Dispositions A very rough approximation of the frontages for each sector of the opposing lines yields a wargame table measuring eight (8) feet by five (5) feet. For the Romans: Nero occupies some 16 inches of table; the praetor might take up 30 inches in the center; and Salinator, with the largest force on the field, could deploy on a front of up to 42 inches. In contrast, the Gauls facing Nero sit on about 18 inches of table. The Ligurians occupy nearly two (2) feet of the center. To their right, the rest of the polyglot army under Hasdrubal could take up nearly three (3) feet of the field. However, it is noted that the Carthaginian commander drew up his veterans in especially tight or deep formation, so one might reduce this frontage by as much as 12 inches. [23] With all respect to the ARMATI rules, as this is a reconstruction of an actual battle, the parameters of deployment are going to be set aside. [23] "According to Polybius, Hasdrubal drew up his Spaniards and Celts in depth on a narrow front." (Lazenby, 189) Historical Commentary The day before the actual battle, Hasdrubal made the unfortunate discovery that he was faced by two consuls instead of just the one. Though the Romans did offer battle that day, Hasdrubal kept to his camp. With nightfall, he broke camp and made an effort to escape the larger Roman forces. The attempt was foiled however, when his guides deserted him and left his army struggling along the wrong side of the river. The night manuever did not go unnoticed. While the opening passage from Punica is quite descriptive, there is little accuracy to the lines. I believe the Romans pursued the fleeing Carthaginians during the night. It makes sense then that the Roman cavalry, then light infantry and then battle infantry would come upon the floundering Spanish, Ligurians and Gauls in that order. It also makes sense that both armies would be pretty tired (hence the fatigue rules tweaking) and perhaps even hungry. Nero assumed the right of the Roman line, facing off against the Gauls. In the center of the field, the praetor Licinus was deployed against the Ligurians. On the Roman left, Salinator was in command, and here, he faced Hasdrubal. Battle was soon joined between these two commanders. The respective centers were soon embroiled in melee as well. Both Livy and Polybius attest to the desperate nature of the contest between the wings of Hasdrubal and the Roman consul. The elephants - as could often be the case on the ancient battlefield - were as much a liability to their own lines as to that of the enemy. On the far right of the Roman line however, Nero was not able to engage the Gauls. Leaving a small detachment to protect that flank, he marched the rest of his men behind the Roman battle line and fell upon the left flank and rear of the Carthaginian position. This surprise proved too much for the heavily engaged Spanish and African troops, and they were quickly routed. Nero's force and the rest of the Roman left then proceeded to roll up the enemy line, ending up in possession of the Carthaginian camp and rescuing a large number of Roman captives. What Gauls did survive the onslaught, retreated in a body away from the field. Perhaps shortly after Nero's flanking attack or when the line had collapsed, Hasdrubal, seeing that all was indeed lost, rode into the thick of fighting and was cut down.24 I must admit, that at several points during the research and writing of this article, I thought that reconstructing the Battle of Metaurus would result in a very poor wargame. The odds seem so heavily stacked against the Carthaginian cause. Let us review the points: Hasdrubal does not have the advantage of position; he is outnumbered in both infantry and cavalry; and in terms of quality, well here too, there is no comparison. The larger question to ask then... "Why Metaurus?" The simple answer is found in re-reading the introduction: I was simply in need of a topic for my next contribution to this newsletter - and the deadline was "looming" on the horizion. The more involved answer entails describing my passion for history, and especially for military history. There would also be a paragraph or three describing how much I enjoy this particular aspect of the hobby ... the researching of sources and reading accounts of battles; the attempt to re-create these on table top or floor in miniature; of being more concerned with rules and development of same than with the right color to paint the coat button on the grenadier infantry or the look of flock for a stand of light cavalry ... However, I will not presume to bore the reader with such description. In his wonderful book, Battle Notes for Wargamers, Donald Featherstone lays out some basic guidelines when the objective is re-fighting any historical engagement. 