A reproduction of Adolf Northen's 1863 painting, The Prussian First Line at Plancenoit, graces the opening pages of Key to Waterloo: Prussian Assault on Plancenoit, an excellent article by Mr. Peter Hofschroer in the June 2002 issue of Military History. It appears that the particular advance depicted on the canvas is taking place late in the day, or perhaps the sky is darkened from the smoke of the burning buildings. There is the palpable sense of motion in the painting, as the soldiers of the Prussian First Line are leaning forward; the tightly packed column forcing its way into what looks like a courtyard or perhaps a kind of plaza. A line officer - blonde and without his hat - has his sword raised and is urging his men forward. To his right, there marches another line officer - this one with hat securely strapped to his head and his sword to his side - and possessed of an even more determined look. On the ground to the front and flanks of this column, the detritus of battle is readily visible: bearskin hats, drums, injured and dead Frenchmen, a broken and abandoned artillery piece. To the front and flanks of the column as well, Frenchmen take aim from the windows of a house, while another group "hides" behind what remains of the outer wall of another house. The defending French are outnumbered, but from what faces can be seen in the haze of the combat, have a look of "resigned determination" about them. In contrast, the faces of the soldiers in the Prussian column betray a wider range of emotion. The character of the two line officers has been estimated. It is more difficult to determine the look on the anonymous ranks making up the rest of the column head: it appears that they are "concerned" with keeping their feet (the column is being "squeezed" by the number of men trying to make their way through this kind of terrain). It may even be suggested that some have hunched their shoulders as if to ward off the expected blows coming from above - for there are two Frenchmen depicted in second story windows. One of these has discharged his musket into the column and another, with his head wrapped in a bandage, is holding his musket at the ready, waiting for a "good" target. There are a number of Frenchmen on the first floor, and their muskets are being discharged, literally point-blank, into the left-front of the column. The ranks press forward, however. Or perhaps it is just that there is no other direction open to these men? The emotion of fear is more easily read on the faces of the infantrymen on the other side of the column, for these troops have discovered the aforementioned "hiding" group of Frenchmen. In brief summary, and stipulating to the fact that I hold no training or certification in art appreciation, history or critique, it is a pretty powerful painting. It is of course, the perfect graphic to accompany Mr. Hofschroer's scholarly narrative. BACKGROUND Some three years ago, I started putting together a draft of an article that would eventually be titled, "Quatre Bras Considered: The Research and Development of a SHAKO Solo Wargame." I opened with a brief paragraph remarking what anniversary it would be of The Battle at Quartre Bras. I commented further, that the anniversary of The Battle of Waterloo - just two days later - would be the one more remembered. Next month will mark the 188th anniversary of Waterloo. (I type this draft in mid-May of 2003.) And while I hold out hope to someday recreate the full battle as a miniature wargame, the resources required are presently beyond my means. Fortunately however, it is presently within my means to reconstruct and wargame a small but important part of that historically significant battle. It is tempting to attribute my interest in re-fighting the Prussian assault on Plancenoit to the aforementioned, fast-approaching anniversary. If it were not for the fact that June 18 this year falls on a Wednesday, how appropriate would it be to be able to wargame this battle within the larger battle - starting at four in the afternoon and calling a halt to the proceedings at quarter-past eight? I think it more realistic and reasonable to consider other factors, however. First, as mentioned in the review of Little Wars 2003, 1 had been thinking about revisiting the Napoleonic Period. Part of this thought process involved exploring the variety of rules available. (Figuring that it would be too much additional work to learn a new set of rules or draft my own, I decided to stay with SHAKO, by the prolific Arty Conliffe.) Second, and at about the same time, there was the re-discovery of a June 2002 issue of Military History magazine on the shelf. Third, there was my participation in a reconstruction of this "sub-engagement" at Little Wars 2003. This wargame experience only served to whet my appetite for additional research and reading. The research and reading evolved (rather quickly) into the decision to try and model the Prussian attack against the French right / right-rear at Waterloo. SOURCES & RESEARCH The period of time spent researching was not extensive. Readers of my submissions will recall that I have previously described my wargaming library as "limited." Indeed, aside from the Military History article, I could uncover just a few other sources. First, there was the article by one Michael Rayner from a July 1990 issue of Miniature Wargames. In Waterloo (Part 2): The Hundred Days Campaign, Part 8, he set out an order of battle, decription and maps for Plancenoit. WATERLOO 1815: THE BIRTH OF MODERN EUROPE, Number 15 from the Opsrey Military Campaign Series was the second source consulted. This was not a specific article but larger work containing references to the fighting in and around Plancenoit. Still, it was valued for colored graphics, having more detailed orders of battle and an end section on ideas for wargaming the Battle of Waterloo. In that same category of reference work - for there was no specific explication or analysis of Plancenoit found within - I turned to my very well-worn copy of The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo & The Somme, by the inestimable John Keegan. Waterloo: New Perspectives - The Great Battle Reappraised, by David Hamilton-Williams, was a last minute addition to the short list.  