Modeling Metaurus

Orders of Battle

by Chris J. Hahn

Authorities and scholars are in agreement on two points with respect to the forces involved in this contest. First, the Romans outnumbered the Carthaginians. Second, Nero's complement numbered 7,000 men (6,000 infantry and 1,000 horse). There is no guesswork required here then. It is only when one proceeds to consider the force totals for the army of the praetor Licinus and of the consul Livius, that one must pick and choose.

For this reconstruction, as I had elected to do when first taking on the project of refighting Cannae, I used ARMATI and ADVANCED ARMATI by Arty Conliffe. And as with Cannae, I opted to use the Epic unit sizes and 15mm "troops."

For the cavalry portion of Nero's force, two units of Roman/Italian HC suffice. This gives 500 men to each unit. On page 112 of WARFARE in the CLASSICAL WORLD, an explanatory chart is provided for The Post-Camillan Roman Army. In the accompanying text, one finds: "The cavalry in a legion consisted of ten turmae; each turma contained 32 horsemen organized into three groups of ten, each led by a decurio with a second-in-command called an optio." The basic cavalry complement for a legion then, was approximately 320 horsemen. One might imagine, given the nature of Nero's march and overall strategy, that an increased cavalry complement made perfect sense.

Using the same chart, the composition of the 6,000 foot soldiers may be detailed. There will be two units each of Hastati and Principes, and just one unit of Triarii. The front rank units then, will number 800 men each, for a total of 3,200. The reserve rank or Triarii, at 600 men, bring the total up to 3,800. How to fill in the remaining 2,200?

Considering the nature of Nero's maneuver and speed at which it was conducted, I am tempted to "pad" the number with light troops and auxiliaries. [6]

However, in the narrative of the engagement, it is plainly stated that Nero could not come to grips with the Gauls he and his men were pitted against. The problem? Difficult terrain. A hill, ridge or some kind of ravine prevented Nero's legion from coming to grips with the barbarians. [7]

If Nero's force did contain a large number of light troops, it would seem to follow that he would be able to engage the Gauls. Even if Nero took an extra cohort or three of legionnaires with him against Hasdrubal, it would seem to follow too, that due to the tactical flexibility of the legion and of the cohorts comprising same, he should have been able to negotiate the terrain. [8]

And yet, the narrative is clear: Nero "demonstrated" and then marched left around the Roman rear and attacked the right of the Carthaginian position. (Lazenby 189; with reference to Polybius 11.1.10)

Perhaps I spoke too soon about there being no guesswork with respect to the composition of Nero's army?

After some deliberation, I decided to add a second unit of Triarii to the force. This left me with 1,600 men, which divides nicely into four units of "lights" at 400 men each. Breaking these down: two will be classed as Velites (the javelin-armed skirmish infantry of the legion) and the other two will be a unit of archers and a unit of slingers.

In quick summary, Nero's force at Metaurus consists of six (6) HI (two units each of Hastati, Principes and Triarii), two (2) HC and four (4) SI units.

Reviewing the sources, it seems that most are in general agreement when it comes to determining the numbers available to the Roman praetor, Licinus. Dupuy and Dupy and Caven suggest a number between 10 and 15,000 men on the field. It is in Lazenby's work however, that one finds a little more description. On page 190 of his well-researched text, Lazenby notes, ". . . Licinus also had two legions (cf. Livy 27.36.12), his army is specifically described as 'weak' ('invalidus' - Livy 27.39.20), and may not have contained more than about 12 - 15,000 men." Personally, I can "live" with the numerical discrepancy. In fact, under the ARMATI scales, it is somewhat difficult to represent two Roman legions and equal this suggested strength. [9]

What I find more interesting is how to interpret and how to best represent the characterization of "invalidus." Should the legion infantry be given low morale ratings? Should they be classed as moderate in morale but brittle with respect to fighting ability? Or does the Latin term indicate a weakness in terms of numbers? Perhaps then, the praetor had three under-strength legions in his command? Perhaps he had the two legions and a large number of auxiliaries to "round out" his force?

It has been mentioned that Caven reported a total of 10 to 15,000 men for the praetor. Caven also reports that the consul, Livius Salinator, received a large number of reinforcements prior to the engagement. There were 9,800 auxiliaries (to include 1,800 cavalry, part of these Numidian) and an additional 2,000 legionnaires from Scipio in Spain. [10]

A rough approximation of these numbers in ARMATI units yields the following: three (3) units of horse at 600 men each (1 classed as LC; perhaps 1 as MC and the other as Roman "knights" or HC); three (3) units of Principes at 600-plus men each to represent the legionnaires; and for the 7,000 auxiliary infantry, one could deploy up to 14 units of skirmish infantry at 500 men each or even nine (9) units of Italian or Allied "cohorts" at 800 men each. A combination of "lights" and Allied infantry could also be calculated.

On the subject of calculation, taking the Caven numbers at face value and adding these to the force totals for the praetor and for Nero, one arrives at 18,000 legionnaires (roughly); 7,000 auxiliaries and approximately 3,000 horse. [11]

But let us return to the consideration of the praetor's "army."

