It is arguable that the Soviets used the real-life counterpart of the Enclave Rule at Stalingrad to turn the tide of World War II. That makes it a worthwhile rule in my book. You might use it just to give the Soviet player an edge in play balance.

For those who like the gamey mechanic of setting up nonoverrunable stacks, and the operational simplicity and predictability of the standard overrun rule, all I can say is, "Don't use the variable overrun table." Of course. even if you want that a variable overrun rule is needed, there is still the question of whether this one is balanced.

I've used the following rule of thumb in setting it up: If a given attacker is capable of eliminating a given defender in the combat phase, he should be capable of eliminating the same defender if the latter is deployed in two separate forces, in roughly the same tinie span, and assuming reasonable movement parameters. For example, it' an attacker has some chance to eliminate two 3-6 rifle divisions at 4:1 odds in the combat phase, he should have some chance of eliminating one of the units at 8:1 odds in the movement phase, and then the other one at 8:1 in the combat phase.

Consider a German 12-10 panzer division, with a 33% chance of eliminating two 3-6 Soviet rifle divisions stacked together in clear terrain during a standard combat phase (2:1 odds, +3 for AEC). Shouldn't it be able to eliminate one of those divisions standing alone with a variable overrun (4:1, +3 for AEC, +1 for German), and then get the other in the combat phase (a combined probability of 27% for eliminating both)?

This might seem to penalize defense- in-depth, but it does so only when the attacker is overwhelming. Consider three Soviet 3-6 rifle divisions, with two up front and one behind: When using the variable overrun rule, the Soviets have a better chance of containing the 12-10 panzer with defense in depth (73%) than if they place the three divisions in a single stack (67%). And three such rifle divisions in depth stand an excellent chance of containment through the movement, combat, and exploitation phases (approximately 83%, compared to 67% if stacked together).

Now consider another situation, where two 12-10 panzer divisions are attacking a single 3-6 rifle division in a fort. The odds are 8:1, with a -1 for the fort and a +1 for Germans in the overrun. The table allows that the Germans have a 33% chance of breaking through a fortified line held by 3-6 rifle divisions two hexes deep (one of them will be a sure thing in the combat phase), and an 11% chance of breaking through a three deep line (and also note that any overrun would eat up half their movement allowance). Sounds okay to me.

Should there be some penalty to the attacker for failing to achieve an overrun? There already is, insofar as the attacker is forced to stop moving if an overrun fails. In Europa terms, there should be no losses to the attacker in moving engagements with at least 3:1 odds and a +4 modifier, or 7:1 with no modifier.

What's being simulated is an overwhelming attacker being able, in some cases, to literally run over more than 16 miles of lightly defended around in 15 days. In those cases where an overrun is possible, but not certain, there really isn't an incongruity in allowing the attacker to choose to plow through, rather than maneuver around; if the attempt to force an issue by storm fails, the attacker deploys and crushes the defense methodically (i.e., in the combat phase). Ultimately, the question is one of historical accuracy, though I'm often amazed at how many Europa players never get around to it. And historically, a panzer division was able, in the best of circumstances, to destroy 3 separate rifle divisions in a 15 day period.

Regardin(, Attacker Retreats: I carried on at length in an old ETO about how attackers in World War II usually didn't run away 16 miles when they failed to take their objective; they typically just returned to the start line, where they continued to benefit from whatever terrain or fortifications they attacked out of. This is especially important in a dense scenario like Stalingrad, and this is why I give the attacker the option of treating any AR result the same as an AS result.

Order of Battles Notes

The number of Soviet 4-6 Rifle XXs present in the game was decided solely by the number of counters with historical designations having no 3-6 flip-sides. It is possible that this may underrate some of the Soviet rifle XXs.

Units which appeared historically between the 29th of a prior month and the 12th of the current month have been placed on the first turn of the month; all others appear on the second turn.

Withdrawals are included only when they could be identified with transfers or specific upgrades; other historical withdrawals are assumed to have been due to excessive losses, and have therefore been ignored.

Sources

Barbarossa, Clark
The Russo-German War, Seaton
The Road to Stalingrad, Erickson
The Red Army Order of Battle, Poirier and Conner
Stalingrad the Turning Point, Jukes
Campaign to Stalingrad, game by Rhino Game Co.
Stalingradskaya bitva, Samsonov, quoted from papers of Dr. Henry Lowood, loaned by Mark Simonitch of Rhino Game Co.
Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, USSR
The Command and Staff of the Soviet A rmy Air force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, Kozhevnikov
The Soviet Air Forces in World War Il, Wagner
The Battle For Stalingrad, Chuikov
Red Phoenix, von Hardesiy
Battle For Stalingrad, Rotundo, ed.
The Secret of Stalingrad, Kerr
Moscow to Stalingrad, Ziemke and Bauer

Lunge to Stalingrad August-October 1942

Historical Background
Rules, Chart, and City Display Map
Designer's Notes
Order of Battle: Axis (Aug I 42)
Order of Battle: USSR (Aug I 42)
Order of Battle: Axis (Jul II 42)
Order of Battle: USSR (Jul II 42)
LtS: Large Area Map (slow: 127K)
LtS: Jumbo Area Map (very slow: 345K)