Supply sergeants ordered the men to bury all supplies in foxholes before moving out, and the men destroyed what could be neither buried nor carried. Everyone worked in haste, fearful that each passing moment gave the Japanese time to tighten their grip on the unit. To this point, except for scattered small arms fire during the night of 10-11 July, the 112th had not been engaged in the fighting. Nevertheless, their perception of that battle rested on the fragmentary reports they had received, and the so-called fog of war had produced extreme apprehension. Thus, while General Martin approved General Cunningham's request to withdraw at 1100 instead of the scheduled 1500, he did so only after emphasizing that the mission of the covering force was to delay the enemy, not to give up ground without resisting. [44]

General Martin faced a series of decisions he had to make on the basis of incomplete information. He had no forces left to plug the breakthrough because the reconnaissance in force operations along either of his flanks required all his reserves. He judged, correctly, that the Japanese were across the Driniumor in force and were threatening his rear. General Krueger did not agree with Martin's estimate of the seriousness of the situation. As limited as his information was, Martin did realize that there were no U.S. forces between the Japanese and the American main line of resistance near Aitape, and consequently he ordered a general withdrawal to River X, where he would reorganize his forces to combat future Japanese attacks. [45]

A signal from the Japanese 80th Infantry put it more bluntly, "Under our eyes the enemy is retreating in boats and along the trails." [46]

As General Cunningham led the first echelon of the 112th in retreat to River X, 2d Squadron finally appeared at Afua. Fear propelled the Americans as they covered in an hour the same distance that had taken them most of the previous day. Everyone pushed himself at an exhausting pace or risked being left alone in the jungle again that night. By 1200, 2d Squadron had replaced the 1st at Afua, and the 2d, in turn, withdrew three hours later. Native bearers helped carry the squadron's baggage, particularly by dismantling and portaging the 5th Portable Hospital, then assigned to the 112th. The 2d Squadron's luck again failed as a torrential downpour punished them all afternoon. The heavy trail and slippery going slowed the native bearers, who, in turn, retarded the column's progress.

So, near midnight the 2d Squadron, less Troop F, wearily reached River X. It had been a physically exhausting and mentally terrifying ordeal. Troop F, whose men brought up the rear, did not close with the main column and, fearful of crossing the River X in darkness, spent the night alone. The night march over a narrow jungle trail was later described in the unit history as "a great hardship." Litter bearers got lost in the black maze, requiring the column to halt until they could be found. After that, men caught hold of the belt or shoulder of the trooper in front of them and led each other in a procession of darkness.

The men stumbled along, and when they tripped and fell over slippery roots or bush on the trail, it caused a chain reaction as several beltholders crashed down together in the mud. Weapons were consequently covered with mud and not in firing condition. The 2d Squadron was no longer a fighting unit, and the men were too exhausted to care. They were too fatigued even to eat. Only a day's rest and refitting would reconstitute the unit.

Both combatants needed time to regroup and reorganize. The 112th's troopers were drained not from fighting, but from the physical demands of making a hasty withdrawal during a tropical deluge, as well as from the mental strain from a night and day of unrelieved tension. The 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had not participated in the fighting either, but it too was scattered in retreat. Farther north., Companies E and G were in disarray somewhere in the heavy jungle between the Driniumor and River X.

Nearer the coast, small groups of men from Company F were fighting Japanese soldiers from the 237th Infantry. The Japanese 78th and 80th Infantry regiments had swung southwest after their breakthrough, but both had suffered dreadful personnel losses. Their. turn south was too late to cut off the retreat of the 112th. In short, despite the initial Japanese breakthrough and severe losses on both sides, the fighting so far had been inconclusive. Once again the respective commanders had to make the operational decisions that would set in motion another desperate melee in the New Guinea wilds.

