleet of the same force from Spithead I would sooner have thought of flying than attacking the French in their position; but I knew my captains."

More Battle of the Nile 1798

Back to Table of Contents -- Napoleon #13
Back to Napoleon List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1998 by Napoleon LLC.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
The full text and graphics from other military history magazines and gaming magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com
Order Napoleon magazine direct