ANALYSIS In a short, sharp engagement, the French forces under Marshal Davout had been thrown back by the Austrians. Neither "army" commander player a significant role in the battle; both were on the field after the fighting was under way, and neither came anywhere close to getting directly involved in the action. Rosenberg was behind the Austrian center during the French general attack, but again, neither he nor his retinue of officers were in danger. Instead of a decision being reached in the center of the field, this meeting engagement was determined on the right and left. Perhaps the Austrian right was the pivotal flank, as an entire French light cavalry brigade was ruined here. And yet, in and around Gerasdorf, a number of French line infantry units "met their makers" as well. Very briefly, in terms of morale markers remaining, the Austrians had almost two dozen when the game was called. The French had none and were, in fact, in a deficit of morale. With respect to points for terrain possession, since the French abandoned the field, the Austrians secured all the points for the three features. The Austrians suffered the following men and material losses: five stands of cavalry (all casualties taken by dragoon regiments); one section of artillery (the cannon were recovered later in the day and crew brought back up to strength by an infantry attachment); 11 stands of infantry (3rd/44th destroyed, and the majority of the casualties - six stands - being absorbed by the 46th Chasteler Line). In comparison, the French commands listed the following: eight stands of cavalry (all battle losses taken by the light brigade; one unit from the heavy brigade did rout off after checking morale); an estimated 10 stands of infantry lost (a rough parity between the 45th Ligne and 30th Ligne Regiments, but a number of these battalions routed off the field as a result). The artillery arm of the French force did not suffer any losses save for the adverse morale effects experienced at the end of the battle. No guns or caissons were lost; they simply limbered up and retreated from the field. A critique of strategy is not really justified. There was no great expense of thought committed to battle plan or plans. I perhaps made the error of spreading each force out so that flank to flank was covered. Additionally, my orders were unoriginal in that I just wanted to bring forces into combat as quickly as possible. The central purpose of the solo wargame was to familiarize myself with the PIQUET rules, concepts, and mechanics. COMMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS My initial impression of PIQUET is less than positive. By stating this, I am not dismissing the rules nor design concepts and philosophy. On the contrary, I think Mr. Jones and now, Mr. Oman, have something worthwhile here. I also think it's too early to tell whether or not PIQUET will meet my Napoleonic or even overall, basic wargaming needs. I think too, that my impression of PIQUET is very probably biased or prejudiced by prior wargaming experience. (It may well be argued that the impression stems from the lack of intelligence necessary to fully appreciate or even competently play PIQUET.) I did not have a great deal of trouble accepting and using the card sequence deck "mode of play". It was a little like learning a different language. I must admit that there is something very comfortable (for lack of a better word) about the move-counter move game turn sequence. As the solo wargame progressed, I was fortunate enough to be able to e-mail Brent Oman with questions and requests for clarification(s) regarding the rules. He was more than accommodating, which was very much appreciated. Nevertheless, I remained "at adds" with some aspects of the rules. For example, the "confused withdrawal" card is something that I would not wish upon my most hated enemy. An Internet reviewer of the rules related that he was eliminating the card after having a very bad time with it in an ACW game. This specific card appeared just after the Austrian had launched a massive cavalry attack against the French left. Guess which command was selected by the French commander for a "confused withdrawal"? One of the basic themes of these rules seems to be the modeling of simulation versus the playing of a game. That's all well and good, but I cannot recall any historical event that would justify such a card. The Persians facing Alexander across the Granicus springs to mind, but that strikes me more of a morale event, and after an initial shock and melee. More to the point, it just strikes me as un easonable or even unrealistic that engaged cavalry would "turn on a dime" and run the other way. It's even more incomprehensible that the cavalry run away from would not spur their horses on and attack the flank and rear of the retreating enemy. In my opinion, it seems that this would be an automatic reaction and not something "controlled" by the turning of a card. Another "oddity" (or just misunderstanding, based on my reading of the rules) was the lack of any coverage on how to resolve/adjudicate multiple melees. At one point during the solo wargame, a French light cavalry regiment charged an Austrian line infantry battalion and the neighboring artillery unit. Upon reflection, it seems that a possible solution would be to take the final melee die of the "lesser valued" unit. That is to suggest, that like with mixed command groups that move at the rate of the majority element, melees involving more than one type of friendly unit would be resolved with rolling a die for the majority element. But here, in this case, there were two units - one artillery battery and one infantry battalion. So, there is no clear majority. Maybe this can be handled by resolving each melee separately, as directed by the initiating side? As it turned out, the cavalry unit routed the artillery crews, but was itself routed as it was disordered upon advance into contact, and, per the rules, any cavalry unit engaged in a melee (win or lose) is disordered. Two disorder results produce a rout. The rules governing disorder and its effects were also an area of concern for this solo wargamer. I readily admit that this concern is the result of prior thinking and writing on the topic of disorder and its representation in miniature wargaming. (In some respects, the thinking is approaching a point of having all units on the table in some degree of disorder; obviously the less disordered the better, but the question becomes how can this be tracked, and would such representation necessarily result in a more realistic game?) In PIQUET, it struck me as inconsistent to have a postmelee disorder rule for cavalry but not have a similar paragraph for infantry. While mounted combat is most assuredly swirling and confused, with troops of the unit / regiment galloping hither and yon, it seems to me that contests between bodies of men on foot would be just as chaotic. I found myself "uncomfortable" with the guidelines for movement of skirmishers and for movement in general. This lack of comfort stenuning from having to halt movement at the instant any other terrain than clear (Type I in PIQUET) is encountered. In one case during the wargame, a single stand of