ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY
The total number of casualties for this four hour battle - well it was more maneuver than actual conflict - was comparatively low. On the British side, only the 1st Brigade of Foot had been involved in close fighting. The 23rd Regiment was the most heavily engaged. For the Americans, Cooke's and Kirk's NY Militia Brigades had seen some fighting, as had Smith's NY Continentals. The artillery of both sides saw quite a bit of action too; if primarily in the center of the field. There was little action on either flank, though the British plan called for a three-pronged attack. The Rangers and Dillon's Scouts suffered few losses in wrestling Birck's Farm from the Rebels. Over on the other flank, the 7th Maryland did lose some men to long range artillery from the light guns of Swanson's Battery. In the closing moments of the action though, they traded evenly with the Loyalists of Blake's Legion.
In review, both sides appeared well able to carry the contest over to another day. The British had four brigades that were untouched; units that never got into the firing line. The Americans retreated from the field in good order. The contingent from Pennsylvania (both regulars and militia) had fired not a single volley. Ketchum's Marylanders were also relatively unscathed. A quick count then, gives the Rebels an equal number of brigades to fight in any subsequent battle. They did lose two pieces of artillery, however, when Apple's crew abandoned their battery on Willow Creek Ridge.
Given the ground chosen for defense by General Elliott, his battle plan might be graded as acceptable. He placed his least reliable troops in protected positions; he held his line units in support for those same troops. However, as related above, the General maintained no concentrated reserve. Furthermore, he let the British dictate the tempo of the engagement. While this can be excused - in some part - due to his assignment of "defense", a simple rearrangement of his lines or a forward defense, might have thrown off the British advance. In retrospect, it appears this was not necessary, as the British did a very good job of interfering with their own plan of attack.
General Gilbert's plan to take Willow Creek Ridge from the Provincials could be argued as ambitious. Ambitious, for it was based on the premise that the three columns or "arrows" of the trident would act in concert. Ambitious, for he planned on striking and piercing the American line in three distinct places, and then capitalizing on that local advantage.
On the other hand, his planned three-pronged assault played into the linear defense of the Americans. Given the static nature of the American position, General Gilbert could have dealt with just one sector of the defensive position without fear of interference from another sector. As it turned out, the three-pronged attack never fully developed. The tardiness of the Hessian Regiments and the indecisiveness of the Loyalists upset the battle strategy from the start. While elements of both flanking forces did get into action, they were unsupported and unable to create the kind of pressure that the General originally desired. Fortunately, he was blessed with a few performing regiments in the 1st Brigade. If the day and field was to be awarded to any single regiment and / or commander, it was surely the 23rd Regiment of Foot, under the capable leadership of Major Ferguson. Unfortunately, this officer paid the ultimate price for winning the day and field for his Majesty's forces.
I have gamed before with the Fire & Fury Rules. In this adaptation, I quickly recalled my frustration with the movement and maneuver of forces. Part of the frustration stems from not being able to bring opposing forces into combat according to my time line. But then, how realistic would that be? How often do troops, especially the elements of three separate field columns - let alone the regiments comprising said columns, act as their wargame commanding general wants them to? And how often do troops act with what seems to be invincibility? The action of the 23rd Regiment does not strike this solo wargamer as unrealistic so much as unusual. There are more than several historical accounts of single battalions, regiments, batteries, or even of officers and a select few followers, having a very significant impact on the course of a battle. In this respect, I might conclude that my rules adaptation is realistic / historical. Still, I am stuck for a way to simplify or expedite the time intensive process of rolling for each unit on the maneuver or disorder tables. I am also perplexed by the capacity of some units under these rules for completely nonsensical movement. It seems that once in motion (forward motion), a unit should stay in motion. The experience with Pepperidge's Militia was one that I don't wish to repeat anytime soon.
In that same vein, I think I may have complicated my adaptation with several levels of command and several layers of command rules to address those levels. That is to admit, in addition to the Regimental Officer and his alternate, there was a Brigade Officer and then another, higher-level officer that could influence the action of a single regiment. Sometimes, this proved counterproductive, as a good or capable line officer was hamstrung by an inept higher-echelon commander. There was also a level of complication added with respect to determining casualties among command. While useful and fun for narrative purposes, in terms of game mechanics, it's probably just as good to know (by the roll of just one die) that the officer is either still alive and functioning, or not.
Disorder, whether by movement, terrain or as the result of combat, still remains a great interest to me. I think this was evident in this rules adaptation with several units accumulating three disorder markers as a result of fire, and with the 11 problems" experienced by the British on their right flank. In some respects, the inability of the British to get anything going along this axis of advance gave me Pause. For example, just how disordered, if at all, would a regular line unit be after moving through a rabble of loyalist militia who couldn't find their hat with both hands? Furthermore, should that same line unit have to roll to reorganize after the passage-of-lines, or should it be automatic? What does this add to the wargame?
These rules handled artillery and small arms resolution well, in my opinion. There Were a few instances of overwhelming fire and like casualties. Overall, casualties were in accordance with the ability and range of the firing units. Broken units were more the result of accumulating disorder markers than of taking casualties and getting the marker.
In this particular engagement, artillery played a major role. The British were able to clear militia from the ridge line with concentrated fire. Some readers may object to the use of canister against troops behind light field works, but I do not see any problem with this type of fire at this range. (The field works put up by the Americans were rudimentary after all.) The Americans too, relied on their batteries to keep the British at arm's length. If only they had placed a battery directly in line of the advance of the 23rd Regiment.
Of melees, there were just two during the course of the wargame. The more pivotal taking place on Willow Creek Ridge between the 1st New York and the indomitable 23rd Foot. The other, between Whiteside's command and the combined units under Rosten and Dillon, resulted in the British occupying Birck's Farm. As with the resolution of fire combat, I think the melee tables worked wen in this adaptation, I really like the Fire & Fuzy- concept of graduated results in melees, and of results applying to both attacker and defender. Here too, some readers might find reason to object or comment: the modifier tables are quite extensive.
In the midst of this AWI scenario, my order of the PIQUET rules and two supplements (Napoleonic and Ancients) arrived. This gave me some pause, as I erred by starting to read these innovative rules while still playing the wargame. This led me to wonder about the efficacy and efficiency of the turn sequence and movement rules. I also thought about the tables upon tables of modifiers that I had adapted for command, fire and melee resolution. Poor judgment on my part, then, to delve into a new rule book in the middle of a wargame.
On the positive side however, it has given me something to think about with respect to my next solo wargame project.
More Willow Creek Ridge
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© Copyright 2001 Hal Thinglum
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