This war lends itself admirably not only to separate tabletop battles but also to lengthier campaign. The marked armament and tactical divisions provide a number of specific battles and periods that can form the basis for the planning and off-table activities that are the integral background to a wargame campaign.
The story of the movements of the contending armies that led to their confrontation on the field at Poitiers forms a most interesting prologue to the battle itself and can readily be adapted to provide a map-wargames campaign.
The army of Gascony, under the command of the Black Prince, marched out of Bordeaux on 6 July, 1356. Making his first headquarters at Le Reole, the Prince detached approximately half his troops (nearly all of them Gascons) for the defense of his borders during the absence of his main army. In the first days of August the Black Prince set out at the head of an Anglo-Gascon army about 6,000 strong with the intention of carrying the war into the enemy's territory with the hope of meeting and defeating his armies in the field, together with the hopeful intention of meeting up with the King or with Lancaster somewhere on the line of the River Loire. Marching at a leisurely rate of ten miles a day, the army passed through Bergerac on 4 August and then Perigueux, Brantome, Rochechouart, Lussac, Argenton, Chateauroux, Issudun and Viezon. Here, on the 28th August, the army crossed from Aquitaine into France proper and began to systematically ravage the countryside.
Next day, 29th August, patrols from the French King John's advancing army were met for the first time. Retreating before the advancing English army, the small French force scampered into the castle of Romorantin, which was immediately besieged by the Black Prince, holding out for four days before being captured. Hearing from prisoners that the French King was approaching and that one of his sons was on Tours, west on the River Loire, the English army marched in that direction down the right bank of the River Cher to the Loire, striking the river near Amboise, 17 miles short of Tours. It has been said that the Prince believed that his father might be on the northern bank of the river and that their forces could join; but not only was there no sign of the English King but the river was in spate and uncrossable while those bridges that had not been destroyed were strongly defended. The English army turned on the fortified town of Tours but, lacking a siege train, were unable to do more than sit before the place for four days, resting after their march of some 320 miles in 32 days.
During this halt, the Black Prince had to decide upon his next course of action. With the French army within striking distance and enemy forces coming up on all sides, together with a shortage of forage and no sign of the armies of the King of England or of Lancaster, the Prince realized that there was no point in pushing further into France. He reasoned that it would be best to retrace his footsteps, marching slowly because of his long train of heavily laden booty wagons. So, on 11 September the army set out for Montbazan, 12 miles south of Tours.
There was another reason for the English marching in this direction. The Black Prince had received a message from his cousin, Henry of Lancaster, telling him that he had reached the River Loire at Les Ponts du Ce, due south of Angers, but that he was unable to cross the river. In the event of Lancaster beign able to cross he would have had to march wide of Saumeur (strongly held by the French) to Montreuil, some 12 miles south of Saumur, and continue on a route that would converge on the course being followed by the Black Prince's army so that the two would meet at or near Chatellerault. The English army resumed their march on the morning of 13 September and covered 30 miles to La Haye and then, on the 14th a further 17 miles were traversed to Chatellerault. Here the English army halted for two days, vainly waiting for the arrival of lancaster's force.
During the halt at Chatellerault, the Black Prince lost touch with the French army whose presence he had been aware of for at least the past week. On the evening of 16 September his scouts reported that King John and his army had, at La Haye, branched off from the route of the English army and had marched 33 miles directly south to Chauvigny. This action convinced the Black Prince that the French King was seeking the safety of the town of Poitiers where he would join with the strong French garrison and await the arrival of the remainder of his forces hurrying southward to meet him. Now the Black Prince conceived the audacious scheme of sending a strong force down to Chabotrie, on the direct road from Chauvigny to Poitiers, to ambush and perhaps capture the French King himself.
Disengaging his baggage train, he got it across the River Clain during the night and at dawn on 17 September the mounted portions of his army set off on their 30 mile ride to reach the Chauvigny road by early afternoon. The force marched down the Roman road toward Poitiers for about 12 miles and then turned off the road and pushed across country leaving the baggage far in the rear. Unfortunately the bold scheme did not come off - it was the French rearguard that were passing on the Chauvigny-Poitiers road just as the English vanguard arrived. They were immediately charged and in the short sharp action that followed many prisoners were taken, including two Counts, but the King escaped and arrived safely in Poitiers. Short of food and water and with their baggage far in the rear, the Prince decided t spend the night in the forest near the little village of Chabotrie.
It has been claimed that King John, in marching to Chauvigny, was attempting to turn the English flank in the area of Chabotrie and cut off their retreat to Bordeaux, but this is hardly feasible because it meant that the French had to out-march the English, having to cover 45 miles to the English's 30 miles whereas it has been seen that, even with two days halt at Chatellerault, the English only must failed to win the race to Chabotrie. It is far more likely that King John had to reach Poitiers before accepting battle with the English because that city had been declared his concentration point. Units of the French army were crossing the River Loire on a 120-mile front - at Orleans, Meung, Tours, and Saumur. To join their King these widely dispersed detachments had to avoid the English army, which they could only do by marching direct to Poitiers rather than attempting to join the King at or on his march to Chauvigny.
All these maneuvers are complicated but they can be followed by consutation with maps and the march-table for both armies.
On 18 September, the day following their arrival at Chabotrie, the English rested whilst the Black Prince courteously received the two cardinals who commuted backwards and forwards between the two armies with the avowed intention of preventing conflict. The cynic might believe that their true purpose was to gain time badly needed by King John for his scattered units to march in to reinforce his army. But the time factor was not entirely in the French King's favor as the Black Prince used it to select the defensive position from which he fought off first the mounted attack and then the Dauphin's column before descending the slopes to defeat the column of King John himself.
100 Years War Campaign
Related
100 Years War Campaign by Don Featherstone
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Battlefields of the Hundred Years War Visiting Yesterday
Reconstructing Agincourt A Wargame
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© Copyright 2004 Hal Thinglum
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