In contrast, the period of time spent sifting and sorting through the narratives and facts uncovered in these varied and admittedly secondary sources, was extensive. In Key to Waterloo: Prussian Assault on Plancenoit, Mr. Peter Hofschroer argues that the Prussian contribution to the defeat of Napoleon has been very much under appreciated, if not overlooked or outright ignored. He points out, for example, that the "Prussians nevertheless attracted Napoleon's attention much earlier than British historians tend to admit. In fact, Napoleon observed the Prussian movement on his right flank before he launched his first assault on Wellington's positions." Mr. Hofschroer also explains that, Although Plancenoit was just a small town, the battle's outcome hinged on it's possession. If the Prussians were to take it, the French line of retreat would be cut. Napoleon knew he had to hold it at all costs ... Each Prussian attack on Plancenoit drew off some of Napoleon's precious infantry reserves and seriously diminished his chances of winning the battle. He then compares the forces involved, noting that the French were putting veterans in the field, commanded by experienced officers. These regiments were well equipped; well supplied, too. The Prussians? They would deploy battalions of farm boys, poorly equipped and even more poorly trained. The effects of weather, miles marched and engagements waged on the 16th and or 17th are also factored in to the equation. "On paper" Mr. Hofschroer states, "the Prussians had no chance. However, despite several setbacks, they eventually managed to impose their will on the elite of Napoleon's forces." (27) In the May 2003 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, there is a very interesting write up of a statistical study entitled: "On the Production of Victory: Empirical Determinants of Battlefield Success in Modern War." The review is called `The Wellington Effect,' and quoting from the synopsis: "Two German political scientists, Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schmidt, looked at 625 battles from 1600 to 1973 to determine how much influence each of several key factors has on the outcome of military engagements." Using statistical modeling and rating a number of battlefield variables - surprise, intelligence, morale and logistics - the authors of this study conclude that having the upper hand with respect to technology is not always the determining factor in victory on the battlefield. To quote again from the review: So what is the most important factor in determining victory in battle? Leadership: its marginal effect is nearly 50 percent. Which means that the Duke of Wellington was being modest. Had he not commanded the British forces that day, Napoleon, the authors calculate, would have had a 79 percent chance of winning at Waterloo. (46, 49) Based on this interesting study then, one might question Hofschroer's argument. Let us suppose that the Prussians never made an appearance on the field of battle that June afternoon. To be certain, this is purely conjecture, but what if. While one is equally tempted to quote that famous phrase regarding the validity of statistics, ("There are lies, damn lies, and statistics.") it appears that Wellington's presence on the field was a very important factor if not the key to the AngleAllied triumph. One might also be tempted to question portions of Hofschroer's narrative upon re-reading sections of Keegan's treatment. For example, in The Campaign sub-section of "Chapter 3, Waterloo, June 18, 1815," one finds: "Napoleon chose to attack about eleven o'clock against the Chateau of Hougomont, which was garrisoned by the Foot Guards." (126) The attack on the Chateau would constitute the first of five accepted phases into which the Battle of Waterloo is "conventionally divided." It is interesting to note that of the five phases, there is not one phase dedicated to the contest for Plancenoit. Mr. Hofschroer suggests that Napoleon had to move some of his reserve to the area of Plancenoit around 1 p.m. to counter Prussian movements. And yet, later in that same article, Mr. Hofschroer cites the Prussian commander's after battle report: "It was half past four in the afternoon, when the head of our column advanced out of the Fichermont wood." (28) It appears that Keegan (unlike other British historians) had access to similar history, for he assigns Napoleon's being aware of the approaching Prussians to coincide with the third phase of the engagment; that phase beginning around four in the afternoon. (127) David Hamilton-Williams weighs in on this issue as well, citing the eyewitness account of General Muffling: On the receipt of my reports, it was resolved not to await the arrival of the whole of Bulow's corps on the plateau, but to advance out of the wood as soon as the two twelvepounder batteries arrived. At four o'clock the Field Marshal [Blucher] began his advance against Planchenois [sic] ... (327) Hamilton-Williams then continues, relating that "At some time between 4 and 4:30 p.m. Nostitz brought Bulow the order to attack." (327) It was only at this juncture, apparently, that anything was done to secure the right and right-rear of the French position: ". . . Gniesenau had indicated to Blucher that the key to the field was the village of Plancenoit which was as yet unoccupied by the French." (327) Further, it was Lobau and not Napoleon, who realized the enormity of the situation and reacted to it with alacrity. "Lobau perceived the Prussians' intention and quickly moved one of his reserve brigades into Plancenoit. These men had to run to beat the Prussians to it." (328) It is, admittedly, more difficult to take issue with or attempt to counter Mr. Hofschroer's points about the "differences in force composition." Keegan does consider the physical circumstances of the campaign and of the battle over the course more than several pages of text. (134-143) So it would appear that both sides had done quite a