Allies

By 1944, having well learnt the lessons of Dieppe, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific, the Allies have become experts in the application of force from the sea - amphibious warfare.

Specialized landing ships and craft, specialized amphibious armor, and a tested amphibious doctrine give the Allies an amphibious capability never before imagined.

To begin planning for a reentry into France, the Allies set up COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander) under British General F. E. Morgan. The decision of where to invade is complex; although the Pas de Calais is actually a closer crossing route and on a more direct path to Germany, the ports in southeastern England lack the capacity of the major port complexes farther west -- Southampton, Portland, and Plymouth. After much anguish, COSSAC has chosen Normandy as the assault point over the Pas de Calais.

The Dieppe mid in 1942 has taught that a direct assault on a port is a bad idea, so instead of a port, Allied planners have looked for a long stretch of usable beach. The Bay of the Seine, in particular a stretch of land called the Calvados Coast (after the Spanish galleon Salvador that sunk nearby), has been chosen over a landing on the Contentin Peninsula. The initial plans call for a concentrated assault, covering only two hexes on the Europa map, 17A:08 10 and 17A:09 10. Further analysis suggests this limited frontage will hamper the post-invasion buildup and the invasion is expanded to include UTAH Beach at the base of the Contentin and extensive airborne operations on both flanks.

The overwhelming force the Allies can bring to bear actually gives the initial landings a very high chance of success, although Air Marshal Tedder fears great losses in the airborne assault. The Allies plan a quick drive inland on D-Day, even including the capture of Caen. Attention will then turn to the capture of Cherbourg and opening its port to provide logistical support, After Cherbourg, a general advance will follow, faster in the west than the east.

The real key to success lies during this battle of the bridgehead, to be won by the side that can more quickly bring reinforcements to the battlefield. Although the Germans' rail and road communications would seem to give them the advantage over the Allies sea routes, at least after the initial invasion, Allied mastery of the air and the need for the Germans to guard against further landings makes the Axis reinforcement abilities tenuous at best.

For the battle of the bridgehead, Montgomery plans a war of attrition that the Germans can ill afford. He assures everyone that soon Rommel will be forced to give up on counterattacks and 'rope-off the bridgehead, resulting in a cordon defense that the Allies can then break, again using the Allies' biggest advantage -overwhelming firepower. Montgomery plans to draw the German armor upon the British and Canadians on the east to allow the Americans to advance in the west and eventually break out from the beachhead.

The final hex-by-hex airborne and amphibious plans appear on page 19.

Axis

Axis strategy for the defense of France is the subject of what will be one of the better known strategic debates of the war. Old Rundstedt calls for a classic mobile defense, with a large reserve of panzer and other motorized forces held in a central reserve far from the coast and committed to an aggressive counterattack when the Allied schwerpunkt is identified. His renegade subordinate Rommel, his African experiences still fresh in his mind, asserts that Allied air superiority will reduce the mobility of a central motorized reserve to such a degree that the battle will be lost before they can arrive. The invasion must be defeated on the beaches, he argues.

The argument cannot be resolved and an unsatisfactory compromise is reached. At D-Day, the German panzer formations are split between Rommel who has positioned his close to the beaches, and the OKW reserves, held for release by Hitter himself.

Worse, most of the German commanders have decided that there will be multiple landings -- they expect the first to only be a feint. Encouraged by an effective Allied deception, this belief will cause crucial delays in the German reaction.

Given the length of coastline to be defended, the only real German chance may lie in discovering the site of the invasion and constructing a trap. In fact, the Germans have been correctly informed of the Allied invasion plans by a French colonel in Algiers. This priceless find has been lost, however, among the hundreds of conflicting invasion plans planted by Allied agents' in neutral countries and with known German agents. The German command enters the battle completely ignorant of, Allied intentions, its command structure split and confused, and without a set anti-invasion plan. They will merely react to events as best they can.

Battle for Normandy Europa as History

The Players
The Plans
The Game (Allied June I 1944 Turn) Set Up
The Game (Allied June I 1944 Turn) Combat: Douve and Carentan
The Game (Allied June I 1944 Turn) Combat: Merderet Valley
The Game (Allied June I 1944 Turn) Combat: Utah Beach
The Game (Allied June I 1944 Turn) Combat: Omaha Beach
The Game (Allied June I 1944 Turn) Combat: Gold and Juno Beach
The Game (Allied June I 1944 Turn) Combat: Sword Beach
The Game (Axis June II 1944 Turn)
The Game (Allied and Axis Jul I 1944 Turn)
The Game Poised for a Breakout