a skirmishing French light infantry battalion came into contact with some light woods. The majority of the battalion in question was in open terrain. In an e-mail to Mr. Oman for clarification on this point, I learned that the infantry would have to halt and wait on the turn of a special card. In my opinion, this really curtails the effectiveness of skirmishing infantry. That is to comment, historically, I thought this kind of deployment made entrance into or progress through other than clear, flat terrain, easier. Skirmish formation facilitates movement; it should not penalize it. My case against general movement is built along similar lines. For example, as happened in the wargame, a regiment of cavalry in line had to stop forward movement once it came "into contact" with the hill over on the French left flank. The terrain was devoid of any other kind of obstacle, there was just the rise of the hill and it was a gentle rise at that. Yet, the forward motion of the cavalry ground to a halt. I guess I'm just more comfortable or used to the process wherein units are penalized a portion of their movement rate when negotiating certain terrain. It struck me as incomprehensible that an object set in motion would not tend to remain in motion. As a sidebar, the rules governing inter-penetration seemed incomplete. In the case of the game, Austrian artillery (deployed in train) wished to deploy into firing position. The batteries were advancing in step with infantry battalions. To deploy, the cannon would have had to unlimber in the middle of ranks of white-coated foot soldiers. As a temporary solution, I simply moved the infantry to the side so that there was enough table space for the artillery to deploy. A few times during the wargame, skirmishing stands (if not entire skirmishing units) were contacted by advancing enemy foot. Neither the PIQUET Master Rules nor Les Grognards supplement contain any rules on evasion. Mr. Oman admitted in an e-mail response to this query that there were no rules covering evasion protocols for this period. He did state that the Ancients supplement, Archon, does have a section about skirmishing infantry and evasion. This seemed a good place for an immediate and improvised house rule, so skirmish infantry were allowed to evade if contacted. Historically, this seems to a more accurate representation of such action than simply letting the skirmishers stand stock-still in the face of a formed advance. Casualty determination and production was yet another point of concern. I can understand and appreciate Mr. Jones' thinking behind the interactive die rolling process and what this lends to the command and control view of the miniature engagement. (Recently, I have begun to re-read a book on the battle of Shiloh, and it's amazing as well as perplexing to note the lack of casualties after 30 minutes to an hour of musketry/rifle exchanges between Union and Rebel infantry across 200 yards or so of cornfield.) I think my opinion is that a victorious unit - whether in musketry or melee - should suffer at least some kind of casualties. In this regard, I prefer the melee tables used in Fire and Fury. The process in this ACW rules set (now much modified and adapted for other periods) is clear, simple, and allows for interactive die rolling as well. Here again, I am fully prepared to admit its me and my lack of understanding (or ability to read wargame rules printed in plain English), but the explanation of the melee process, as when the melee resolution card is drawn (page 37 of Master Rules Book), was confusing. Confusing and frustrating too, was the separation of commanders from their commands. I don't quite follow why leaders cannot move with commands, if mixed commands can move together on the draw of an "infantry move" card. Form an historical stand point - and here again I will bow to those more expert - I don't believe brigade or division commanders could effectively lead from way back in the rear. There were many times (phases, sequences) during the wargame where great distances separated fighting units from their commanding officers. Outside of the rules system and concepts, there was a certain level of administrative burden in playing through the game. The sequence cards are, as I stated, interesting and certainly innovative. I think though, that I would benefit if there were more detail provided on the cards. Like other neophyte players, I too, confused the Deployment and Maneuver cards. The problem here is admittedly mine, and easily addressed by hand-labeling the cards with definitions from the rule book. A lot of time was spent paging through this section of the rules, trying to figure out what was and was not allowed with the turn of each sequence card. It seemed that an inordinate amount of time was spent placing and removing unit markers. Keeping track of moral markers / chits was a job unto itself. Perhaps, from this aspect, PIQUET is not a solo-friendly wargame. AND SOME MORE THINKING As a result of this play test using the PIQUET rules, I have done some additional thinking on the matter of wargaming the Napoleonic period. In search of material to plug the gaps noted, I returned to the bookcase game of Napoleon's Battles. Following on that, I dug through several storage boxes and retrieved a rather lengthy set of "home grown" rules for review. Thus stimulated, I briefly considered developing a tactical, strictly battalion-level variant, using a scale of one inch equals approximately nine yards. A single French line infantry company then, would occupy a space of roughly four inches across by one inch deep. The entire battalion in line formation (including grenadier and light companies) would stretch for two feet of table space. Effective range for muskets might be placed at 20 inches. Progress slowed rather quickly looking at artillery fire. It stopped completely with a consideration of a "real" time scale and the establishment of movement rates/distances. The following is certainly not an original idea. I discovered - or was reminded of that fact - that the simulation of Napoleonic warfare in miniature, at whatever scale, is not possible. Napoleon's Battles promulgates one approach. The rules I wrote some seven years ago and then set up on a shelf, appeal from a different perspective. More recently, I researched and played a wargame using SHAKO. Now, my interest and search has lead me to PIQUET. PIQUET certainly offers several interesting spins on the attempt at simulation. To reiterate the evaluation of another gamer, "it does force you to make some hard choices about what you want to do". I think what I want to do is try these rules out a couple of more times. I think too, that I will be making several "house revisions" to sections of the rules. Mr. Jones gives us license to do this, and even encourages it, when he explains that PIQUET is more of a "tool box" than "dogma" etched in stone. More Gamble at Gerasdorf French v. Austrians in 1805 Introduction Scenario Development and Order of Battle Terrain, Deployments, and Plans Moves Analysis and Commentary Back to MWAN #113 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2001 Hal Thinglum This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com