bit of marching, and both had been present if not participated in the battle of Ligny on the 16th. One of the French divisions, the 21st of the VI Corps (as far as I have been able to discover) was heavily engaged at Ligny and then again, at Wavre. The reference to "French veterans in their prepared position" (27) paints a picture - at least to me - of sturdy line infantry occupying field works of some sort. But when the deployment of the French is described, this is hardly the impression created:  Lobau attempted to halt the wave of Prussian blue rushing toward him. One of his four brigades occupied Plancenoit. The other three, along with most of his 38 guns and the two cavalry divisions, each with two batteries, were deployed in the open ground to the north of the village. (29) Perception and perspective come into consideration as well, with respect to the imposition of "their will on the elite of Napoleon's forces." (27) While it is historical record that the Prussians eventually bested the battalions of the Young Guard in the contest for Plancenoit, can the Young Guard be rightly addressed as the "elite" of Napoleon's forces? The same question cannot be raised about the Old (Imperial) Guard. Or can it? But then, what impact could two battalions of Old Guard have against over 10 times their number? And in house-to-house combat as well? To further cloud the narrative, the Rayner accounting has the Old Guard taking the village without a shot fired and then, withdrawing to leave the reoccupation of Plancenoit to the Young Guard. (Miniature Wargames, 27) As is always the case, the historian (both amateur and professional) is left to his own devices in the attempt to make sense of the sources available. He can decide to agree or disagree with the interpretations of scholars before him; to try to understand what really happened. In this specific case, at least this much of the record is clear: there was a terrific battle around the little village of Waterloo on June 18, 1815. In a day long contest, the French under Napoleon were defeated, and casualties were significant on both sides. On one part of that field, a large number of Prussians were engaged with a lesser number of French. The object of this "battle within a battle?" The town or village of Plancenoit. The historical record reflects that the village fell three times to the Prussians before French resistance finally collapsed. And, interestingly enough, this separate battle was still being waged when the main French army was in retreat from the field. (Keegan, 127) DISCOVERY The article by Mr. Hofschroer provides a wealth of narrative detail. In some respects, it is almost too much. There is reference made to this regiment or that regiment; this squadron or regiment of horse; that battery of guns; even to a group of volunteers, commanded by one Lt. Schonfeld - who was wounded four times and "only after a further bullet hit him in the knee did he reluctantly leave the field of battle ..." (30) However, there is not a wealth of detail with respect to the order of battle and the numbers of men engaged. To be certain, he does cite that the "forces involved were 22,300 French defending against 37,100 Prussians attacking." (32) This total figure does not do much for the wargamer interested in reconstructing the battle on tabletop, however. The wargame scenario provided by Mr. Rayner in Miniature Wargames (No. 86, July 1990) offers a more recognizable and workable order of battle. However, there appears to be some variance with respect to the composition of I ,obau's corps, as well as to the presence of horse artillery with his supporting cavalry. There is a listing for all three armies within the Osprey Campaign text. However, this order of battle is organized by title only. That is to remark that unit designations are given: the components of the Fench IV Corps are detailed with respect to overall commander, divisional commands, brigade and regiments as well as the total number of batteries in the reserve artillery of the Corps. What is lacking from this record is: the number of battalions within the regiments and or brigades; the number of men in those battalions; the number and type of cannon making up that reserve artillery. As I did during the course of my research on the battle at Quatre Bras, I turned to the data base within Fields of Glory. (A computer simulation game reviewed in Issue 78 of MWAN.) As mentioned in the Quatre Bras article, this data base is a treasure chest of detail: there is a visual representation of the uniform worn by the men of the unit; the names of commanders are given - even down to the level of battery command; the field strength of the units are given as well, and there is a regimental honor history provided. For the upper-echelon command, there is a brief biography of service and accomplishments, or wounding and death on the field of battle. Another nice touch is the rating of the commanders. They are graded in the areas of Ability, Personality and Leadership. [Sidebar: I did previously remark on the lack of details with respect to an order of battle in the article by Mr. Hofschroer. It was quite a surprise then, to find his name listed in the Credits of the Fields of Glory manual.] The following order of battle is presented in a similar format to that used for the Quatre Bras submission. Explanatory notes following most if not each division or command. Additionally, a section of general notes follows each complete order of battle. Unlike the previous efforts with respect to SHAKO and orders of battle however, I have not at this time completed the preparation of the identification tags/markers for all of the units. Therefore, I am assigning the MR (morale ratings) as I work my way through the troop lists. Project: Plancenoit The Research and Development of Another SHAKO Solo Wargame Introduction, Sources, and Discovery Order of Battle: French Order of Battle: Prussians Terrain, Rules Modifications, and Scenario Parameters Wargaming the Prussian Advance of June 18, 1815 [MW126] Back to MWAN # 125 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com