Europe was faced with a large war in Spain, a war that showed every sign of lasting a long time, and the conflict had already involved Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. So the farce of "nonintervention" was invented. What this meant was that all the powers of Europe agreed not to supply arms or other war materials to either side. After December 1936, therefore, the Republic found it even harder to get equipment from anywhere except the Soviet Union.

Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini, whose governments were all signatories to the NonIntervention Agreement, all had absolutely no intention of abiding by ft. The force behind this joke was the Tory government of England under Baldwin and later Chamberlain. However, while England forced the French and others to honor the agreement, Italian submarines and light surface units were sinking merchant ships, many of them British, outside Republican ports; the once-peaceful Spanish skies were filled with Russian, Italian, and German planes; and thousands of foreigners were entering Spain to fight for both sides.

The only country that refused to go along with this charade was Mexico, which to its credit supported the Republic to the extent that its very limited resources would allow.

The Non-Intervention Committee, when ft did anything, interfered with the Republic's attempts to import materials. Many people in the West had been frightened by the social revolution that started in the Republican zone with the onset of the war; they saw the Nationalists as a force for order. It was perfectly fine with many conservatives that the Non-intervention Committee applied its rules only to the Republic.

Stalin continued sending arms to the Republic, arms that were already paid for since most of the Spanish gold reserve, the fourth largest in the world, had been sent to Moscow. That part of the gold reserve sent to France was impounded by the Nonintervention Committee and was returned, to Franco, in August 1939. Soviet influence grew as the Republic became increasingly dependent on it for everything. But the Soviet Union's ability to help Spain was limited, even with the best of intentions, and Stalin's intentions were not particularly good. Stalin continually extracted more concessions from the Republic, including communist control of the military intelligence service and the police.

Resistance to his demands was met with threats or sometimes actual delay of shipments. One of Stalin's goals was the elimination of the anti-Stalinist Communist party, the P.O.U.M. It was dissolved after trumped-up charges of treason and secret contact with the fascists. Stalin insisted that Soviet advisors and Spanish Communist Party members be given de facto command of much of the Republic's army. Yet the actual number of Russian participants was never large, probably no more than 3,000 during the entire conflict, and many of them were aircrew.

A much more numerically important contribution was made by the Internationals, probably around 45,000, plus 10,000 additional noncombatants. Although the Internationals began as a Communistsponsored organization, it attracted support from progressives and antifascists of all kinds. The Moscow-aligned Spanish Communist Party grew from a prewar membership of around 40,000 to 250,000 in March 1937. Most of the new members were riot workers at all, but middle class-government officials, small businessmen, and army officers drawn to the party because of its great influence, iron discipline, and opposition to more radical groups.

Germany treated the war in Spain as a laboratory of military experimentation and a great place to train aircrew. The Germans founded the Condor Legion, a military advisory mission with a combat component of armor and aircraft. German aviators cycled through Spain on six-month tours of duty, gaining valuable experience against a real, though weak enemy.

Interesting new methods were tried: terror bombing, use of heavy antiaircraft guns against tanks, direct air support, and employment of massed armor, although the inferiority of German tanks at that time limited the effectiveness of German-supplied formations.

Germany learned many valuable lessons in Spain. The strength of the German contingent in Spain hovered around 5,000 from January 1937 until the end of the war in April 1939, with a total of about 15,000 serving in Spain. Germany's significant contribution was in the area of instructors, communications equipment, technical services, and, of course, aircrew. Hitler extracted his price for aid to Franco, all of which was supplied on credit. Germany wanted, and got, virtual control of the important Spanish mining industry. In this way, Franco mortgaged his country's future to the Third Reich and was therefore a direct beneficiary of the allied victory in 1945.

To Mussolini Spain offered an opportunity to demonstrate the power of Italy and the prowess of Italian arms. Italy sent a whole army corps (Corpo di Truppi Voluntari) to Spain in January-February 1937 and maintained it there until the end of the war. Italian contributions to the Nationalist war effort were at least as, if not more, important than those of Germany. Certainly Italy supplied much more war material, and many more Italians, approximately 80,000, went to Spain than Germans.

Although this would logically have permitted Mussolini to exert great influence, Italy maintained a hands-off policy towards Spain and only made efforts to see that it would someday be paid for the supplies provided. In comparison to the Germans, even these efforts were weak and half-hearted. Italy made almost no attempt to guarantee itself a favorable position in the economy of postwar Spain. The key to understanding Italian involvement in Spain is Mussolini's ego rather than the interests of the Italian state. The Italian military seemed to learn nothing from its participation in the Spanish conflict.

The first use of Mussolini's "legionnaires" was in the attack on the isolated Republican enclave of Malaga in February 1937. The anarchist-led (if that is the right word) defense collapsed against the Italians. Elated by this event, Mussolini then wanted to win the war for the Nationalists by capturing Madrid. Franco had already realized Madrid was not going to fall, but since the Italians were supplying a vast amount of material on credit, he decided to let Mussolini have the "glory." The ensuing battle of Guadalajara, which took place from

March 8 to 23,1937, was a catastrophe for the Italians. The prisoners and equipment captured in the Republican counterattack left no doubt as to the scale of intervention on the side of the Nationalists. Yet even this revelation prompted no response from the democracies, who preferred the hypocrisy of "nonintervention" to facing reality.

Spanish Civil War

Introduction and Background
The First Six Months
Foreign Involvement
War in the Summer of 1937
Politics and The Aragon Front
The Czech Crisis and End of War
Bibliographical Note
Who Was Who in the SCW?