Dahomey War Part 1

French OB for 1892 Dahomey War
and Battles

by Mark Stevens


French OB for 1892 Dahomey War

Staff – 14 Officers (O), 11 European Other Ranks (EOR), and 2 African Other Ranks (AOR), Commanded by General Dodds.

French Foreign Legion - 800 men (400 each from 1st and 2nd regiments, divided into four companies each of 6 O and 200 EOR, commanded by Major Marius Paul Faurax.

Infantrie De Marine – 3 O, 120 EOR.

Mountain Artillery – 3 sections each of 2 O, 30 EOR, 24 AOR. The guns were 80mm broken down into three pieces, weighing a total of 670 pounds, carried on mules. The had an effective range of 1600 to 2700 yards and could fire one shot per minute. The artillerymen carried 60 rounds each for their 1874 Gras musketoon.

Tirailleurs Senegalais – four companies (3rd, 5th, 9th, and 12th) each with a paper strength of 3 O, 11EOR, 139 AOR.

Tirailleurs Haussas – two companies (1st and 2nd) each with a paper strength of 3O, 13 EOR, 137 AOR.

Volontaires Senegalais – 3 O, 13 EOR, 137 AOR.

Pioneers – 15 EOR

Spahi – 2 squadrons each of 125 men.

Plus - Engineers, Ambulance, Veterinary, and Administrative sections; 1858 porters and 47 laborers, guides and runners.

The European infantry carried 150 smokeless rounds for their 1886 Lebel .31 caliber repeaters. The African Other Ranks carried three ammo pouches for their 1874 .43 caliber Gras rifles. NCOs carried only 60 rounds.

Tirailleurs Uniforms

These men wore either a blue jacket or khaki fading to almost white with brass buttons and yellow piping. The trousers were white shading to gray; some may even have worn blue. Generally bare calves and feet but could be covered by puttees, garters shoes or sandals. Finally, a red or dark scarlet fez with a sky blue tassel.

Tirailleurs Morale and Discipline

According to Douglas Porch (The French Foreign Legion, page 249) the Senegalese Tirailleurs in Dahomey lacked discipline. “There is no way to make a Senegalese do what he doesn’t want to do. They have no respect for their leaders, whom they treat as equals. Also, during combat,[the leader] has all he can do to keep them in line, because they were mediocre. These Tirailleurs always wanted to charge the enemy with the bayonet…. We sometimes took losses because of their errors…. They advanced and got in front of the Legion companies. This kept us from firing while they attracted the fire of the enemy.

Route of March

There were two routes considered one from Porto Novo to Abomey 85 miles NNW through marshes, or Porto Novo via Oueme River to Paguessa then overland to Abomey (40 miles). The river route was chosen as it would reduce French dependence on porters and lessen the chance of fevers and sickness on the troops. The force divided into three groups of 800 mixing French and natives and proceeded up river, this left 900 men at Porto Novo. The Dahomey force opposing them between Paguessa and Abomey was the Dahomey army of 4500 including 800 Amazons that soon swelled to a total of about 10,000 with local levees.

Battles of the Dahomey War

There are three large actions and several series of smaller actions. On 19 September 1892 near Dogba a surprise attack by the Dahomeans drove forward units back until a counterattack by Legion bayonets. The Amazons put sharpshooters in the trees as snipers; their fire was deadly accurate a French Marine Commander and several other officers were killed. By the time the battle was over 825 Dahomean bodies were left on the field, most of them were Amazons.

This was followed by small-scale engagement dominated by French machine-gun fire.

On 4 October the advanced guard of Senegalese cavalry was attacked so furiously they retreated in great disorder, and then a company of T. Housas broke and ran. A line of T. Senegalese skirmishers was next to come under attack by a battalion of Amazons but the T. Senegalese stood their ground. Despite withering fire the Dahomean troops persisted in their suicidal attacks, the men being exhorted to attack by the Amazons and their actions, time after time until compelled to break contact. The French then attacked but were driven back several times. Throughout the battle the Dahomey artillery dropped shell after shell into the French lines, only rarely did the fawlty shells explode. The accuracy of artillery fire was so great the French found it hard to believe that the Dahomey’s without training could fire so well. Later the French found that 3 Germans and one Belgian commanded the guns. After two hours the Senegalese cavalry broke through the Dahomey line and reached the artillery sobering the crews, at this point the Dahomeans routed.

The Young Amazons were the best men in the Dahomey army, a match for any in the French army. The Amazons were armed with the Spencer repeating carbines and made much better use of them then the men did with their rifles. The Dahomeans consistently fired high and were armed with obsolete guns; a French Captain picked up an old rifle from the Franco-Prussian War from the battlefield still with his serial number on it.

The Dahomeans continued to fight holding actions until the French army reached Cana not ten miles from Abomey. Of the approximately 400 Amazons involved with the holding actions only 17 survived.

The battle at Cana started with the Frecnh initiating the action in the toughest fighting yet; time and again the French were driven back finally late in the day the Dahomey were overpowered. During the ten hour battle the Dahomeans lost 2,500 to the French 100. Following the fight the French found both the Amazons and the Dahomey men drunk on the field from English Gin. The Dahomeans had fled from Cana and the French burned it after several days of resupply and rest.

The French then moved on to Abomey, but the Dahomeans had already set it afire. The Dahomeys had fled leaving behind drink and ammunition.

In the battle analysis the French lost 27% battle casualties including 45 officers. Nearly 75% of the force was incapacitated by disease during the campaign. Of the original 800 FFL and 250 FFL replacements sent to Dahomey only 450 returned to Algeria.

Dahomey War Part 2

Dahomey War Part 1


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© Copyright 2002 by Richard Brooks.
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