Fatal Flaws

Besides the general malaise that afflicted the French army and nation in 1940, the armored units had a number of problems all their own involving the vehicles, units and doctrine regarding their use.

The problems with the vehicles started with the very short range of most models. One of the worst was the Char B. The Char B-1 had fuel adequate for eight hours of operation. Addition of a second carburetor to improve the performance of the Char B-1 bis reduced its endurance to 5 1/2 hours. Other deficiences included lack of radios, the low speed of the infantry's chars legers, and the suspension problems of the AMCs. Tactically the greatest flaw was the one-man turret used on all French tanks except the Char 2C. The commander in the turret was overworked. Besides commanding the tank, the commander had to load, sight, and fire the weapons, signal other vehicles with flares or flags, and where fitted, operate the radio. Despite these faults several of the tanks were superior to their German counterparts, and the crews were well trained.

The French political and industrial problems forced the army to use a variety of models, and prevented standardization. Sabotage and strikes delayed production during the 1930's, especially in the factories making Chars B and D-2, and 25mm guns. These stoppages disappeared in late 1939, leading to great increases in production. The highest production during a single month was achieved in May 1940, when 534 Chars and AMDs were produced. Of these 120 lacked turrets because most turrets were produced in Lille, which the Germans captured during May.

The flaws in doctrine manifested themselves both in the structure of the units and their employment, French armor doctrine was based on their First World War experience using tanks in support of infantry. The DCRs, BatailIons Organiques and Compagnies Autonomes were to operate in direct support of the infantry, and lacked adequate supporting arms. The DLMs and DLCs, on the other hand, were combined arms teams intended to operate in the traditional cavalry missions ahead of and on the flanks of the infantry army. The DLCs were prevented from being effective because the horsed and mechanized brigades could not effectively cooperate in action. No French armored unit was intended to be used like the German panzer divisions. Generally they lacked anti-aircraft artillery and sufficient infantry to allow such employment. Plans to correct these faults fell victim to production problems and the Blitzkreig,

Despite these flaws, the French cotilci have been more successful if the units, especially the DCRs, could have been used according to the existing doctrine, Ultimately, the reason for the failure of the French armored force was not inherent in the armored units or their equipment. The fatal flaw was in the paralysis and indecision of the French High Command, which fragmented the units, especially the DCRs, and committed them piecemeal for destruction, in violation of any doctrine.

Bibliography

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The author acknowledges the assistance of J.C. Goeury and J.M. Astell.

More French Armor Battle of France 1940

Introduction
Infantry Tanks
Cavalry Tanks
Other Armored Vehicles
Armored Units and In Action 1940
Fatal Flaws and Bibliography
French Armor in "Fall of France" OB
Table 2: Armored Units and Equipment: May 1940