For the purposes of this historical reconstruction, Licinus will have at his disposal the following units: 10 units of HI (4 of Hastati, 4 of Principes and 2 of Triarii - unlike Nero's force, these cohorts will number 700 men for front rankers and 500 men for the veterans, respectively); six (6) units of Velites or other skirmish infantry (bow or sling-armed); two (2) smallish units of HC; and let's say ... two (2) units of auxiliaries (LI or LHI ?) at 800 men each.

Turning then, to the army of the Consul, Livius Salinator, it appears that there is no general agreement among the sources reviewed. Lazenby states, ". . . Salinator's army would have been a full consular army of two legions and allied contingents, totaling, perhaps 20 - 25,000 men..." (190) Dupuy and Dupuy reinforce this assessment in their work. [12]

The sidebar in WARFARE in the CLASSICAL WORLD states however, "In this period, the Roman Army consisted of four legions supplemented by allied Italian cohorts equivalent to another four legions. (...) They usually furnished fewer velites but more cavalry (up to 30 turmae)." (112) If one takes a low estimate at the field strength of an active legion to be 4,000 troops (all types), then the consular army of Livius would number some 32,000 men. [13]

This last figure is very close to that total arrived at in my independent paper. In the sub-section on dispostions for the battle, I "gave" the consul Livius 33,000 infantry and 3,000 horse. Recalling the Caven evidence (without exact reference however; the apparent ineptitude of an undergraduate): Livius received reinforcements: 9,800 auxilaries (including 1,800 cavalry, part of them Numidian) and 2,000 legionnaires (...) (209) If the figure of four (4) legions is accepted, based on previous scaling with ARMATI, I find the Roman element would total roughly 9,000 infantry and 600 cavalry. The allied Italian counterpart would double that, and perhaps add another 600 horsemen to the mix. But then, this equals just 18,000 infantry and some 1,800 cavalry.

Adding the cohorts from Scipio, the total climbs to 20,000. Factoring in the 7,000 auxiliaries, the consular army then has a strength of 27,000. Of this number, only 9,600 or just over a third, are Roman legionnaires. With the cavalry reinforcement, the number of this particular arm on the field seems correct. [14]

It appears however, that between the original research effort and my renewed interest in this engagement, I have "lost" 6,000 men. [15]

The representation of this, the main Roman strength on the field of Metaurus, involves a combination of guess work and some "manipulation" of unit composition. That admitted, the following is a very rough approximation of the consular army of Livius Salinator.

I adopted the organization of Nero's legion as the basis for the two Roman under Salinator. Each legion then, will have two (2) units of Hastati (800 men each); two (2) units of Princeps (800 men each); one (1) unit of Triarii (600 men each); two (2) units of Velites (400 men each); and, a smallish unit of cavlary (HC - approximately 300 men). The allied Italian legions will be similar, but have only half the number of Velites and double the number of cavalry.

The legionnaires from Scipio's command (Spain), may be represented by one (1) unit / cohort each of Hastati, Princeps and Triarii (800, 800 and 400 men, respectively).

The 1,800 additional cavalry may be represented by three (3) units (600 men each). Having only the reference to some of these being Numidian, one unit will be classed as LC and the other two may be classed as "nobles," and thus, fall into the category of HC.

Breaking down the 7,000 auxiliary infantry proves slightly problematic as in the table of organization provided in the ARMATI texts, there is no middle ground between the infantry of the cohorts and the skirmishers who fronted the main battle line. I should like to have been able to make some of these (perhaps half?) a kind of medium infantry, but could find no real evidence on which to rest that assignation. Let me break these thousands down then, into: two (2) units of Cretan bowmen (500 men each) and 10 units of light infantry (variously armed, at 600 men each).

Although the following might be more properly placed in the sub-section covering Dispostions, I think it important to present it here, just before the detailed orders of battle for each side.

Given the disposition of the Romans on the field and the number of commanders / forces present, I do not think the ARMATI rules for initiative, deployment and command, divisional organization or control rating can apply. To be certain, the basic concepts can be utilized, but I would think that Nero's force would have its own initiative rating, its own organization, control rating and BP total before it turned into a rabble of fleeing survivors. Nero's force, as with each Roman force, is considered as its own separate entity. Each force will have its own control rating, division composition, break point total and initiative rating. This applies to the Carthaginian lines as well.

Footnotes

[1] Punica, translated by J. D. Duff, Harvard University Press, 1949.
[2] The following is the actual text from page 2 of my independent study paper:

    An examination of the Battle of Metaurus, including the events leading up to the actual conflict, enables us to gain a better understanding of the battle's importance. Moreover, the examination gives us an idea about the character of the opposing commanders, informs us of the relationship between military action and political policy (especially in the case of Rome), demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of the military systems of Rome and Carthage, and most important, reveals the nature of military conflict in the ancient period. These then, comprise the general parameters of this essay. (Whew!)