24 The majority of this narrative adapted from the Internet posting of The Battle of the Metaurus River, where Book 27: 48 - 49 of Livy's History is presented in the original Latin and in the English translation. Numerous other sources (academics), have cited his work as well for their narrative reconstruction of the battle. My personal favorite is the one guideline which reads: "... to follow the the original course of events reasonably well, but allow some leeway, without too much imaginative stretch, for a reversed result." (11) This seems more reasonable or attractive to that poor wargamer who takes the role of Hasdrubal or for the team of players who get "stuck" with the outnumbered Carthaginians. When I first wrote the independent paper, I thought I had come across an original idea during my breakdown of the battle into its respective phases.25 Reviewing the number of men Hasdrubal had on the right of his line, and recalling that he had deployed them on a narrow front and in some depth, it seemed to me that at the outset, he and his army would have been outflanked by the Romans. Livius Salinator had nearly twice the number of men and essentially, a complete majority in the mounted arm. And yet, Livy writes of "a furious conflict" taking place, and of there being a "dreadful slaughter on both sides.i26 Now, some years later, having a a little more knowledge about the battle, I cannot escape the same line of questioning: Why then, the hard-fought contest on this side of the field? Nor can I avoid the same conclusion: The Carthaginians were, in fact, outflanked at the start of the enagement. The Roman commander just did not take advantage of the position." The line of questioning continues with respect to recreating the battle on the wargame table. For example: Instead of setting up the table with Nero's legion-plus and the Gauls present, why not just have Nero appear on a diced for game turn? There would be no question as to if he would arrive on the Carthaginian right-rear, only a question of when. Better still, why not make it "interesting" by providing for the chance that Nero gets lost or delayed or even comes in on his own flank by mistake? What if, after Nero circles around, the Gauls suddenly spring to life and cross the previous impassable terrain and overwhelm the Roman left and threaten the center? What if the Ligurians prove more than a match for the "invalidus" legions of the praetor and are able to catch Nero in the middle of his march, or they wheel and attack Salinator in the flank? What happens if one or two of the Roman commanders is felled during the refight? And so on. Yes ... And so on. 25 Keegan's most excellent work had come out a couple of years before I wrote the paper, and I borrowed his methodology from the Waterloo chapters of The Face of Rattle. However, I did not go so far as to analyze the particular types of combat: Elephant v.s. Legion, Cavalry v.s. Warband and so forth. During the aforementioned closet-cleaning, I was re-reading chapters of The Western Way of War: Infantry Rattle in Classical Greece, by Victor Davis Hanson. While the battles he wrote so intelligently about took place some 200 years before Metaurus, one could still take away an idea of what the field of combat must have been like during The Second Punic War. 26 The Battle of the Metaurus River, Livy (Internet). 27 I know I stated that I would limit myself to details of the battle proper and avoid politics or the character of the commanders. However, the following quote from Livy is very interesting and may help to explain why the Romans were so roughly handled on the part of the field where they held a real advantage: There is an utterance recorded of M. Livius which shows his bitter feelings towards his fellow citizens. When on his departure Q. Fabius warned him against giving battle before he knew the sort of enemy he had to meet, Livius is said to have replied that he would fight as soon as he caught sight of the enemy. When asked why he was in such a hurry he said: `Either I shall win special distinction from conquering such an enemy or a well-earned if not very honourable pleasure from the defeat of my fellow-citizens.' (121) Then again, this attitude flies in the face of the council of war held the night Nero arrived in the camp of Salinator. And, even if the estimated frontage under the ARMATI rules is halved for the wing commanded by Salinator, this still gives the Romans a 21 to 12 inch advantage over Hasdrubal. Modeling Metaurus Reconstructing Hasdrubal's Defeat in the Second Punic War Historical Background Orders of Battle Historical Commentary and Dispositions Detailed Orders of Battle Back to MWAN # 121 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com