Snappy Nappy

The Austrian Invasion of Italy 1809
Archduke John vs. Prince Eugene

Background: Historical Progression
of the 1809 Italian Campaign

by Russ Lockwood

On March 23rd, Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, stepson to Napoleon, learned from his spies of Austrian troop concentrations at Laibach, Klagenfurt, Villach, and Salzberg. This information came hard on the heels of other reports, one of which indicated the Austrians would attack between March 25 and April 1. He dutoifully passed that info onto Napoleon. But by the end of March, the Emperor had released his own analysis that predicted an Austrian attack no earlier than mid-April.

No attack developed by the 1st of April. Eugene was less inclined to believe his spy reports, including a note on the 10th about Austrian troops -- and an army warchest -- were moving out of Trieste and heading for Italy. Still, Eugene was prudent, and was making a tour of his eastern forces, being at Udine on April 9th.

On April 9, 1809, the Austrian Army of Italy (later renamed the Army of Inner Austria), commanded by Archduke John began its advance into Italy. The French forces under Eugene, were scattered across northern Italy, and he was worried about an attack out of the Tyrol in addition to attacks from Carintia (northeast of eastern Italy) and Carniola (southeast of eastern Italy).

Austrian Possibilities

For an invasion of Italy from Austria, Archduke John did indeed have a choice of invasion routes, boiling down to a one-pronged attack or a two-pronged attack. 8th Korps was in Carinthia near Tarvis and Villach. 9th Korps was in Carniola, more or less in the Trieste-Laibach area.

9th Korps could concentrate at Goritzia and advance about 20 miles to the northwest. It would meet the advance of the 8th Korps marching about 30 miles to the southwest from Tarvis/Villach. Both prongs would unite at Cividale and head west.

Or, he could concentrate both armies at Tarvis/Villach and create a single strike force that would march on Cividale. The disadvantage with this idea was that 9th Korps would have to march 60 miles to get from Laibach to Tarvis and then stack up behind 8th Korps.

On the other hand, should Archduke John use the two-pronged approach, he feared that Prince Eugene would concentrate eastward at Udine and grab the central position, holding off one Korps and defeating the other, then switching back to defeat the second Korps.

Thus, Archduke John chose to consolidate both Korps into one combined command, leaving a covering force at Goritzia under Gen. Gavassini. Altogether, he could count on about 45,000 troops.

As for other areas, Chasteler was chosen to liberate the Tyrol with 10,000 troops, aided by pro-Austrian Tyrolian rebels. Another force of about 8,000 under Stoichewich was to head south into Dalmatia to confront Marmont's scattered command of about 14,000.

Uncharacteristically, the Austrians advanced rapidly into Italy, clearing the passes and pursuing the withdrawing French forces. The fortresses of Osoppo and Palmanova were isolated and bypassed.

French Possibilities

Prince Eugene could count on only Seras' division of 8,000 at Udine and another scattered division of 8,000 more troops under Broussier to oppose the Austrians coming out of Cividale. Prudently, he elected to retreat in accordance with Napoleon's ealier instructions received in January to withdraw the army to the Piave River, if not the Adige River, before confronting the Austrians. Eugene, however, opposed the idea of falling back that far.

On paper, the Prince calculated that he could withdraw upon Barbou's division at Sacile by the 14th, with Lemarque's division (8500) and Pully's 2nd Dragoon Division (1600) appearing on the 15th (even though both were 70 miles away), plus additional units. Thus, he could counterattack the Austrians with eight divisions (paper strengths at outbreak of war): Broussier (8,000), Seras (8,000), Severoli (7,000), Barbou (10,000), Grenier (9,000), Lemarque (8,500), Pully's 2nd Dragoon Division (1,600), and Sahuc's light cavalry division (2,700). All together, that allowed about 60,000 troops...on paper.

His spy reports pegged Archduke John's forces accurately enough at around 45,000, but overestimated Chasteler's Tyrolian forces at 20,000--about double the actual amount. Eugene worried, perhaps excessively, about his northern flank on the Tyrol, half expecting Chasteler to come screaming out of the alps and cut his line of communications. Thus, Eugene felt he should turn on John first and early, and then deal with Chasteler later.

