The Strategic Situation

Sir John Moore, commander of the largest single British land force since Marlboro, had been retreating for several weeks. On paper, his force consisted of over 25,000 men. It was heavily an infantry force but extremely weak in cavalry. He had for the last several months in 1808 been campaigning in support of the Spanish resistance to the French take-over of Spain.

The army had advanced into northern Spain in the hopes of helping three large Spanish armies to hold the main French armies in the northern quarter of the Iberian peninsula. While Moore's army was advancing to position, Napoleon took command of the strongly reinforced French forces and rapidly destroyed or routed the Spanish armies.

Though Moore's first impulse was to pull back immediately and guarantee the safety of the only British army in existence, he received captured intelligence that showed Napoleon to be unaware of the location or size of his force. The French armies were continuing to sweep southward to secure their hold on Madrid and capture Lisbon.

Deciding that his force was too small to halt this advance (his correspondence shows that he believed he was facing at most 90,000 Frenchmen while in reality there were more than 150,000 men under Napoleon on the peninsula), Moore chose another strategy. He decided he would "threaten the French communications and create a diversion . . ." [1]

The army moved into northern Spain on the rear of the bulk of the French.

Two days earlier, in a letter to Castlereagh on his situation, he commented that "if the bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it." After gaining minor victories in small engagements with local French forces, the bubble burst in midDecember. While Soult, with a force as large as the British, maintained an active contact with Moore from the northeast, Napoleon ordered Ney to move north from Madrid with 35,000 men, including portions of the Imperial Guard. The plan was to crush the British army between these two forces.

Fortunately for Moore, Napoleon made the mistake of assuming that a portion of the British artillery sent into Spain by a circuitous route was the main British force. He therefore ordered a concentration too far from the actual force to bring it into battle, allowing Moore time to begin an orderly withdrawal.

With Moore in full retreat, Napoleon returned to Madrid and, characteristically, declared a victory. Soult's force maintained a harassing contact with the British for the length of the retreat. However, the British army suffered in this retreat far more from the effects of human nature and the low character of the typical British soldier.

Drunkenness and desertion became severe problems in many units as morale sagged. Many of the relatively less well trained units lost their cohesion during the march, slowing the march and causing even more straggling. Diaries and letters rage against the general who was retreating so precipitously and wouldn't bring his army to battle.

Fortunately there were several units which not only maintained discipline, but began establishing some of the most distinguished records in the British annals. The cavaIry, under Lord Paget, showed their typical dash and daring and also demonstrated self control that was often lacking in later actions. Lord Paget's brother commanded the Reserve division, consisting mainly of two light regiments that had been previously trained by Sir John Moore. These were the 52nd Light and 95th Rifles. These units under both Pagets served as a most effective rear guard; using terrain to great advantage, they were able to delay and disorganize Soult's forces on several occasions buying needed time for the slowly retreating army.

Arrival in Corunna

Ragged, weakened, and frustrated, the army arrived at Corunna on January 11. Unfortunately, due to adverse weather, the transports to return the army to England did not reach the port until January 15. During this time Soult was able to collect and prepare his pursuing forces for one final attempt at decisively defeating the British before they escaped.

The French began their attack around noon on January 16, 1809.

More Corunna

Introduction and Strategic Situation
The Battle of Corunna
The Corunna Scenario