General Krueger at 6th Army still refused to believe that Martin's retreat from the Driniumor had been necessary. On 12 July, he ordered General Hall to drive the Japanese back eastward across the Driniumor. General Hall, in turn, ordered General Martin to retreat no further, except before overwhelming odds, and he forbade the withdrawal of any unit not in actual contact with superior enemy forces. To emphasize the point, later the same day General Martin was relieved of command of the covering force and assigned command of Eastern Sector. Major General Gill assumed command of Persecution Covering Force. [47]

Gill's Field Order Number One, Persecution Covering Force, directed a counterattack on 13 July to restore the Driniumor line. For operational purposes, two clusters of units, designated North Force and South Force, would attack east to the west bank of the Driniumor, where they would turn south and north respectively in order to join forces, thereby sealing the Japanese penetration (see map 20). [48]

At 18th Army, General Adachi believed that the battle was developing favorably. According to the preliminary reports he had received on 12 and 13 July, the 20th Division was southwest of Afua, and the Americans were in full retreat. Regimental staff officers reported that the Americans had suffered "many casualties," but darkness prevented a detailed account of enemy dead or captured equipment. Japanese losses were given as twentyfive dead and fifty-nine wounded. [49]

Adachi concluded that his initial attack had succeeded and that his next attack towards the airfields at Aitape could continue according to plan.

On 12 July the 112th Cavalry was sorting itself out in anticipation of imminent fighting. Patrols had no success in locating the Japanese, but everyone dug in, expecting yet another Japanese attack that night. About twenty men laid out an escape trail, and others reestablished communications between the 112th and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, also regrouping after being scattered during its retreat.

Then at 1750, in accordance with 6th Army's orders, General Martin ordered the 112th Cavalry to reoccupy its former positions on the Driniumor the following morning. Commanders' meetings and coordination conferences with the 3d Battalion, which would advance on the 112th's left flank, occupied the early daylight hours. During this time, General Cunningham also coordinated air and artillery support for the 112th Cavalry, should it encounter Japanese resistance. Similar preparations were repeated to the north, where the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, would simultaneously attack towards the Driniumor. [50]

Rested and refitted, the 112th was ready to be committed to battle again. At 0800 an advance guard platoon moved from River X eastward to the Driniumor.

In three hours during intermittent showers the advance guard platoon from Troop B had covered about 2,000 meters, making very good time over the jungle trails. Then the point men bumped into perhaps seventy-five Japanese soldiers from the 20th Division near a stream crossing. As one American veteran recalled, "We just walked up on what looks like about fifteen Japs out in the river. They were great big Japs, looked like he was six feet tall and with one of our ponchos on his back." [51]

Both sides recovered from their initial shock and surprise and sprinted for cover. A sharp fire fight flared, punctuated by bursts of light machine gun fire, thunks of Japanese grenade dischargers, and rifle shots. The Americans wisely waited for the main body of the 112th Cavalry and its additional fire support. For the next three hours, 1st Squadron cautiously deployed forward, with Troop B in the center, A on the right, and C on the left, until all had reached the creek. Most of their firing was unaimed, because the thick vegetation precluded seeing much farther than a few meters, and men were reluctant to expose themselves for aimed fire. Another pause occurred as requests were made for artillery fire against the Japanese.

Finally at 1400, after artillery fire had fallen on the suspected Japanese positions, the entire 1st Squadron made a rush across the stream. Their spectacular charge went for naught, however, because the Japanese had realized early in the engagement that they were outnumbered and outgunned and had Red deeper into the jungle. So the 112th Cavalry crossed the nameless stream, and by 1530 lead elements had reached Afua without opposition. The 112th was back on the Driniumor.

Squadron defensive deployments were textbook: two up, one back. The 1st Squadron deployed Troop B on the river's west bank as the squadron's south flank with Troop C to its north and Troop A in reserve. The 2d Squadron moved downriver from Afua and took up positions north of 1st Squadron with Troop F's lines tied to C, Troop G holding the north flank, and E in reserve. The impression that the defenses were laid out in neat and orderly "lines" was misleading.

Afua had already been hit with an air strike, and the American soldiers had to dig in amidst the rubble. It was too late in the afternoon to prepare elaborate entrenchments, so they used bomb craters and artillery shellholes that pitted the area as foxholes or outposts for minimal protection against potential enemy fire and the elements. The heretofore constantly booming artillery fire slackened by early evening after General Hall had warned artillery officers to conserve ammunition or risk exhausting their stocks. For the next ten days, harassing fire was limited to not more than ten rounds per gun per night. [52]

Troop G's sector was the most active that night. Throughout the night, sentries heard and occasionally, when the clouds parted, caught fleeting glimpses in the moonlight of Japanese soldiers crossing the Driniumor and moving southeast, away from the American lines. These Japanese probably were scouts or guides sent to find the exact whereabouts of the 20th Division, at present somewhere southeast of the river and Afua, but two of whose regiments were now northwest of Afua.