However, paper strengths are never field strengths, and in the intervening days, Eugene suffered a number of losses from general attrition, especially since Broussier and Serras had been marching and fighting since the invasion began. He also suffered a sharp defeat at Pordenone which included the entire 35th Regiment surrendering and the 6th Hussars virtually eliminated as a regiment. Furthermore, Lemarque and Pully were still on the march. Eugene's numbers plummetted.

Battle of Sacile

On the 16th, despite being outnumbered, Eugene made a stand at Sacile. He knew he was outnumbered slightly. His big advantage on paper had dwindled to about 34,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry in the field. Opposing him, the Archduke had 35,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

Eugene sought to neutralize the cavalry supremacy by advancing over the broken ground to his right, hoping to take the town of Porcia quickly enough to unhinge the Austrian disposition. Then, with Lemarque and Pully re-inforcing his left, he'd have even numbers and a better position.

It did not quite work that way. Delayed in part by heavy rains, his reinforcements never arrived, and as he obliqued to the right towards Porcia, his left had to stretch to keep linked. The 8am attack rolled off on time, and by 9am had cleared bad ground and villages and started the attack for Porcia. Archduke John, unsure of French numbers, waited. Gen. Frimont, the Austrian commander on the receiving end of the first attacks, saw the predicament of the French troops struggling over difficult ground and swiftly counterattacked. His troops sent Seras' and Severoli's divisions backward. Eugene countered with part of Barbou's division and sent Frimont reeling. The French took Porcia.

Yet, the Austrians sent in fresh troops, and Porcia changed hands several times as the day progressed. In doing so, the remainder of the French infantry on the left was forced to move into the open plain. Archduke John, seizing the idea that he outnumbered Eugene, ordered a broad attack. The Austrians, slow as they were at maneuvering, finally shook out into combat formations by 5pm, and it soon became apparent that weight of numbers would tell.

Unfortunately for Archduke John, his flanking cavalry actually became part of his inner line, while his infantry became the outer flank troops. Instead of infantry pinning infantry and cavalry swinging around to cut off the French, the Austrian cavalry engaged in bloody frontal attacks and the Austrian infantry oh so s-l-o-w-l-y tried to march around the flank. The French flank remained intact, the road to Sacile remained open, and Eugene, realizing his plight, ordered a general withdrawal. French infantry squares, muddy roads, and a general battering prevented Austrian cavalry pursuit.

Although the Austrians lost about 4,000 troops, the French lost about 7,500. It was the pinnacle of John's military career, and the bottom of Eugene's. Napoleon, having learned of the defeat, even had cut orders potentially removing his stepson from command.

    "In giving you command of the army I had made a mistake. I should have sent Massena and you would have comanded the cavalry under his orders...I think that if circumstances become pressing, you should write the King of Naples (Murat) asking him to join your army. You will give up command to him and place yourself under his orders."

But events would overtake the slow communications between Italy and Bavaria, and Eugene remained in command--although with three French corp commanders, but no Murat, for stability.

As the French retreated, they paused on the Piave, but Eugene decided to take Napoleon's missives about positioning to heart, and elected to fall back to the Adige. He dispatched about a division's worth of troops under Barbou to garrison Venice, and fell back to Verona. Archduke John did not press forward with vigor, and allowed the Franco-Italian army to regain its morale and numbers.

The Tyrol

Approximately 4,500 Bavarian troops in six battalions were dispersed among the towns of Innsbruck, Prunecken, Brixen, and Sterzing, and 4,000 French troops (2,000 north of Brixen and 2,000 south of it) were enroute to Augsburg to reinforce Napoleon. The April 10th invasion of the Tyrol by Chasteler's 10,000 Austrians began a pre-arranged revolt that caught the Franco-Bavarian forces completely by surprise. The garrisons of Innsbruck and Sterzing were killed or captured, while the other two Bavarian garrisons were driven out of the towns. The northern French column got as far as Innsbruck, but was forced to surrender. The southern column fell back to Trento by the 12th.