[3] Brian Caven, in The Punic Wars, cites Ovid for the date of the battle. It was 23 June, the day after the anniversary of the Roman disaster at Lake Trasimene. Lazenby, however, cites the same ancient authority and suggests that the battle was possibly fought on 22 June, "by the Roman calendar." (189)
[4] For example, Livy reports the number of Carthaginian dead on the field at 56,000. See Lazenby, 190. This figure is obviously an exaggeration, given that the number in Hasdrubal's force is estimated at just 30,000. And even this figure may be on the high side. See Caven, 209-211.
[5] Again, I would make reference to the Carthaginian casualty figure that he cites. More importantly, looking at the life span of this Roman historian as well as at those of Polybius and Ovid, it becomes immediately apparent that none were present on the field that day. Polybius may well have had actual "interviews" with veterans of the battle, but this is based on conjecture: he was a prisoner in Rome following the conquest of Macedonia in 168 B.C. Any surviving veteran of the legions on the field that day, would have been well into his 60's. (A relative rarity in Ancient times, to be sure.)
[6] Nero and his men conducted a series of forced-marches, covering some 200 miles in approximately 7 days. On average then, we are looking at a daily total of just under 30 miles. Even with the utilization of the Roman road system, the speed and distance of this march must have left the most veteran of Nero's cohorts attrited.
[7] Lazenby notes, ". . . it is not possible to locate the site of this crucial battle with any certainty, even if we reject all suggested locations north of the river: at least six locations south of the river have been proposed ..." (188) He goes on to cite Livy (27.48.5-7): "the Gauls were on the Carthaginian left, protected by a hill ..." (189) In the map I included in my college paper (taken from THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY, by Dupuy and Dupuy) the Gauls are in position west of the ravine of present-day Saint Angelo. Nero's complement is on a slight rise, overlooking the ravine.
[8] Dupuy and Dupuy note the following about the tactical ability of the legion:
    This cellular, checkerboard type formation had a number of inherent advantages over the phalanx: it could maneuver more easily in rough country, without fear of losing alignment, and without need for concern about gaps appearing in the line - the gaps were built in (...) In battle it appears that the lines would close up to form a virtual phalanx, but these could quickly resume their flexible relationship when maneuver became necessary once more. (74)

I am left to puzzle over this detail of the battle. If the terrain prohibited the Romans from coming to grips with the enemy, then one could deduce that the same would hold in reverse. That is, the Gauls would not be able to advance across or through this same ground and engage the Romans. The question then becomes, if this ground was so unsuited for combat, why did each army commander place men there? I can perhaps see Hasdrubal's planning, for the Gauls were "bad" troops. In "Battlefield Tactics of the 2nd Punic War: Part One - Carthage," Michel Syrett writes this with respect to the quality of Gallic infantry: "Their initial charges were very effective but they tired easily if blunted. They were notoriously unreliable and treacherous." With respect to their performance at Metaurus, he adds: "At Metaurus nine years after Cannae, his brother Hasdrubal placed his Gallic levies out of harm's way on rough hilly ground behind a steep raving. There they proved so ineffective ..." Miniature Wargames, No. 10, page 29. But what of the Roman decision?
[9] Utilizing the chart previously referenced in WARFARE in the CLASSICAL. WORLD, a full-strength Roman legion would total some 5,000 infantry and approximately 320 cavalry. In ARMATI terms, this would be represented by 3 units of Velites (400 men each); 2 units of Hastati (800 men each); 2 units of Principes (800 men each); I unit of Triarii (600 men); and, the complement of cavalry, at 320 troopers. I could find no mention in any reference of the cavalry for the praetor's force. Nor could I determine if the two legions were Roman, Allied, or a mixture - one and one.
[10] Unfortunately, this specific listing of reinforcements is not found in any other source. Adding to this, Idid not state in my original paper the source for Caven's numbers.
[11] I have yet to get to the examination of the Carthaginian order of battle, but it should be remarked that this total for the Roman force (excluding the consular army of Livius) comes very close to the high-end estimate for Hasdrubal's force.
[12] "A Roman legion, with its allied counterpart, was the equivalent of a modem army corps, a force of some 9,000-10,000 men, of whom about 900 were cavalry. Two Roman legions and two allied legions comprised a field army, known as a consular army, commanded by one of Rome's two consuls." (72)
[13] This figure derived by multiplying 4,000 men by 8, the combined number of legions. If one allows for one legion to be posted as camp guards or garrison and another legion "out" due to illness and other causes between the remainder of the force, one still arrives at a standing force of 26,000 men. This is close to the estimate offered by Lazenby and may well have been equal to that force deployed by Hasdrubal. The army of the praetor and the force of Nero would have tipped the scales strongly in the favor of Rome, then.
[14] Estimating the cavalry complement for Livius's legions and adding the reinforcements, one arrives at a 3600 horse on the Roman left wing, which is not too far over the estimate of 3000 horse stated above.
[15] Perhaps this total represents the camp garrison, sick and other troops who were not directly engaged on the field?

Modeling Metaurus Reconstructing Hasdrubal's Defeat in the Second Punic War

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