Pvt. William Garbo had arrived at Troop G that day as a replacement and promptly became an ammunition bearer. After dark he found himself in a machine gun pit, about the size of a dining room table, covered with ponchos and logs. Although he had listened to everything the veterans had said, nothing had prepared him for a night in a pit so black that he could not see his hand in front of his face. It was so still that he could hear the Driniumor flowing past, but more menacing sounds of five Japanese infiltrators soon followed.

A Japanese soldier climbed onto the logs covering Garbo's dugout and hurled a bundle of dynamite onto the startled machine gun crew. Only the detonator caps exploded, deafening the Americans and covering them with sulphur powder. Grenades, followed by American small arms fire, killed two of the infiltrators, and the surviving Japanese escaped into the jungle darkness. While the rest of the night passed quietly in the 112th's area, once again came the sounds of small arms and heavy artillery fire to the north.

Although the men of the 112th could not know it, what they heard was fighting among the American 1st and 3d battalions, 124th Infantry, and the Japanese 1st and 2d battalions, 237th Infantry. They had the vaguest idea that someone besides themselves had the misfortune to find Japanese troops. It was probably fortunate that the 112th troopers did not know that the 78th and 80th Infantry regiments at that moment were about 2,500 meters northwest of Afua, in the rear of the 112th's defenses, and preparing to attack. All the cavalrymen knew for certain was that in the morning it would be their turn to attack.

On a situation map everything was clear. The Japanese had broken through the center of the American lines. The U.S. forces even now had launched a counterattack to seal off the gap. On 14 July South Force (the 112th Cavalry and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry) would attack north as the 124th Infantry Regiment, minus one battalion, would attack south. The axes of attack were parallel and west of the Driniumor. The objective was for the Americans to join forces, thereby destroying the Japanese units operating west of the Driniumor.

The more one was removed from the actual fighting and terrain, the clearer the situation seemed. No one at any echelon realized that two Japanese regiments were readying an attack from northwest of Afua.

In the 112th Cavalry, everyone was tense and nervous, checking their weapons before their attack on the morning of 14 July. No one knew exactly where the Japanese were silently waiting for the American approach, but everyone knew that Japanese ambushes from the thick, lush, green vegetation could erupt at any moment and spray them with deadly small arms fire. Leading the advance patrols was as nerve racking and potentially lethal. But without patrols, the squadrons were blind.

Shortly before 0800, a squad-size patrol from Troop F crossed to the Driniumor's east bank in front of its troop sector. Almost immediately, Japanese machine gun fire struck the patrol, wounding one man. The squad was temporarily pinned down, but covering fire from Troop F's machine guns and mortars kept the Japanese gunners' heads down and gave the patrol time to escape back across the river.

Then tragedy struck. As the artillery liaison officer tried to adjust the 120th Field Artillery Battalion's 105-mm fire on the Japanese ambush site, four shells landed short, exploding just in front of the south flank in Troop F's sector. Friendly fire killed one American and wounded three others. It was a portent for the 112th Cavalry that day.

The 1st Squadron pushed north, parallel to the Driniumor's west bank, preceded by squad-size patrols. Screening patrols, one squad from each troop sector, took up positions about 600 meters east of the river and remained there during the day to protect 1st Squadron's flank. The mission of 1st Squadron was to link up with the 124th Infantry, operating somewhere-no one seemed to know where-to the north. Cavalry patrols, however, advanced 1,500 meters downriver without finding any trace of either American or Japanese units. Moreover, the commander of the 124th Infantry, who was supposed to be clearing Japanese troops along the Driniumor by a southern advance, reported that his troops had reached the Anamo-Afua trail junction. The 2d Squadron, however, was occupying these positions at present, which meant that the 124th Infantry was lost.*

*Gray, "Aitape," maintains that there were two Afuas--an old Afua and a new, the latter 1,500 meters upstream-so both commanders were correct. The terrain map of Aitape issued to the troops shows only the one village.