Eugene sent the 112th Infantry Regiment and the 7th Dragoons to join the survivors at Trento to form a provisional division under Baron Vial. Fontanelli's division joined them, united under Corps Commander Baraguay d'Hilliers, so that on April 16th, the force totalled just over 10,000 infantry and 1,100 cavalry. d'Hilliers, panicking when informed about the loss at Sacile, and attacked by Tyrolian rebels, figured that Chasteler was nearby with 20,000 men. d'Hilliers bolted south.

Eugene expected to trap and counterattack the Austrians on the Adige, but he needed his Tyrolian flank secured. He ordered d'Hilliers to do a fighting withdrawal, scorning Chateler's force as a bunch of peasants. d'Hilliers turned and fought at Roveredo, but continued his southward retreat, eventually steadying at Rivoli.

Meanwhile, Archduke John lost more and more combat power the farther he advanced. He detached 10,000 to keep an eye on Venice, and additional troops filled the Austrian predilection for garrisoning towns along their line of communications.

Meanwhile, Archduke Charles, up in Bavaria, had been soundly beaten and retreated back towards Vienna. Napoleon was as concerned with the Tyrol (his strategic southern flank), as Eugene was. Napoleon, worried by the loss at Sacile, sent Marshal Lefebvre into the Tyrol from Bavaria.

Archduke John, meanwhile, knew he could no longer tackle the French without support from Chasteler. When news arrived of the retreat of his brother, Archduke Charles, from Bavaria back towards Vienna, John realized his position was soon to be untenable. A French probe to Monte-Bastia was counterattacked on April 30 to clear a line of retreat. On May 1, he started his own withdrawal back to Austria.

Eugene followed on the 3rd, and in addition ordered Rusca (taking over for d'Hilliers) out of Rivoli and towards Trento, He also signalled Marmont to begin his advance in Dalmatia. By the 6th, the Austrians had retreated east of the Piave River, Eugene's army following closely. John had about 30,000 near Conegliano, Eugene almost 50,000 on the Piave. On May 8th, the Battle on the Piave began.

Eugene started crossing at 8am, and John began to deploy his army to drive them back across the Piave. But Austrian staff inefficiency interfered with tactical realities, and the Austrians were slow to deploy. By mid-afternoon, the Austrian cavalry charges had been smashed, artillery taken, and John forced back on the defensive, his line long and thin. With Grenier pressing an attack on the Austrian left, and a cannonade and infantry charge beginning to smash the center, John's army shattered and began a headlong retreat. Eugene prevented a night battle, but he needn't have worried about an Austrian rally. By daybreak of the 9th, the Austrians were at Sacile. They continued to retreat eastward, as pursuing French gobbled up the wounded and stragglers.

On the afternoon of the 9th, Grouchy and Desaix caught up with the Austrian rearguard under Frimont, driving him easily out of Sacile. They turned north and crossed the Tagliamento River at Splimbergo and reached St. Daniel on the 10th. Eugene crossed with the main French force at Splimbergo on the 11th and sent Grouchy and his cavalry to Udine and Palmanova. Another attack against Frimont's rearguard at St. Daniel pushed the Austrians further east, and Archduke John retreated past Osoppo. On the 13th, the last Austrians in Italy retreated east. By the 15th, the Austrians had retreated back to a defensive line running from Villach to Laibach.

The Austrian invasion of Italy had ended, the French invasion of Austria would now begin.

Bibliography

Bowden, Scotty and Tarbox, Charles. Armies on the Danube. The Emperor's Press. 1990.
Epstein, Robert M. Prince Eugene at War. Empire Press. 1984.

www.magweb.com : Barstow, Ian. "Battle of Sacile." First Empire #27. 1996.

www.magweb.com : Barstow, Ian. "Battle of the Piave." First Empire #30. 1996.

www.magweb.com : Barstow, Ian. "Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy: Neither King Nor Marshal." First Empire #31. 1996.

www.magweb.com : Gioannini, Marco. "An Account of the Battle on the River Piave." Empires, Eagles, and Lions. Vol. II #13. 1995.

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