The Meleni Pocket?

One more German operation was in the offing first though, a very peculiar operation that is described in von Mellenthin's book under the heading "The Meleni Pocket."

In this battle, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps once again wheeled to the northeast and then on December 16 attempted to surround a Soviet pocket between Korosten and Malin. Von Mellenthin claims that on the 21st a map was found on the body of a Soviet major that revealed that the pocket contained four rifle corps and three tank corps, which explained why the three panzer divisions were unable to either surround or destroy this group. Yet there is something fairly fishy about this.

The four rifle corps are not hard to identify. They are the XXIII, XXX, XVII Guards, and XVIII Guards. These are the same units that von Mellenthin claims were annihilated just previously. And yet just a week after they were annihilated, they are launching attacks that "...took (the Germans') breath away."

The three tank corps are unknown-on December 24th the nearest Soviet tank corps, the IV Guards and the XXV, as well as V Guards Tank somewhat further away, were well east of any pocket. Stranger still, German maps for the whole period indicated Malin securely in Soviet hands. This squares well with Soviet accounts, including Dragunsky's, that describes the defense of Malin and Yalzovka (Yaltsovka) against German attacks (his full strength brigade had been detached from its corps and dispatched to assist Chernyakovsky).

Von Mellenthin describes the right (eastern) pincer being launched from a 7th Panzer bridgehead north of the Irscha at Malin. The German maps, however, have the 7th Panzer spread out attempting to maintain contact with XIII Corps north of Gorbulev and nowhere near where von Mellenthin would have them.

Most damning of all for von Mellenthin's assertions is the fact that when the Soviet offensive broke on the morning of December 24, it was led by many of the formations supposedly knocked out of action, including the IV Guards Tank Corps which, along with the "annihilated" 60th Army drove from southwest (sic) of Malin to Shepetovka bypassing Zhitomir to the northwest.

The front line from Radomyshl through Brusilov to Komin (all German occupied) erupted as 1st Guards Army, supported by 3rd Guards Tank Army; 18th Army; and 38th Army, supported by Ist Tank Army, struck out for Berdichev, Kazatin, and Lipovets far to the south. Meanwhile the 40th Army, supported by 5th Guards Tank Corps, drove south past Belaya Tserkoye (Belaya Zerkov) and 27th Army levered the Germans away from the Bukrin bend, pivoting on Kanev.

The newly arrived German 18th Artillery Division served only to foul up all the traffic in the Zhitomir area, while 8th and 19th Panzer Divisions were forced to break out of encirclement southwest of Brusilov. The luckless 25th Panzer found itself directly in the path of 1st Tank Army, a fresh formation, and suffered accordingly.

By January 14th, the Germans were able to finally stop the offensive, and with reinforcements were able to drive back the 38th and 40th Armies a bit, while SS "AH" and 1st Panzer were able to stop 1st Tank Army.

There was now no question of any containment of the Soviets in their Dnepr bridgeheads; the question was when they would reach the USSR's 1941 boundaries.

Conclusions

A number of familiar patterns emerged in the battles around Kiev during November and December. Once again, the leading edge of the Soviet offensive was led by Marshal Vatutin, with Marshal Zhukov supervising him. Once again, after initial surprise and breakthrough, the Soviet offensive had expanded until its lines thinned out. Once again opportunities beckoned to the west and the south, but forces had been inadequate to exploit them.

Once again von Manstein had lashed back with a group of powerful panzer formations and driven in Vatutin's spearheads. But each time the pattern was repeated there was a change; the German ripostes were becoming less and less effective, their losses greater, and the Soviet recovery and renewal of the offensive quicker. The evidence leans to the conclusion that not only was Soviet production able to provide more weapons and ammunition, but Soviet leaders were becoming more and more effective in wielding their stronger forces.

One might question why the German counterattacks struck at the westernmost part of the Soviet bulge at Zhitomir and Korosten, rather than renewing the drive on Kiev to cut off most of 1st Ukrainian Front. The most important reason was the threat to German communications posed by the 60th and 38th Armies and the pressing requirement to free these lines.

In addition, the position of the 3rd Guards Tank Army around Fastov and the fact that this sector was the easiest to reinforce made it an uninviting avenue of attack.

This battle of monumental proportions, little examined in post-war literature (except in the distorted words of von Mellenthin), decided the resolution of the battles for the Dnepr River, set up the Korsun Pocket for annihilation, and opened the way to Poland, Rumania, and points west.

The Battle for Kiev November 1 - December 24, 1943

Prelude to the Onslaught
Breakthrough and Counterstroke
The Second Round
The Meleni Pocket? and Conclusions